NSA NARAYANAN SUGGESTS SARAN-BURNS MEETING AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 006230 SIPDIS SIPDIS DOE FOR U/S GARMAN, SHANE JOHNSON, TOM CUTLER, ADAM SCHEINMAN DEPARTMENT PASS TO NRC E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN SUBJECT: NSA NARAYANAN SUGGESTS SARAN-BURNS MEETING AS ALTERNATIVE TO RE-STARTING 123 NEGOTIATIONS Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary. In a September 6 meeting with National Security Advisor Narayanan, Ambassador Mulford urged India to re-engage in negotiations on the 123 Agreement. Narayanan would not commit India to doing so, but offered as a sign of India's engagement to send Foreign Secretary Saran to meet with Undersecretary Burns in order to discuss areas of India's agreement and disagreement over pending legislation on the civil-nuclear initiative. Narayanan explained that the GOI doesn't see the value in discussing final details of the 123 agreement prior to final legislation coming out of Congress. Note: This conversation took place four hours before the Ambassador and NSA Narayanan discussed these issues with the Prime Minister (septel). End Summary. AS EASY AS 1-2-3 -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador met with NSA Narayanan on September 6 to discuss progress in the civil-nuclear initiative and ways to move forward. Citing Prime Minister Singh's effective August 17 speech to parliament as demonstrative of his commitment to the deal, the Ambassador said the effort now must turn to getting a final bill out of Congress to which both sides can agree. The Ambassador pointed out that should legislation not be passed by Congress during this term, it would have to re-start from the beginning next term. To reach the goal this term, dialogue should intensify to sort out as many problems as possible prior to the bill going to conference. In order proactively to address remaining issues and improve the atmosphere of the negotiations as the Senate considers its bill, India should re-engage on 123 Agreement talks. Re-engaging on 123 is in India's interests as it would allow it to demonstrate good faith toward the July 18, 2005 agreement, prioritize problems and shape the debate when the House and Senate go to conference on a final bill, he said. IN BETTER SHAPE NOW -------------- ¶3. (C) Narayanan admitted the delay in progress on the 123 Agreement was due to an Indian Parliament preoccupation with the civil-nuclear initiative as a whole, and it was PM Singh's August 17 speech which allowed the GOI to reach a broad consensus on moving forward. "We have much better support here now," Narayanan said. "The Prime Minister's hand is much stronger across the board. We didn't want people to say we were discussing final details of the deal before the Prime Minister talked to Parliament." WE NEED TO TALK -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador said that while the USG was hoping to return to 123 negotiations soon, the impression he received from his discussion September 5 (note: reported septel) with Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran was that India felt too many problems remained in congressional amendments to the legislation to discuss final details of the 123 deal. Saran had offered instead to talk directly to his frequent counterpart, Undersecretary Burns. While that would have NEW DELHI 00006230 002 OF 003 value, the Ambassador argued, it would also be beneficial for India to help along the U.S. system, and to re-start 123 negotiations with ISN/NESS Director Dick Stratford. The Ambassador added he intended to encourage PM Singh, at a meeting scheduled for later in the day, to endorse progress in the 123 Agreement. (Note: PM Singh meeting reported septel.) A NERVOUS EYE ON THE HILL -------------- ¶5. (C) While the GOI recognizes the importance of being seen as moving forward, Narayanan said, it remains unsettled as to what will be the final shape of U.S. legislation, and therefore does not want to get locked into any position in the 123 Agreement which may later be changed or affected by law. He said he and PM Singh were trying to put together a negotiating brief to serve as the basis for discussion on Indian concerns, but added it was difficult for India to declare a position prior to seeing the final conference bill. Rather, Narayanan proposed, India would prefer for FS Saran to talk directly with U/S Burns to see what issues could be resolved before Congress goes to conference. The Ambassador noted that engaging in 123 negotiations now could help India shape the outcome of the legislation without having to enter into specific commitments, and explained that by waiting until after the final legislation on the initiative the 123 Agreement could be less flexible once the law is in place. A SARAN-BURNS MEETING? -------------- ¶6. (C) Unyielding, Narayanan said the Bush administration had implied that it would try to persuade Congress to produce a final bill that would be acceptable to India. Any agreements made prior to final legislation may be changed by that legislation, he claimed, and would give Indian opponents of the deal the opportunity to claim that the U.S. was "shifting goalposts." India would prefer for FS Saran to raise India's concerns with U/S Burns, and to address the larger, political issues rather than technical ones, Narayanan stated. He offered to dispatch Saran quickly to meet with U/S Burns. KEEP THE MOMENTUM UP -------------- ¶7. (C) Ambassador urged Narayanan to consider the technical progress which could be made on the 123 Agreement which would be separate from the policy concerns India has raised, and asked Narayanan if India would negotiate those aspects of the Agreement. By being able to tell Congress that, for example, ninety per cent of the 123 Agreement had been negotiated, Director Stratford would be able to show the progress India has made, and perhaps some of what would be negotiated could preempt pending amendments which India opposed. Engagement now could resolve as much as possible and better define India's objection to other areas. Narayanan agreed there were several aspects of the 123 Agreement India could agree on, and said FS Saran could discuss these with U/S Burns, but added "India is not in a position to agree formally before a final bill." Narayanan also agreed with the Ambassador's NEW DELHI 00006230 003 OF 003 assertion that the Senate bill is unlikely to change during floor debate, but maintained that India will not give its final position until U.S. legislation is finalized. HOLDING HIS GROUND -------------- ¶8. (C) Narayanan ended by saying India agrees that the 123 Agreement will be a most important part of the overall civil-nuclear deal, and added that it does not see failure to re-engage on 123 at this time as a sign that it is not moving forward. The GOI will explain areas of agreement and disagreement to U/S Burns, he offered. However, he said, "We can negotiate 123 only when we know what the final bill is." MULFORD