GOI PROMISES MILITARY SUPPORT TO SRI LANKA AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000583 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2016 TAGS: PREL MASS MOPS ENRG EPET IR CE IN SUBJECT: GOI PROMISES MILITARY SUPPORT TO SRI LANKA AND DEBATES IRANIAN PIPELINE DURING U/S BURNS VISIT REF: A. NEWDELHI 000027 ¶B. CHENNAI 000062 NEW DELHI 00000583 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: During U/S Burns' January 21 consultations on regional issues, the GOI relayed its concerns over the increasingly possible return to war in Sri Lanka and the conflict between the need for Iranian gas and the looming crisis over Tehran's nuclear program. Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran emphasized that the GOI advised SIPDIS President Rajapakse during his December 27-30 trip to be flexible on moving forward the peace process and to take all possible steps to prevent a return to war. However, if hostilities do break out, India has committed to a "significant program of upgrading" the Sri Lankan military, including training programs, air defense capability and patrolling equipment. In a meeting later that day, Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia told U/S Burns that India is moving forward on the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, and the GOI faces strong public pressure to resist any US influence on this issue. He indicated that India's biggest obstacle is finding financial backing for the risky and expensive project. Burns noted that Tehran's recent decision to break the IAEA seals at the Natanz enrichment facility reinforces US concern about Iran's WMD plans and the proposed pipeline. End Summary. GOI: Be Flexible and Stop Dissing Norway -------------- ¶2. (C) During a January 21 working lunch, Foreign Secretary Saran told U/S Burns that the GOI counseled new Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse to prevent greater violence by maintaining flexibility towards the LTTE and supporting Norway's role as facilitator in the peace process. The GOI shared its concern with Rajapakse about the strain on the ceasefire agreement and the possibility that hostilities would break out soon in Sri Lanka. Saran shared his assessment that the Sri Lankan Armed Forces were "not in good shape" to meet the threat posed by Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Therefore, Saran told him, the best strategy is to do everything within his power to prevent greater violence. Saran emphasized that Rajapakse should be flexible on holding talks with the LTTE, even if it meant politically challenging compromises. ¶3. (C) Noting that there were no other countries which could effectively facilitate the peace process, Saran said he also advised Rajapakse to allow Norway to continue with its role with the co-chairs. India has no contact with the LTTE since PM Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, so it was unsuitable for the facilitator role (Ref A). He acknowledged that Sinhalese attitudes towards Norway were very negative, and offered to talk to Oslo about Sri Lankan complaints. In response, Rajapakse agreed to invite Norway to stay on and to tone down public GSL complaints. Saran commented that he had also spoken to Norway's Special Advisor on Sri Lanka, Eric Solheim, ahead of his visit to Sri Lanka. But If That Doesn't Work, We Are Here For You NEW DELHI 00000583 002.2 OF 003 -------------- ¶4. (C) Saran explained that if hostilities do break out in Sri Lanka, the GOI has privately committed to a "significant program of upgrading the military's training, air defense and patrolling capabilities." India also agreed to increased economic aid, including funding for small economic assistance programs to benefit Sri Lankan communities at the local level. Saran stressed that much of this assistance would go to the northeastern sections of the island in order to highlight that India's opposition to the LTTE does not extend to the Tamil people. He commented that the GOI is still looking at a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Sri Lanka, but "needs to iron out the elements." India's involvement in Sri Lanka is politically constrained by the UPA government's Tamil coalition partners, Saran added, particularly ahead of elections this spring in Tamil Nadu (Ref B). However, he speculated that Rajapakse had returned happy with New Delhi's military and economic support. Saran: "Rajapakse is a Different Type of Leader" -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Sharing his impressions from GOI meetings with the new Sri Lankan president, Saran observed that Rajapakse is much more "street savvy, direct and open" than the previous Bandaranaike family. Both Kumaratunga and Wickremasinghe came from the aristocratic elite, whereas Rajapakse comes from a "grassroots" background. Despite his hardliner image, Saran noted that the President was very worried about the LTTE and the perception that he is a failed leader taking the country back to war. Saran also mentioned that India was encouraging other Sri Lankan party leaders to work with Rajapakse for peace rather than portray him as an incompetent president for their own political gain. Pressure to Proceed on Iran, but No Financial Backing -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) In a meeting later that day, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission Montek Singh Ahluwalia told U/S Burns that the GOI remains intent on buying Iranian gas but still needs financial backing for the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline to proceed. In response to U/S Burns' question on a timeline for the deal, Ahluwalia said there is strong public pressure to resist any US influence on this issue. He added that the GOI is not planning to make any investments in Iran but is intent on buying Iranian gas if it makes commercial sense. Despite ongoing talks, the GOI is still very skeptical that commercial financing can be obtained for the project given the risk and high project cost -- an issue that has not been addressed in media reports. ¶7. (C) Ahluwalia reported that Indians are continually asking the Government whether the US is asking the GOI to turn its back on any economic dealings with Iran. Burns stressed that the USG will oppose any gas pipeline deal with Iran should it appear that India and Pakistan are going through with the plan. Ahluwalia inquired whether the US objected only to Indian investment in the pipeline or also to NEW DELHI 00000583 003.2 OF 003 the purchase of Iranian gas. Burns responded that Iran's support for international terrorism and effort to acquire nuclear weapons means that there can be no business as usual. "You would expect that from us," he added. Burns Highlights Possibility of Future Sanctions on Iran -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Burns noted that Iran made a miscalculation last week in breaking the IAEA seals and proceeding with nuclear enrichment. He explained that he has spoken with Chinese and Russian officials who are also worried about Iran's behavior. Burns predicted that if Iran does not negotiate with Russia and/or the EU, they may face sanctions sometime in 2006. Ahluwalia conceded that UNSC sanctions would make it very difficult to obtain financing for the gas pipeline. MEA Joint Secretary (Americas) S. Jaishanker noted that India is not yet in violation of any ILSA provisions (which require a USD 14 million threshold investment in Iran). Ahluwalia again stressed that India will buy gas and oil from any possible seller to sustain the economy's growth here. ¶9. (U) U/S Burns cleared this cable. ¶10. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: (http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) MULFORD