GOI STUMPED ON ITS NEPAL POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000550 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2016 TAGS: PREL KDEM MASS PTER ASEC IN NP SUBJECT: GOI STUMPED ON ITS NEPAL POLICY Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: New Delhi is trying to decide its next steps on Nepal, and hopes for more "clarity" in a few days, Joint Secretary Pankaj Saran said in a January 25 meeting with SIPDIS PolCouns and Poloffs. The GOI is committed to maintaining its current pro-democracy position (including the cutoff of military assistance),and is prepared to condemn the February 8 municipal elections if, as Delhi expects, they are not credible. The GOI is waiting to see whether the political parties will be able to maintain momentum for civil disobedience, and views the Maoist return to violence with growing concern. Delhi's conflicted approach to Nepal stands in marked contrast to its clear-eyed policy on Sri Lanka and reflects the consideration of domestic and foreign policy compulsions that shape its approach to Kathmandu. End Summary. Reactive Policy -------------- ¶2. (C) The arrests, curfews, and crackdowns in Nepal on January 18-20 were "unexpected," Saran reported. India's strongly-worded statement was deliberately released early in the day instead of routinely in the evening as a signal that "we're watching Nepal closely," he added. New Delhi is digesting Nepal events "day by day," Saran said, and is undertaking a series of internal deliberations, as it did in February 2005, to determine "specific policy instruments" to use in response to developments in the neighboring kingdom. While New Delhi continues to tell the King that he has miscalculated in his strong-arm tactics, other governments should not "underestimate his cunning," Saran warned, speculating that Gyanendra would try to use family connections to influence Indian leaders in his favor. However, at the end of the day India will have a policy toward Nepal based on ending the Maoist insurgency and promoting democratic governance, he concluded. ¶3. (C) Ambassador to Nepal Shiv Mukherjee's consultations in New Delhi coincided with the crackdown in Kathmandu, and Mukherjee used his meetings with the PM, Defense Minister, Home Minister, and Chief of Army Staff to brief them on India's concerns and shore up support in the Defense and Home Ministries for India's uncompromising policies. Although those two Ministries expressed concern that India's support for the parties and cutoff of military assistance to the RNA was emboldening the Maoists, Mukherjee emphasized that India's pro-democracy policy was "framed to address the Maoist issue" as the only way to achieve a lasting solution to the insurgency, Saran explained. Responding to MEA concerns about USG plans, PolCouns reassured Saran that the US also had no intention to resume military assistance without progress from the Palace. Elections Likely to Be a "Farce" -------------- ¶4. (C) The GOI is focused on the period until the planned February 8 municipal elections, which look like "a farce," Saran commented, adding that India would be prepared to issue a statement of disapproval if in fact the elections proceed as expected, with only one candidate per district, major party leaders in jail, and candidates' names kept secret for safety. Events unfolding until then will depend in large part on the ability of the political parties to maintain their momentum, which Saran assessed has been building since September. New Delhi believes it is up to the parties to "spearhead" the movement for democracy, and wants to wait NEW DELHI 00000550 002 OF 002 until the parties can regroup after the January 18-20 arrests and plan their next steps. India has seen some "signals" from the Palace that the King may be considering a postponement of elections as an initiative to break the deadlock, Saran reported, adding that the GOI is "trying to get a fix on how serious" these signals are. Maoist Shift of Tactics -------------- ¶5. (C) Saran reported that New Delhi is undertaking an analysis of Maoist tactics, which have "shifted" from before the cease-fire. India has been concerned by the large attacks, including two in Nepalgunj on the Indian border, in which Nepalese police fled to the safety of India where they were sheltered by the SSB (border force) overnight. PolCouns emphasized USG concern about the apparent increased willingness of Maoists to target US interests and Westerners as well as Indians, and pushed strongly for India to take firmer action to arrest Maoist leaders who may be in Indian territory. Saran asserted that India has no official contact with Maoist leaders, but admitted that many sympathizers in academia, the press, and the political parties have facilitated their travel in India. No Meetings, Please -------------- ¶6. (C) Saran told us that the British High Commission had suggested a three-way (US, UK, India) meeting to discuss Nepal, leading to a possible joint statement calling for postponement of elections, but as India is "not too keen" on the idea, he has not yet responded to the inquiry. He was similarly skeptical about UK suggestions of a UN role in defusing the crisis. Comment: Steadfastness or Indecision? -------------- ¶6. (C) Although Saran reassured us that India's policy will remain firm on support for the political parties, suspension of military assistance, and a call for the King to reach out to the parties, New Delhi is unlikely to come up with any new ideas soon, and appears stuck in a reactive track of issuing progressively gloomier statements as events in Nepal go downhill. It is ironic that the GOI, which is so decisive and clear in its Sri Lanka policy (septel),is so indecisive and uncertain when responding to equally troubling unrest in the territory of another close neighbor. This in turn reflects the more complicated domestic and foreign policy dynamics of relations with the country that buffers India and China across an open border. ¶7. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: (http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) MULFORD