INDIAN THINK TANKS STRESS NEED FOR UN INVOLVEMENT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 004947 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2016 TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM KPKO IN NP SUBJECT: INDIAN THINK TANKS STRESS NEED FOR UN INVOLVEMENT, UNITED POLITICAL FRONT AGAINST MAOISTS REF: A. KATHMANDU 1794 ¶B. KATHMANDU 1806 ¶C. KATHMANDU 1732 Classified By: Charge Geoff Pyatt for reasons 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Representatives from Delhi-based think tanks stressed to PolOffs on July 11 that proposed negotiations with the Maoists in Nepal will not be successful without UN involvement and a strong and united front by the country's political parties. The representatives also stressed their belief that the GOI will eventually overcome its objections against a UNSC role in order to end the conflict, and likely are already resigned to it. They argued against pressing the Maoists on arms decommissioning, describing the issue as a "non-starter." Instead, they urged the GON, UN and international community to agree on a mutually acceptable weapons monitoring/management program. Our interlocutors thought it unlikely that the Maoists would restart armed conflict after the constitutional assembly and general elections, even if they do not gain control of the government, claiming that a few choice ministerial positions would satisfy the Maoists. End Summary. UN Role in Arms Monitoring Needed -------------- ¶2. (C) Former Ambassador and current head of the Institute for Integrated Learning in Management, Krishna V. Rajan informed PolOffs on July 11 that the GOI has expressed more concern to him over fissures in the SPA than in any role for the UN in Nepal. He noted that while the GOI is worried that a greater UN role could sideline India, even though it is by far the largest contributor of aid, the greater worry is the apparent lack of cohesion between Nepal's political parties. Rajan was adamant that the GOI will not oppose UN involvement in arms monitoring or observing encamped Maoist and Nepal Army soldiers even if it requires UNSC action, stating that the MEA is "reconciled to the fact that it will go that way." ¶3. (C) The Observer Research Foundation researcher and Maoist mouthpiece Ambassador SD Muni told PolOffs that the UN has not yet responded to the Ref A request from the GON for UN assistance in monitoring the agreed upon code of conduct, the human rights situation, and weapons decommissioning, and that ideally the GOI would like to keep the issue of UN involvement in the office of the Secretary General (SYG), rather than pass it to the UNSC. He argued that while the SYG office has limited discretion and power to handle certain matters directly, it has not yet determined whether this matter falls under its purview. Noting possible pitfalls, he commented that any UN role authorized solely by the SYG office would only be successful if the process unfolds seamlessly. He maintained that if any part of the process undertaken by the SYG office, such as if monitoring or disarmament of the Maoists is disputed by either party, the matter will have to be deferred to the UNSC. Muni also stated that there are local powers on the ground in Nepal who may have an interest in seeing the UN fail in its efforts, as they want to wrest control of or influence the process to their own advantage. He remarked that it would be more expedient to have the UNSC take up the issue now rather than wait for a problem to occur. Maoist Intentions -------------- NEW DELHI 00004947 002 OF 004 ¶4. (C) Muni stated that the Maoists have a coherent and consistent position on the weapons issue, which is they will not lay down their arms until after they have been given a representation in the government. However, he asserted that this issue should not be allowed to grind the peace process to a halt and that the Maoists are sincere in their claimed desire to be a part of a representative government. Muni put the Maoist position in historical context, asserting that between 1991-1994 the Maoists were the third largest political party in the Nepalese Parliament with nine MPs, but after Parliament's 1994 dissolution, they were kept out of the new government. He explained that internal disputes split the Maoist party in half, with each side claiming ownership to the Maoist name and symbol. The issue made its way to the Supreme Court, but by the time a decision was made, a new parliament had been created, leaving the Maoists out of the government. This event embittered them and, Muni asserted, was the main cause for them taking up armed revolt in 1996. Muni predicted that the Maoists would be satisfied with some minor yet influential ministerial slots in the new government. He proffered that they would not demand the PM or President's job, or "return to arms" if their election results were poor. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Rajan opined that the Maoists' intentions are not quite so transparent and harmless. He noted that they are content with the present confusion dominating the SPA and are not going to give up their demands easily. Regarding weapons decommissioning, Rajan remarked that the Maoists know full well that if they give up weapons they would "lose their teeth" and will only do so once they have a place in the government. He indicated that the Maoists view Prime Minister Koirala as weak, especially in light of his medical condition, and that they, not the government, are "calling the shots." Recent statements by the Maoists asserting they will not disarm (Ref B) demonstrate that they are "beginning to show their true colors and lack of sincerity," Rajan remarked. ¶6. (C) Rajan stated that the Maoists have been able to set the agenda in recent weeks. He warned that they intend to allow the UN "a very limited role in Nepal, one that is manageable, in order to keep India out." He also indicated that the Maoists are attempting to create a "nationalist divide," portraying their forces as fighting for Nepal, while the SPA has become a lackey of India and the US. Problem is a Lack of Trust -------------- ¶7. (C) Muni asserted that the principal explanation for the lack of progress is the lack of trust between the SPA and Maoists. Highlighting the GON demand that the Maoists lay down their arms prior to being allowed to enter the new government, he explained that the Maoists fear that if they did so, they will be destroyed like the Shining Path movement in Peru. He commented that the Maoist leadership has closely studied the history of the Shining Path, which laid down its arms and was subsequently "crushed out of existence" without gaining a role in government, and are determined not to follow them into history. ¶8. (C) The Maoists have little reason to trust the current Koirala regime, Muni asserted. He recounted the 1997-98 episode in which Koirala,s government unleashed force on the Maoists, only to later back down as a matter of political expediency, after realizing that it needed their support to help unseat the King. NEW DELHI 00004947 003 OF 004 Other "Trouble Makers" -------------- ¶9. (C) Muni noted the other potential troublemaker on the scene are ultra-national royalists (the Mandalays),who may stir up violence. Muni reported that the King is still communicating with royalists in the army, and has ordered them to sit quiet and wait for three months, hoping for a new wave of violence on which to capitalize. He opined that the King is uninterested in the peaceful creation of a new government, especially one which will relegate him to a minor role. ¶10. (C) Muni also mentioned that the minor political parties in the SPA have no desire to see new elections take place, because they are not confident that they will maintain a role in the next parliament. They prefer the indefinite continuation of instability so that they can keep maneuvering for power, while blaming the Maoists for the lack of movement, Muni theorized. Rajan also asserted that the smaller political parties in the SPA are hampering the peace process as they are afraid that they will lose their parliamentary seats when a new government is formed. ¶11. (C) Muni asserted that the Maoists should not be the only group facing criticism. He pointed out that the GON, US and many others are reserving all of their condemnation for atrocities and violence commited by the Maoists, yet no one is criticizing any of the other players. Muni noted that out of the 14,000 killed in the insurrection, 8,500 were killed by the Army, yet despite this, "no one, not Koirala, not any of the International Community has called for investigations of abuse or atrocity on the part of the GON or the King." Think Tank Recommendations -------------- ¶12. (C) Muni suggested that the Maoists gaining a role in the government is a fait accompli. He noted that their ability to summon 300,000 people to a rally in Kathamandu, or even one tenth of that number, demonstrates a level of support that no other political power in Nepal can muster. Muni remarked that the Maoists understand that the situation is at a stalemate, and that they are ready to give up a number of demands in exchange for representation in the new government. Muni advises taking them at face value, and offering them a place at the table, even if they refuse to fully disarm before the constituent assembly. Muni suggested that they are not desperate like other extremists, because they value the political credibility they enjoy among the people, and are not willing to risk losing it. ¶13. (C) Rajan recommended the GON, GOI, UN and other interested parties work behind the scenes to form a consensus, specifically on the arms monitoring question, prior to further negotiations with the Maoists. He noted that full arms decommissioning is an unrealistic goal, but that all the interested parties must decide on "a basic minimum for arms decommissioning" and then present it the Maoists. Rajan noted it is important to show the Maoists the GON, UN, US and India are in agreement on the arms issue and give the Maoists "a little wiggle room." He commented that if the international community leaves the issue to the GON and Maoists to resolve, the conflict will "get very messy." He asserted that public statements similar to Ambassador Moriarty's June 28 speech (Ref C) should be continued, but that the details must be decided on in private. NEW DELHI 00004947 004 OF 004 ¶14. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: (http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) PYATT