WHY IT'S TOUGH FOR INDIA TO CLIMB DOWN FROM SIACHEN

Show metadata

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 003466

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2016

TAGS: PREL, PINR, MOPS, PGOV, PTER, PBTS, IN, PK

SUBJECT: WHY IT'S TOUGH FOR INDIA TO CLIMB DOWN FROM SIACHEN

REF: A. NEW DELHI 3334

B. NEW DELHI 2998

C. NEW DELHI 2090

D. NEW DELHI 554

E. 05 NEW DELHI 9771

F. 05 NEW DELHI 8012

G. 05 NEW DELHI 7794

H. 05 NEW DELHI 4200

I. 05 NEW DELHI 3969

J. 05 NEW DELHI 3745

K. 05 NEW DELHI 2884

L. 04 NEW DELHI 4965

Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

1. (C) Summary: Rumors of a deal on Siachen being "close"

have come and gone with each iteration of the Indo-Pak

Composite Dialogue (Refs A, C-L),and the coming (tenth)

round of Siachen talks is no exception. The political optics

of a Siachen deal -- a territorial agreement in J&K that

moves troops away from each other -- are enticing, and it

would be a deliverable worthy of a possible PM Singh trip to

Pakistan, as well as an issue the PM and President Musharraf

short-listed during the April 2005 summit for the two sides

to resolve "expeditiously" (Ref K). While we await the

outcome of May 23-24 Indo-Pak talks on Siachen to be held in

Delhi, we canvassed informed journalists, think-tankers,

retired military officers and Track-II participants who

indicated that a breakthrough is not yet imminent for a

variety of reasons, many relating to domestic politics, which

we list below. We cannot rule out the possibility of a

surprise deal emerging, except to note that if it does, it

will probably come not from the negotiating teams themselves

but from the senior-most political levels, utilizing the SK

Lambah-Tariq Aziz back-channel, which in Delhi is kept

largely opaque to outsiders. Were any deal to crystallize, PM

Singh would need buy-in from the Army and the BJP to avoid

handing himself a political firestorm. End Summary.

First Obstacle: Managing the Military

--------------

2. (C) Army Chief JJ Singh appears on the front page of the

"Indian Express" seemingly fortnightly to tell readers the

Army cannot support a withdrawal from Siachen. Given India's

high degree of civilian control over the armed forces, it is

r />improbable that Gen. Singh could repeatedly make such

statements without MoD civilians giving at least tacit

approval. Whether or not this is the case, a Siachen deal is

improbable while his -- and the Army's -- opposition

continues to circulate publicly.

3. (C) Gen. Singh reiterated to reporters in Delhi on the

first day of the May 2005 talks (Ref I) the importance the

Indian military places on an agreed and authenticated Actual

Ground Position Line (AGPL) demarcating the positions

currently held by Indian and Pakistani troops as a

precondition to Indian Army buy-in for any deal; his position

on this, which is reflected in the Foreign Ministry as well

(see Para 12),has not publicly shifted. Mapping the

currently held positions would give India future

justification for limited punitive action, should Pgkistan

reneg on an agreement to withdraw its forces. Authentication

will also prove that the Indian Army is in possession of the

main glacier and ridgeline, versus Pakistan holding the Lower

Saltoro Ridge. Mapping positions could also affect a future

agreement on alignment of the LoC (and perhaps a soft border)

NEW DELHI 00003466 002 OF 005

north of marker NJ9842, which is the last codified point on

the LoC per the 1972 Simla Agreement.

4. (C) One theory advanced by some local Indo-Pak watchers

is that Gen. Singh has been the willing foil for PM Singh,

allowing Indian negotiators to point to his well-publicized

opposition as a bargaining ploy to maintain a firm stance on

AGPL in talks with Islamabad. Any deal the PM cuts would

then receive the Army's blessing, goes the RUMINT, thereby

muting some of the domestic opposition and demonstrating the

PM's courage in "facing down" the Army.

Better Conditions for Troops Hardens India's Stance ...

-------------- --------------

5. (C) One oft-heard argument supporting a deal is that

India spends more incrementally to transport, feed, supply,

and arm its troops than does Pakistan, due to Pakistan's

ability to service its logistics needs by road vice India's

requirement for air supply. This imbalance has become easier

for the GOI to shoulder, in recent years, however -- India's

economic strength has grown significantly due to its own

economic liberalization policies, which makes funding Siachen

and the improvement of logistical infrastructure at Siachen

easier. The Army now claims it suffers no weather- or

terrain-related fatalities, and still issues incentive pay to

soldiers billeted there -- fatalities aside, the environment

there remains harsh. The Army says the Siachen presence

costs 3,000 crore Rupees per year (USD 670 million),which is

a small sum when compared to the entire Indian defense budget.

... As Does Considering the Costs Already Borne

-------------- --

6. (C) Opponents to a Siachen deal point not only to today's

more hospitable operating environment, they also revisit

publicly the human and financial costs the Indian Army has

already borne to seize and keep the high ground. Major

Generam (ret.) Ashok Mehta -- who incidentally supports a

deal -- recently noted in the BJP-affiliated daily "The

Pioneer" that India has suffered "650 fatal and 19,500

non-fatal (Siachen-related) casualties." While moderates use

these figures as reason to make a deal more palatable,

hardliners use them to impassion the masses to ensure that

these soldiers did not die in vain: "Why did we send so many

soldiers to die there only to hand it back?" goes the refrain.

Coalition Management Not an Issue ...

--------------

7. (C) Fortunately for the PM, Congress' coalition partners

are unlikely to obstruct a Siachen deal. The most vocal and

difficult to manage UPA partner, the Left parties, generally

favor policies that promote Indo-Pak rapprochement and

cutting the defense budget; demilitarizing Siachen would

likely advance both these goals.

... But the Opposition Would Obstruct ...

--------------

8. (SBU) BJP Rajya Sabha Opposition Leader Jaswant Singh

publicly laid out four preconditions for his party's support

of a deal:

-- Inviolability of the confirmed AGPL

-- A Pakistani commitment not to reoccupy military positions

NEW DELHI 00003466 003 OF 005

subsequent to a pull-out

-- No Pakistan Army terrain advantage over the Indian Army

after any demilitarization

-- A timetable to clean up the glacier of accumulated waste

and military hardware

(COMMENT: The first three items, should they be delivered,

could be very subjectively interpreted by the BJP as being

insufficient should the party deem it politically

advantageous to do so. End Comment.) BJP players have

complained to us privately that Congress has refused to

provide any kind of briefing on Indo-Pak plans, raising the

odds of a political backlash.

9. (C) Any Siachen compromise would give the BJP a political

cudgel to wield against the UPA government. BJP and Hindutva

firebrands would spin any deal, including the creation of a

DMZ, as being a territorial concession. The BJP's mantra

would most likely follow the formulation, "Congress gave to

Musharraf that which he could not take from us by force or by

stealth." The BJP would remind the public that Siachen --

indeed, all of J&K -- belong to India, and that Pakistani

provocation had sparked the war at 22,000 feet, not India.

The fact that Pakistan launched the 1999 Kargil mini-war in a

bid to cut the main Siachen supply line -- and the BJP's

success in that era -- only adds to the political tinder.

... and No Signs Emerging From Congress Ministers

-------------- --------------

10. (C) Lack of a vocal constituency that specifically

supports a Siachen deal (countered by the potential backlash

against one) make a dovish approach politically costly.

Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee, in a written response to a

Parliamentary question on May 11 (Ref A) replied "There is no

decision at present to pull out troops from Siachen area.

India's position on this issue is that authentication of the

presently held positions has to be the first step before any

redeployment of troops is considered."

GOI May Be Hardening Further Post-Doda

--------------

11. (C) The GOI will be ever more reluctant to appear to be

caving in to terrorism following the massacre of 35 Hindus in

Doda April 30-May 1 (Ref B). Mukherjee, speaking on May 9

after a day-long visit to the two massacre-hit villages in

Doda, Jammu, told reporters "We are not talking ob

demilitarization from Jammu and Kashmir ... If attacks by

terrorists on soft targets continue, we will numerically

enhance troop presence. Terrorists have stepped up senseless

killings and we have to induct more troops to make the people

secure." Mukherjee reiterated the GOI,s call for Pakistan

President Musharraf to live up to his promise not to let

Pakistani territory be used by terrorists, claimed the GOI

had evidence of 59 terrorist training camps operating in

Pakistani Kashmir, and called on Islamabad to eradicate those

camps. With this rhetoric in the public record, and the Doda

massacres fresh in people's minds here, GOI concessions on

Siachen will be much harder to sell politically.

Insiders Not Likely to Facilitate a Deal

--------------

12. (C) The Indian bureaucracy, never known as a well-spring

NEW DELHI 00003466 004 OF 005

for innovation, has come around to be more accommodating on

Indo-Pak CBMs but retains a hard-line approach to Indo-Pak

territorial issues. "There is no question of a deal without

authentication," MEA Joint Secretary (Pakistan, Afghanistan,

Iran) Dilip Sinha told us recently (Ref A). Sinha had

previously noted to us that there was no trust in Delhi

regarding Siachen "post-Kargil" and that "1989 and 1992 are

in the past," referring to two prior occasions when a deal on

Siachen appeared imminent (Ref J). Former Defense Secretary

NN Vohra similarly harkened back to when he led the Indian

delegation in the 1992 Siachen talks, saying that the two

sides were "an hour away" at the time from signing an

agreement, but that was not the case after the Kargil war

(Ref L).

13. (C) A key insider whose buy-in would be critical is NSA

MK Narayanan. Our wealth of experience with Narayanan since

he assumed the NSA mantle suggests to us he is perhaps the

polar opposite to his predecessor, JN Dixit; on Indo-Pak

matters, Dixit was known for his creative thinking and can-do

approach, Narayanan (particularly in the security arena)

remains ever the cop, more comfortable listing reasons not to

trust Pakistan President Musharraf than on crafting an

arrangement to negate those concerns. On the other hand,

Narayanan is a veteran of the Indo-Pak Track-II circuit,

where just about every Siachen permutation has been tested

out.

Pundits Battling it Out in the Press

--------------

14. (C) In the run-up to the Composite Dialogue, the Indian

press has been awash with hawkish and dovish editorials on

Siachen. For every C Raja Mohan, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Ashok

Mehta, and Lt. Gen. (ret) ML Chibber (the officer who was

responsible for India seizing the upper ridge in 1984)

supporting a deal, the hardliners throw up former Vice Army

Chief Lt. General (ret.) Vijay Oberoi, former High

Commissioner to Pakistan G Parthasarthy, former RAW chief

Vikram Sood, and retired RAW officer B Raman. The themes

among the hawks include all those listed above, plus a

reluctance to trust President Musharraf (now charitably

described as "the Architect of Kargil" vice the prior

sobriquet "the Butcher of Kargil") or the Pakistan Army; the

objective reality that it would be easier for the Indian Army

to hold the position it now possesses than to try to re-take

it should Islamabad make a land-grab; and the understanding

that India holds the high ground politically, economically,

and militarily, and does not need to climb down. In fact,

Siachen has become a much harder nut to crack post-Kargil.

NDTV Defense Correspondent Colonel (ret.) Ajay Shukla noted

that "Leaving is easy, returning if necessary is well-nigh

impossible."

Press Window into Back-Channel

--------------

15. (C) Both the MEA and Ambassador Lambah believe

religiously that the back-channel can work only if it remains

in the background, and neither has been forthcoming to us on

Lambah's meetings with Pakistani NSA Tariq Aziz. Our one

window into this initiative is a remark by Major General

Mehta that the two met in Dubai to hammer out a Siachen

compromise: the GOI would attach the AGPL as an annexure,

which the GOP would accept without authentication, according

to Mehta. The second part of the arrangement would be the

GOI endorsing copies of the AGPL-demarcated map with

NEW DELHI 00003466 005 OF 005

satellite photographs to the UN and the international

community as a public back-up, he continued. We cannot

independently corroborate this formulation with our GOI

interlocutors, however.

Comment: Signposts That a Deal Is In The Works

-------------- -

16. (C) An Indo-Pak deal on Siachen may come as a surprise

deliverable, more likely to be announced during a

much-talked-about PM Singh summer visit to Pakistan than

after the May 23-24 bilateral talks in Delhi. However,

because of the obstacles listed above, the GOI will probably

try to lay down the political groundwork first. The most

telling signpost indicating the GOI is preparing the country

for such an announcement would be Gen. Singh publicly

adopting a neutral (or supportive) position on a Siachen deal

to signal in advance that the Army is on board, and that the

GOI no longer needs to point to Army concerns to explain why

a deal is not possible. Narayanan and the PM reassuring the

public through media interviews that any deal would guarantee

Indian security, buttressed by similar statements by the

Defense and Home Ministers, would be another clear and strong

signal. We continue to hope for a breakthrough in this

arena, but we will not be surprised if progress here remains

glacial.

17. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:

(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)

MULFORD

WHY IT'S TOUGH FOR INDIA TO CLIMB DOWN FROM SIACHEN

Share this cable