Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NEWDELHI2561
2006-04-17 13:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

TERRORISTS UNSUCCESSFULLY STRIKE DELHI AND

Tags:  PTER PREL ASEC KISL PGOV IN PK 
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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0195
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2450
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002561 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT, DS/IP/ITA AND DS/IP/SA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL ASEC KISL PGOV IN PK
SUBJECT: TERRORISTS UNSUCCESSFULLY STRIKE DELHI AND
SRINAGAR AGAIN

REF: A. NEW DELHI 2539

B. NEW DELHI 2363

C. 05 NEW DELHI 8504

NEW DELHI 00002561 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002561 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR S/CT, DS/IP/ITA AND DS/IP/SA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2016 TAGS: PTER PREL ASEC KISL PGOV IN PK SUBJECT: TERRORISTS UNSUCCESSFULLY STRIKE DELHI AND SRINAGAR AGAIN REF: A. NEW DELHI 2539 ¶B. NEW DELHI 2363 ¶C. 05 NEW DELHI 8504 NEW DELHI 00002561 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Thirteen people were injured, but none killed, by two bombs that went off during Friday (April 14) evening prayers at the Jama Masjid in Old Delhi, the largest mosque in South Asia and a popular tourist destination (although tourists are escorted out of the mosque grounds by custodians during prayer time) (Ref A). The suspect list currently includes established jihadi terrorist groups based in Pakistan (i.e. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba/LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad/JeM - unlikely),Hindu extremists (ostensibly seeking revenge for the March 7 Varanasi twin bombing - highly unlikely) or local Islamic extremists who oppose the Masjid being used to preach a moderate line (most likely). However, no group has yet claimed responsibility. Also on April 14 a series of grenade attacks in Srinagar underlined terrorists' opposition to Legislative Assembly (state parliament) by-elections scheduled for April 24. As-yet unknown assailants also shot and wounded a senior Kashmiri politician on April 16. We do not think that nine blasts in Delhi and Srinagar April 14 were coordinated. The attacks are unlikely to bring lasting changes to the life of the capital or the voting habits of the Kashmir Valley, where people seek a return to peace. Most importantly, Indians have proven yet again they refuse to let terrorists fan the flames of religious intolerance. End Summary. Bombs at Jama Masjid Cause Little Damage -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Two bombs, which police sources told reporters appeared sufficiently crude to have been the work of amateurs, detonated at approximately 5:20 and 5:30 PM near the wazu or pond that worshippers use to cleanse themselves before prayers. The pond is located at the center of the large open-air courtyard where worshippers pray. Delhi Police Commissioner KK Paul told reporters the bombs were unsophisticated low-intensity chemical devices, not fabricated with RDX or other advanced explosives, and set off with probably a chemical timer device an electronic timer or radio-control detonator. The size and composition of the bomb
s, along with the timing (ten minutes earlier would have caught worshippers still at the pond),suggest they were meant to cause panic and garner media attention rather than mass casualties. Post cannot rule out that amateurs inadvertently timed the explosives to cause more harm but failed. Three Theories Prevail -------------- ¶3. (C) Three clusters of Jamma Masjid suspects have emerged in the Indian media: -- (less likely) Pakistan-based jihadi terrorists (LeT most prominent among them): The target and timing of the bombings (a religious site during a period of several religious holidays, including Good Friday and the Birth Anniversary of NEW DELHI 00002561 002.2 OF 003 the Prophet) are consistent with the Varanasi and Diwali (Ref C) attacks over the past six months. Such attacks on a moderate Muslim target could have been meant to stoke the communal reaction that did not follow the other two bombings. However, this type of attack would not be effective without casualties and it appears that the bombing was not intended to kill or maim. If jihadis conducted the attack, it would be a departure from their normal modus operandi. -- (highly unlikely) Extremist Hindu Retaliation: Some media commentators have noted that the symmetries between the Jamma Masjid bombing and the Varanasi attack -- two low-intensity bombs at a well-attended religious site during a traditionally busy time of day, apparently designed to frighten but not cause mass casualties -- suggest the culprits may be extremist Hindus seeking belated revenge for Varanasi. This could also explain the use of relatively unsophisticated explosives, which could have been obtained within Old Delhi itself. This theory loses credibility because no Hindu group has claimed responsibility, nor has any Hindu politician drawn parallels to Varanasi, nor has such terrorism been a tactic used heretofore by Hindu groups. -- (most likely) Local Muslim Extremists: Jamma Masjid's Shahi Imam Syed Ahmed Bukhari has modified his formerly aggressive stance in the past year and embraced moderation, conducting a conference on Islamic social development on March 18, in which he urged Muslims to renounce terrorism and extremism and to refrain from criticizing the US. He also refused to sponsor anti-US demonstrations during the recent visit of President Bush, although Muslim leaders repeatedly urged him to do so. The bombing could have been intended by Indian Islamic extremists to remind Bukhari to support their agenda or face the consequences. Shia Extremists Are Not Suspects -------------- ¶4. (C) No one is pointing a finger at Shia extremists. Whereas Shia and Sunni groups in Pakistan and Iraq routinely carry out terrorist attacks against each other, this has not been the case in India, where no such terrorist groups exist or operate. Moderate Indian Shias have espoused communal harmony and renounced terrorism and violence, while Shia extremists have embraced their Sunni brethren and work together with them to advocate anti-US, anti-GOI and pro-Iran stances. In India's unique Muslim mosaic, in which there is no history of Shia/Sunni terrorism, an attack against a prominent Sunni place of worship like the Jama Masjid by Shia extremists does not have the same capability of inciting Shia/Sunni violence as it does in other countries. Srinagar Attacks More Deadly -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Also on April 14, seven blasts in Srinagar (including two grenade attacks) between noon and 7:30 PM killed five people and injured another forty-plus. Four groups separately claimed responsibility: Jaish-e-Mohammad, Jamiat-ul-Mujahedeen, Islamic Front, and al-Mansourian (the last a front name used in the past by LeT when the jihadi NEW DELHI 00002561 003.2 OF 003 terror group targets civilians). Most of the attacks appeared to have targeted security forces, but a number of civilians were also among the casualties. At this early point in the investigation there appears to be no connection between these attacks and the blasts in Delhi. All theories point to the Srinagar explosions being timed to discourage turnout for four Assembly by-elections set for April 24. ¶6. (SBU) Continuing their targeting of Kashmiri mainstream politicians, terrorists shot at senior National Conference politician Ali Mohammed Naik on April 17, injuring him and killing one of his guards; three police guards were also wounded in the attack. Comment: Terrorists Again Fail to Spark Religious Tension -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Local Muslim reactions to the Delhi bombings have remained calm; no backlash has occurred and none is expected. Jamma Masjid's Shahi Imam Syed Ahmed Bukhari, shortly after the attacks urged the populace publicly "to maintain peace and calm," and Delhi's Muslims responded positively to his appeal. Interestingly, he later stated that the perpetrators of this attack were the same as those who conducted the Varanasi bombings; it is unclear if he meant that literally, or if he was simply equating intolerant violence with intolerant violence. If the attackers hoped to ignite communal violence they were disappointed, as this was yet another in a (regrettably) growing number of examples of extremist groups failing to fracture India's communal harmony. Although Uttar Pradesh witnessed Hindu/Muslim rioting in Aligarh over the past two weeks, it has sputtered to an end. Anti-US and pro-Iran demonstrations (largely sponsored and financed by Iran) ceased after President Bush concluded his March visit. With calm returning, it would take much more serious terrorist incidents than these to raise the communal temperature enough to set off widespread violence. Unless attacks in J&K escalate, we judge the effect of the April 14 bombings on the by-elections will similarly be minimal. People there crave normalcy too much to let terror influence them after so many years. BLAKE

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