Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NEWDELHI2527
2006-04-13 11:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:
JASWANT SINGH CAUTIOUS IN MEETING WITH A/S BOUCHER
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002527
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON MNUC KIRF ENRG IN PK
SUBJECT: JASWANT SINGH CAUTIOUS IN MEETING WITH A/S BOUCHER
NEW DELHI 00002527 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002527
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON MNUC KIRF ENRG IN PK
SUBJECT: JASWANT SINGH CAUTIOUS IN MEETING WITH A/S BOUCHER
NEW DELHI 00002527 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: During his April 7 meeting with SCA A/S
Boucher, former Indian Foreign Minister and BJP leader
Jaswant Singh cautioned that the US and India should not
emphasize the nuclear agreement to the exclusion of other
bilateral initiatives, but agreed that the two share a
civilization and philosophical outlook that will make them
excellent partners. Jaswant also expressed caution about the
potential benefits of the nuclear agreement, and groused
gently about Pakistan, Iran, and China, but warmed up to A/S
Boucher's explanation of US vision and efforts to stitch
Central and South Asia closer together. Boucher also raised
with Jaswant, a Rajasthani, an anti-conversion law the
BJP-run Rajasthan parliament passed April 7. Jaswant's lack
of criticism in private of the nuclear deal proves the BJP's
public opposition is a function of domestic politics, not
deeply-rooted conviction. END SUMMARY.
TOO MUCH FOCUS ON NUCLEAR DEAL
--------------
2. (C) SCA A/S Boucher reminded Jaswant that the two had
worked together in previous jobs and that he continued to
value Jaswant's opinion. Jaswant, clearly pleased with the
visit, said it had only been a matter of time before US-India
relations came to fruition. He cautioned, however, that it
was important not to push the evolution beyond its natural
pace; things tended to loosen and people tended to balk when
pushed. The nuclear agreement, worried Jaswant, was too much
at the forefront of relations, and risked being seen as the
totality of ties. The implication one could draw was that if
the nuclear deal falls apart, everything goes with it. Such
a stance was "dangerous" and "unwise" stressed Jaswant. A/S
Boucher countered that while the deal was important, it
certainly did not represent the entirety of relations, which
continued to grow in new and promising ways. Boucher also
made the point that while governments could not directly
impact business growth, trade, educational or cultural
linkages, or people-to-people contact, they surely could work
on nuclear, defense, and regional policy initiatives where
their roles were essential. While it was important not to
lose sight of the broader relations that form the bulk of
relations, stressed Boucher, the nuclear agreement was a
powerful symbol of how the US and India -- having solved such
a thorny problem -- could work together to acomplish anything
in the defense, foreign affairs, and other realms.
WE WILL MAKE A GOOD PARTNER
--------------
3. (C) Jaswant concurred, but reminisced that when the US was
"pillorying" India in 1998 following the nuclear tests, the
issue had been a very large symbol indeed. Jaswant posited
that the US nonproliferation lobby was passionate about WMD
elimination, but insisted India would make a good partner on
civilizational and philosophical grounds. He did grouse,
however, at the Congress-led UPA government for keeping the
NEW DELHI 00002527 002.2 OF 003
nuclear agreement's details too close to their chest, saying
with a twinkle in his eye that their secretive instincts had
made it more difficult for him to find fault in their
erformance, for which he remained quite eager. Speaking with
the sweep of history in mind, Jaswant evoked the images of
thousands of Indians who thronged streets to greet Eisenhower
in 1959, then the decades of disappointment and drift in
relations. Boucher agreed that there had been periods of
elation and tension, but it was important to think that this
phase marked the beginning of a fundamentally different
departure from the past oscillations.
MORE CAUTION ON NUCLEAR UPSIDES
--------------
4. (C) Jaswant, referring to his careful read of the
Secretary's testimony and Senator Lugar's remarks, cautioned
SIPDIS
against exaggerated expectations, especially on the energy
front. The agreement, he said, was unlikely to boost
civilian nuclear power production beyond eight percent of
India's needs because money was needed for development and
security. On the environmental arguments, he insisted
"poverty is the first pollutant," and must remain India's top
funding priority.
A DOUR TOUR D'HORIZON...
--------------
5. (C) Shifting to the neighborhood, Jaswant complained about
Chinese/Pakistani nuclear cooperation and the activities of
AQ Khan, saying the US maintained total silence on his
egregious record, with the exception of the occasional
mention. Nevertheless, said Jaswant, it was important to
de-hyphenate India and Pakistan, even as the Chinese "resent
very much" Sino-Indian hyphenation. Mulling whether or not
China was a threat, Jaswant waxed philosophical, saying it
was the nature of power to want to multiply. Just as America
remained engaged globally to preserve its power, so, too, was
China expanding its power and would continue to seek to
become more powerful. Jaswant then proceeded to tick off US
activities in Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan that had "stirred"
India's broader neighborhood.
FOCUSES ON CENTRAL ASIA
--------------
6. (C) When asked what India could do to enhance its links to
Central Asia, Jaswant curtly said "nothing." Foreign
Secretary Saran, he explained, was only a civil servant,
SIPDIS
albeit effective, but it was not his job to make policy.
Who, besides Saran, he asked rhetorically, would Boucher
speak with in the government of India regarding Central Asia?
Recalling his days as a "backpack traveler" in Central Asia,
Jaswant said the histories of the nations of that region were
intertwined with that of India to the point of
inseparability. When Boucher evoked visions of energy and
transport links between India and Central Asia, Jaswant
pointed to the Pakistani "blockade" of trade between India
NEW DELHI 00002527 003.2 OF 003
and Afghanistan. While India understood US relations with
Pakistan, said Jaswant, he recalled how India's donation of
55 trucks had been blocked from overland transit to
Afghanistan and had to go by ship via Iran, reinforcing
India's relations with that country. The key, said Jaswant,
was transit through Pakistan.
ANTI-CONVERSION LAW
--------------
7. (U) Boucher mentioned how carefully large groups in the
US, as well as senior administration officials, were watching
the anti-conversion law before the BJP-dominated Rajasthan
state assembly. Jaswant, himself from Rajasthan, urged
Boucher to read "Haqeeqat," a book published by Emmanuel
Mission, the Rajasthan Christian mission whose sales of the
book had sparked a backlash that fueled support for the law.
Haqeeqat, said Jaswant, was deeply offensive. NOTE: The
bill passed 120-60 in the Rajasthan assembly later April 7.
END NOTE.
COMMENT: OUT OF POWER BUT NOT OUT OF TOUCH
--------------
8. (C) Jaswant, a real lion in winter, clearly stays attuned
to foreign policy developments as he waits for a return to
power. While critical of the UPA government, he did not
criticize the US-India nuclear agreement, proving that the
senior BJP leadership's public condemnation is more a
function of domestic politics than any real conviction. END
COMMENT.
9. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/
MULFORD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON MNUC KIRF ENRG IN PK
SUBJECT: JASWANT SINGH CAUTIOUS IN MEETING WITH A/S BOUCHER
NEW DELHI 00002527 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: During his April 7 meeting with SCA A/S
Boucher, former Indian Foreign Minister and BJP leader
Jaswant Singh cautioned that the US and India should not
emphasize the nuclear agreement to the exclusion of other
bilateral initiatives, but agreed that the two share a
civilization and philosophical outlook that will make them
excellent partners. Jaswant also expressed caution about the
potential benefits of the nuclear agreement, and groused
gently about Pakistan, Iran, and China, but warmed up to A/S
Boucher's explanation of US vision and efforts to stitch
Central and South Asia closer together. Boucher also raised
with Jaswant, a Rajasthani, an anti-conversion law the
BJP-run Rajasthan parliament passed April 7. Jaswant's lack
of criticism in private of the nuclear deal proves the BJP's
public opposition is a function of domestic politics, not
deeply-rooted conviction. END SUMMARY.
TOO MUCH FOCUS ON NUCLEAR DEAL
--------------
2. (C) SCA A/S Boucher reminded Jaswant that the two had
worked together in previous jobs and that he continued to
value Jaswant's opinion. Jaswant, clearly pleased with the
visit, said it had only been a matter of time before US-India
relations came to fruition. He cautioned, however, that it
was important not to push the evolution beyond its natural
pace; things tended to loosen and people tended to balk when
pushed. The nuclear agreement, worried Jaswant, was too much
at the forefront of relations, and risked being seen as the
totality of ties. The implication one could draw was that if
the nuclear deal falls apart, everything goes with it. Such
a stance was "dangerous" and "unwise" stressed Jaswant. A/S
Boucher countered that while the deal was important, it
certainly did not represent the entirety of relations, which
continued to grow in new and promising ways. Boucher also
made the point that while governments could not directly
impact business growth, trade, educational or cultural
linkages, or people-to-people contact, they surely could work
on nuclear, defense, and regional policy initiatives where
their roles were essential. While it was important not to
lose sight of the broader relations that form the bulk of
relations, stressed Boucher, the nuclear agreement was a
powerful symbol of how the US and India -- having solved such
a thorny problem -- could work together to acomplish anything
in the defense, foreign affairs, and other realms.
WE WILL MAKE A GOOD PARTNER
--------------
3. (C) Jaswant concurred, but reminisced that when the US was
"pillorying" India in 1998 following the nuclear tests, the
issue had been a very large symbol indeed. Jaswant posited
that the US nonproliferation lobby was passionate about WMD
elimination, but insisted India would make a good partner on
civilizational and philosophical grounds. He did grouse,
however, at the Congress-led UPA government for keeping the
NEW DELHI 00002527 002.2 OF 003
nuclear agreement's details too close to their chest, saying
with a twinkle in his eye that their secretive instincts had
made it more difficult for him to find fault in their
erformance, for which he remained quite eager. Speaking with
the sweep of history in mind, Jaswant evoked the images of
thousands of Indians who thronged streets to greet Eisenhower
in 1959, then the decades of disappointment and drift in
relations. Boucher agreed that there had been periods of
elation and tension, but it was important to think that this
phase marked the beginning of a fundamentally different
departure from the past oscillations.
MORE CAUTION ON NUCLEAR UPSIDES
--------------
4. (C) Jaswant, referring to his careful read of the
Secretary's testimony and Senator Lugar's remarks, cautioned
SIPDIS
against exaggerated expectations, especially on the energy
front. The agreement, he said, was unlikely to boost
civilian nuclear power production beyond eight percent of
India's needs because money was needed for development and
security. On the environmental arguments, he insisted
"poverty is the first pollutant," and must remain India's top
funding priority.
A DOUR TOUR D'HORIZON...
--------------
5. (C) Shifting to the neighborhood, Jaswant complained about
Chinese/Pakistani nuclear cooperation and the activities of
AQ Khan, saying the US maintained total silence on his
egregious record, with the exception of the occasional
mention. Nevertheless, said Jaswant, it was important to
de-hyphenate India and Pakistan, even as the Chinese "resent
very much" Sino-Indian hyphenation. Mulling whether or not
China was a threat, Jaswant waxed philosophical, saying it
was the nature of power to want to multiply. Just as America
remained engaged globally to preserve its power, so, too, was
China expanding its power and would continue to seek to
become more powerful. Jaswant then proceeded to tick off US
activities in Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan that had "stirred"
India's broader neighborhood.
FOCUSES ON CENTRAL ASIA
--------------
6. (C) When asked what India could do to enhance its links to
Central Asia, Jaswant curtly said "nothing." Foreign
Secretary Saran, he explained, was only a civil servant,
SIPDIS
albeit effective, but it was not his job to make policy.
Who, besides Saran, he asked rhetorically, would Boucher
speak with in the government of India regarding Central Asia?
Recalling his days as a "backpack traveler" in Central Asia,
Jaswant said the histories of the nations of that region were
intertwined with that of India to the point of
inseparability. When Boucher evoked visions of energy and
transport links between India and Central Asia, Jaswant
pointed to the Pakistani "blockade" of trade between India
NEW DELHI 00002527 003.2 OF 003
and Afghanistan. While India understood US relations with
Pakistan, said Jaswant, he recalled how India's donation of
55 trucks had been blocked from overland transit to
Afghanistan and had to go by ship via Iran, reinforcing
India's relations with that country. The key, said Jaswant,
was transit through Pakistan.
ANTI-CONVERSION LAW
--------------
7. (U) Boucher mentioned how carefully large groups in the
US, as well as senior administration officials, were watching
the anti-conversion law before the BJP-dominated Rajasthan
state assembly. Jaswant, himself from Rajasthan, urged
Boucher to read "Haqeeqat," a book published by Emmanuel
Mission, the Rajasthan Christian mission whose sales of the
book had sparked a backlash that fueled support for the law.
Haqeeqat, said Jaswant, was deeply offensive. NOTE: The
bill passed 120-60 in the Rajasthan assembly later April 7.
END NOTE.
COMMENT: OUT OF POWER BUT NOT OUT OF TOUCH
--------------
8. (C) Jaswant, a real lion in winter, clearly stays attuned
to foreign policy developments as he waits for a return to
power. While critical of the UPA government, he did not
criticize the US-India nuclear agreement, proving that the
senior BJP leadership's public condemnation is more a
function of domestic politics than any real conviction. END
COMMENT.
9. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/
MULFORD