MEA PROVIDES A/S BOUCHER WITH TOUR D'HORIZON OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 NEW DELHI 002496 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2015 TAGS: PREL PTER ENRG ETRD PBTS MOPS ELTN EPET KDEM PHUM, EAIR, EAID, UNSC, IN, IR, IZ, PK, CE, KZ, KG, TI, TX, BG, NP, GT, VE SUBJECT: MEA PROVIDES A/S BOUCHER WITH TOUR D'HORIZON OF INDIA'S REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS REF: A. NEW DELHI 2367 ¶B. NEW DELHI 2229 ¶C. DHAKA 1159 ¶D. DHAKA 1053 ¶E. SECSTATE 49445 NEW DELHI 00002496 001.2 OF 008 Classified By: A/DCM Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Over an April 7 lunch, MEA regional Joint Secretaries provided Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher with SIPDIS a review of India's relations with its neighbors in South and Central Asia. Boucher probed them specifically on Nepal, Pakistan (including Kashmir),Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iran, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Bangladesh, and Guatemala-Venezuela. The Foreign Ministry officials emphasized the need to maintain close coordination on Nepal policy to isolate the King and direct the Maoists into the political process, the importance of stability and financial viability in pursuing trade and energy opportunities in Central Asia, and the necessity of continued pressure on Bangladesh for free and fair elections and continued counterterrorism efforts. Giving their read of the current state of play in the region, the officials also raised perceived Pakistani intransigence as a hurdle to India's regional development efforts and offered low expectations of the Sri Lankan peace process. Finally, the MEA took on board A/S Boucher's points on the importance of managing India's relationship with Iran, the value of Indian involvement in Iraqi police training, and were receptive but noncommittal in response to our request for support for Guatemala's bid for a non-permanent seat on the UNSC. Nepal: Let's Stick Together -------------- ¶2. (C) J/S (Americas) S. Jaishankar opened the discussion on Nepal by underlining two elements from A/S Boucher's conversation with Foreign Secretary Saran (Ref A): the US and India should avoid any activity that would signal a deviation from their established policy line, and India is the country that would be most affected if the Nepalese Maoists continue to make gains against the Nepalese government. J/S Pankaj Saran (Nepal/Bhutan) gave a short briefing of chronological trends and indicators in Nepal: momentum for anti-monarchy demonstrations traditionally ratchets up in April-May, the �0A;period in 1989-90 in which democracy was restored, and also the lead-up to the monsoon and holiday season, when violence would normally ebb. This pattern suggests the window of opportunity for the democracy movement lies in the few weeks before June. Political agitation in Kathmandu Valley and City has started and has been "successful," although there had been many arrests in the past few days, and a rally originally slated for April 8th was pushed back to the 24th. Meanwhile, the Maoist cease-fire is holding in the Kathmandu Valley. NEW DELHI 00002496 002.2 OF 008 ¶3. (C) The King has hinted that he wants to open up to the parties, Saran continued; "We hear him but we don't believe him," Saran remarked. Renewing the Terror and Detection Ordinance on April 3 and adding new, "sweeping" provisions was a discouraging sign, he reported. Saran observed that international opinion is moving in our direction, with Beijing and Tokyo now adopting the US-India language on Nepalese democracy. No Bullets Please -------------- ¶4. (C) Joint Secretary Saran underlined the Foreign Secretary's earlier comments to A/S Boucher, noting that SIPDIS transferring ammunition to the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) would send a political signal that would far outstrip the material benefit that could accrue to the RNA. The Army's problems lie more in poor discipline and motivation than in diminishing stocks, Saran argued, and the Maoists arm themselves largely through weapons stolen or otherwise acquired from the RNA. Highlighting New Delhi's concerns about additional arms transfers to the RNA, Saran noted that among the most significant known collaboration between Nepal's Maoists and India's (Naxals) are arms sales by Nepalese Maoists to their Indian counterparts, "on commercial terms, not based on ideological fraternalism." (NOTE: Saran reported the Indian government held several inter-agency meetings to assess links between Nepalese and Indian Maoists, and they could corroborate only the arms sales connection. They also judged the Maoists would only win 10-15 percent of the vote in free and fair elections, a fraction that has decreased in recent months, he added. End Note.). Nevertheless, Saran assessed the Army is Nepal's most important institution, which is taking on a more divisive character as it is viewed less as a national army and more as the King's instrument that is unable to go out against the Maoists and instead is turned on the political parties. No Daylight Between Us -------------- ¶5. (C) A/S Boucher noted that it would be helpful for India to take further steps to stop arms flows to the Maoists, whether commercial or ideological, while emphasizing the importance of isolating the King in order to further legitimize the political parties. Saran responded that Kathmandu would pick up on any rift between Delhi and Washington, so staying in sync was of utmost importance. A/S Boucher raised the idea of India and the US hosting a meeting with the political parties, excluding the Maoists, and Saran and others commented that this could be a very useful tool. The Indian government is putting its money behind supporting the political parties, and believes we should treat the parties as a government-in-waiting, he suggested. The King only reacts under pressure, and the isolation since February 2005 has not yet achieved its goal, Saran continued; since NEW DELHI 00002496 003.2 OF 008 the Indian government finds it difficult to pronounce on what the King's role in government should be, it would be helpful to make it a "matter of discussion" between Washington and New Delhi. Central Asia: Access, Energy, and Democracy -------------- ¶6. (U) Boucher explained that the first stop on his trip was to Kabul, in part to attend a conference hosted by the Afghan government and Johns Hopkins University. The United States is very interested in the prospects of bringing electricity, goods, services, and people between South and Central Asia, now that Afghanistan no longer serves as a barrier. He explained that we think energy can be moved from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, through Afghanistan, to Pakistan and India. ¶7. (C) J/S for Eurasia Bhagwati took note of the recent U.S. Trade Development Agency (USTDA)-sponsored South/Central Asia Conference in Mumbai. He was upbeat on India becoming a source and a market for energy throughout South and Central Asia, though he noted that, for the time being, the Indian government focus was on projects across the Indo-Pakistan border. In addition to a host of regional political issues that need to be factored into energy diplomacy, Bhagwati underlined the importance of regional stability to ensure the security of large energy projects, noting that many proposed projects traverse conflict-prone regions. ¶8. (C) Bhagwati emphasized the key role improved transport links could play. He noted that few Indian air carriers fly Central Asian routes as they are difficult to make commercially viable. Indeed, several routes have been canceled recently. Some of the more successful carriers route through the Gulf as their hub; Uzbekistan's carrier remains viable not for its Delhi-Tashkent traffic but because an onward flight provides the least expensive connection to the UK (Birmingham),Bhagwati reported. Overland access is more difficult yet, he continued -- shipments from the sea originate in the Pakistani port of Gwadar, which is "hard to get to," and both roads and rail require significant investments. It's a Gas, Gas, Gas -------------- ¶9. (C) Turning to energy, Bhagwati said it was critical, though difficult, to "get energy firms excited about Central Asia." The government of India will continue to attend the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline conferences, although Delhi remains skeptical about Turkmenistan's level of reserves even in the wake of its agreement to supply gas to China. Noting the opportunities in local cross-border electricity projects, A/S Boucher brought to Bhagwati's attention the USTDA-sponsored Istanbul electricity Conference to be held in June, and said he would NEW DELHI 00002496 004.2 OF 008 forward details. Bhagwati was responsive to the suggestion of Indian attendance. Democracy Cooperation -------------- ¶10. (C) To A/S Boucher's question of India's assessment of Kyrgyzstan's political prospects and how India could help stabilize it, Bhagwati gave a mixed response. Prospects are improving, and the population is relatively small (five million),but the leadership (and the population) is divided by ethnic and tribal loyalties. He prescribed a multi-year civil society-building plan including training in English and the information technology sector to improve the country's economic potential. ¶11. (C) According to Bhagwati, Tajikistan joins Kyrgyzstan near the bottom of the per capita economic charts; he also reported a rise in open displays of Islam, such as Ramadan fasting and women wearing hijab, which he did not describe as prima facia reasons for concern but as indicators that bear close scrutiny. ¶12. (C) On Kazakhstan, Bhagwati said he "does not see President Nazarabayev smoothly transferring power outside his family or clan;" he "does not have the mental make-up for multi-party democracy" and will continue playing one power against another, remaining sensitive to China and Russia. ¶13. (C) Bhagwati noted the sensitivity of Central Asian countries to sovereignty issues. He indicated that India would be willing to help some of these governments with their democratic transitions, but would insist on doing so quietly, as India did not even share a border with any Central Asian state. China and Russia both border Central Asia, Bhagwati continued; Russia also shares history with the region, and China is further tied through labor flows and immigration. He cautioned that these factors within and around Central Asia could risk Indian assistance being "counterproductive." Pakistan and Afghanistan: Security and Attitudes -------------- --- ¶14. (C) J/S for Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran Dilip Sinha stated that successful Indian engagement with Central Asia requires security along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and a change in Islamabad's rigid and unhelpful attitudes toward transit trade (which currently enjoys only one-way access, from Afghanistan to India, despite Pakistan's South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) obligations). Relations between Islamabad and Kabul have been strained, though they are improving now, he assessed. He argued that a "symbiotic relationship" between the Army and fundamentalist clergy threatens to cause continued instability in Pakistan's relations with its neighbors. NEW DELHI 00002496 005.2 OF 008 ¶15. (C) Sinha asserted that Musharraf is not serious about clamping down on Islamist groups active near the border with India, even if the Pakistani government is taking action in the tribal areas near the Afghan border. Furthermore, Sinha concluded that until the security situations in Pakistan and Afghanistan are addressed, "there will be no investors for anything," no roads, no pipelines, even though the market exists for goods and energy. He observed that Afghanistan has grown less secure over the past year, and that the "constant threat" to Indian companies working there has adversely affected India's road projects. For instance, India is currently unable to deploy workers on the northern side of its Zaranj-Delaram road project. A/S Boucher added his assessment that the next year would see an increase in violence in Afghanistan, as a result of expanded NATO operations into Taliban territory. Sinha listened, but did not comment on A/S Boucher's observations about the improved tone of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and President Musharraf's efforts to crack down on the Taliban. Glacial Progress -------------- ¶16. (C) To A/S Boucher's question on possible progress in demilitarizing Siachen Glacier, Sinha reiterated the Indian formula that the current ground positions of the troops would have to be authenticated before any withdrawal and creation of a demilitarized zone. He evinced some flexibility on resolving the border dispute along Sir Creek, advocating that Delhi and Islamabad should settle each of the three segments in turn (the horizontal portion, the creek, and the maritime boundary, rather than try to settle the entire region in one fell swoop). Sinha was upbeat on the growth of people-to-people contacts between India and Pakistan, but he criticized Musharraf and the government of Pakistan for not moving forward quickly on issues on which the two sides already concur. He castigated the Pakistan Army for, according to the International Crisis group report, preventing civil society aid for victims of the October 8 Kashmir earthquake, in order to allow jihadi terrorist groups to garner local goodwill by being the dominant aid providers (along with the Army) for the first weeks after the quake. ¶17. (C) Turning to Pakistan's domestic political environment, Sinha asked A/S Boucher for his assessment of prospects for free and fair elections, and democracy, in Pakistan. Sinha listened attentively as A/S Boucher noted that Musharraf is likely to be generally straightforward, and that the US will be watching for a good and independent central election commission to play an active role in the polls. Iran: Again, Energy and Access -------------- ¶18. (C) In response to A/S Boucher's observation that the NEW DELHI 00002496 006.2 OF 008 Iran showdown might lead to a request for a Chapter VII process, along with his caution that Indian interactions with Iran are viewed very closely by the US government and Congress, Sinha detailed the several axes of India-Iran relations. Iran is needed to access Afghanistan for aid delivery and reconstruction in the absence of transit rights through Pakistan, and Sinha noted his concern that in the event of hostilities with Iran, India's transportation links would become "a road to nowhere." Jaishankar flagged India's need for Iranian natural gas and, with Afghanistan's infrastructure still under repair, Iran's value as a land bridge to Central Asia. He asked that India not be required to demonstrate deteriorating relations with Iran in parallel to its improving relations with the US. Picking up on Secretary Rice's testimony in Congress last week, Jaishankar SIPDIS noted that "a lot of countries have ties with Iran...the US can't have unrealistic expectations, and you don't make demands of the UK or Japan." Sinha compared US concerns over Indo-Iranian relations with India's apprehension regarding the US-Pakistan relationship. Both Sinha and Jaishankar reassured A/S Boucher, however, that the government of India is aware of the situation's fragility, and Jaishankar concluded, "we don't want it to get any more complicated." They emphasized that the most recent Iranian naval ship visit before the one in late March 2006 had been two years prior. Sri Lanka: Low Threshold for Success -------------- ¶19. (C) J/S for Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Burma Mohan Kumar expressed the MEA's low expectations of the second round of talks between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, noting that President Rajapakse's efforts to extend development assistance in LTTE areas is not getting traction because Prabhakaran's single objective is disarming rival rebel leader Karuna. Kumar concluded that the best case outcome is that the second round of talks leads to a third. He revealed that the Norwegian Ambassador to India expected the same outcome, but that the envoy was concerned about the safety of the LTTE delegates to the talks. Kumar observed that the real problem in Sri Lanka was "the LTTE's frenzied acquisition of arms," and he cited the recent suicide attack on a Sri Lankan ship as evidence that "the area is almost impossible to patrol." In response to A/S Boucher's hope that the second round would solidify the current ceasefire, Kumar remained dismal, concluding that he would be "happy if this ceasefire holds" because he does not expect it to strengthen. Keep Pressure on Bangladesh for Elections, CT -------------- ¶20. (C) Moving on to Bangladesh, Kumar hoped the US would continue to press Dhaka on free and fair elections and counterterrorism efforts. He credited US and international community pressure as the main reasons for the government of NEW DELHI 00002496 007.2 OF 008 Bangladesh's recent arrests of Jammatul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB) leaders Bangla Bhai and Sheikh Abdur Rahman (Refs B, C and D). In response to a request from Kumar, A/S Boucher reported that DAS Gastright's meetings in Dhaka last week went very well. He noted that the opposition Awami League is willing to work in the parliament, which is a good signed. At the same time, A/S Boucher assured Kumar that the US is trying not to be sanguine, and that Ambassador Butenis is very aware of the challenging situation. A/S Boucher told Kumar that the US shares the government of India's concerns about prospects for free and fair elections and continued progress on counterterrorism, and he pointed out that the US is actively supporting the elections and providing training on counterterrorism. Kumar asked if the BDG had shared Bangla Bhai or Abdur Rahman's confessions with us, noting that "nothing is coming out." A/S Boucher offered to check with the FBI on whether they had gotten any debriefs and get back to the MEA on this issue. Guatemala: Yet to Respond on Pitch for UN Seat -------------- - ¶21. (C) Jaishankar responded to A/S Boucher's request for early and public support for Guatemala's bid for the Group of Latin American Countries (GRULAC) UNSC seat by noting that he had seen the demarche and the issue was probably with the MEA's UN Division. He offered to find out where India stands and get back to us. Iraq: Prefer Police Training in India Rather than Jordan -------------- -------------- ¶22. (C) On the topic of Indian experts training Iraqi police officers at the International Training Facility in Jordan, Jaishankar explained that the GOI would be more comfortable conducting training in India. Among his concerns were possible repercussions against the approximately 3.5 million expatriate Indians living in unguarded housing in Gulf countries, who he described as "exposed pigeons." Still, he agreed to follow up on our earlier demarche regarding the Amman Center. Comment: Frank Discussion Reaffirms Positive Relationship -------------- -------------- ¶23. (C) Although the Foreign Ministry officials did not always agree completely with the US view of the range of issues raised at the lunch discussion, the candid and broad ranging exchange emphasized the strikingly positive tenor of the US-India relationship. The focus of each of the joint secretaries was on areas of cooperation, even in the SIPDIS complicated cases of Iran and Pakistan. We are seeing in these interactions the fruits of the President's efforts with India. ¶24. (U) Assistant Secretary Boucher cleared this cable. NEW DELHI 00002496 008.2 OF 008 ¶25. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: (http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) MULFORD