S57-05 AND MTAG: CW DEMARCHE DELIVERED, FOLLOWING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000224 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR ISN/MTR, ISN/CB, ISN/CPI, SA/RA AND SA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2016 TAGS: PARM PREL CBW ETTC MTCRE IR IN SUBJECT: S57-05 AND MTAG: CW DEMARCHE DELIVERED, FOLLOWING UP ON OTHER PROLIFERATION CASES REF: A. STATE 3484 ¶B. STATE 2371 ¶C. 05 MUMBAI 2418 ¶D. 05 NEW DELHI 9758 ¶E. 05 NEW DELHI 5278 ¶F. 05 NEW DELHI 6223 NEW DELHI 00000224 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (S) PolCouns and Poloffs delivered Ref A points to MEA Joint Secretary (Disarmament and International Security Affairs) Hamid Ali Rao and his deputies on January 10, and followed up on several 2005 proliferation cases involving Iran. Rao agreed to look into Ref A transaction, but pushed back on US demarches, complaining that, despite repeated requests, India has not received the required detail on alleged transactions in order to take legal action to block them. The GOI would be more empowered to take action against suspect transactions, particularly those that fall under catch-all provisions, if we are able to provide a higher level of detail on the end-user data that led to our concern about diversion of these dual use commodities. End Summary. CW Precursor Chemicals in 2002 -------------- ¶2. (S) We delivered Ref A points to Rao, Deputy Secretary (DISA) Naveen Srivastava, and Under Secretary (DISA) Jayant Khobargade, requesting GOI assistance in investigating possible proliferation of chemical weapons (CW) precursor chemicals to Iran's CW program through Indian entity Prachi Poly Products Ltd. Srivastava clarified that the USG was asking only for information at this time on Prachi Poly's activities, and agreed to look into the transaction and respond to us. Rao commented that the transaction in question occurred in 2002, under a different Indian export control regime. GOI Wants More Info -------------- ¶3. (S) After PolCouns updated the DISA officials on the status of the Sabero sanctions case (Refs B and C),Rao again complained (Ref D) that the USG did not provide the GOI with enough information to defend the blockage of the Sabero transaction and the Prachi Poly case in court. Without more detailed information demonstrating that the declared end-user is connected with Iran's WMD or missile programs, the GOI cannot legally block a shipment that complies with both India's export controls and CWC obligations simply because "the Americans told us to." Such an action, he pointed out, would not stand up in court. "Does the US want India to stop shipping anything to Iran?" he asked rhetorically. PolCouns pushed back strongly, pointing out that while India has strong bilateral trade links with Iran, the US has only raised specific transactions in which we have good reason to believe that the trade will benefit illicit Iranian programs, which threaten India as well. Following up: Mayurakshi, Arun Hurley, Balaji Amines -------------- -------------- NEW DELHI 00000224 002.2 OF 002 ¶4. (S) Srivastava said that India's intelligence agencies had been investigating the Mayurakshi transaction (Ref D), and he hoped to provide us an update within a few days. He also agreed to check on the status of the Arun Hurley (Ref E) and Balaji Amines (Ref F) cases, but pointed out that in the case of Balaji Amines, the GOI has similarly requested additional information from the UK on the end-user, which it is still awaiting. The chemical in question for Balaji Amines does not appear on either the Australia Group lists or India's SCOMET lists, Srivastava explained, making additional clarity on the end-user essential for action. Comment: Can We Give Them Something? -------------- ¶5. (S) While the MEA appears to be willing to follow up on our requests, we risk wearing thin their patience with a stream of requests for action against Iranian destined transactions, while withholding the basis for our request. As Rao pointed out, without solid evidence that the materials are destined for an entity of concern in Iran, the GOI would not have a legal basis to stop a shipment of licit materials. Post recommends that we review whether it is possible to provide additional information on the end users, without endangering US intelligence sources and methods. ¶6. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: (http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) MULFORD