Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NEWDELHI224
2006-01-10 13:41:00
SECRET
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:
S57-05 AND MTAG: CW DEMARCHE DELIVERED, FOLLOWING
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000224
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/MTR, ISN/CB, ISN/CPI, SA/RA AND SA/INS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL CBW ETTC MTCRE IR IN
SUBJECT: S57-05 AND MTAG: CW DEMARCHE DELIVERED, FOLLOWING
UP ON OTHER PROLIFERATION CASES
REF: A. STATE 3484
B. STATE 2371
C. 05 MUMBAI 2418
D. 05 NEW DELHI 9758
E. 05 NEW DELHI 5278
F. 05 NEW DELHI 6223
NEW DELHI 00000224 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000224
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/MTR, ISN/CB, ISN/CPI, SA/RA AND SA/INS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL CBW ETTC MTCRE IR IN
SUBJECT: S57-05 AND MTAG: CW DEMARCHE DELIVERED, FOLLOWING
UP ON OTHER PROLIFERATION CASES
REF: A. STATE 3484
B. STATE 2371
C. 05 MUMBAI 2418
D. 05 NEW DELHI 9758
E. 05 NEW DELHI 5278
F. 05 NEW DELHI 6223
NEW DELHI 00000224 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (S) PolCouns and Poloffs delivered Ref A points to MEA
Joint Secretary (Disarmament and International Security
Affairs) Hamid Ali Rao and his deputies on January 10, and
followed up on several 2005 proliferation cases involving
Iran. Rao agreed to look into Ref A transaction, but pushed
back on US demarches, complaining that, despite repeated
requests, India has not received the required detail on
alleged transactions in order to take legal action to block
them. The GOI would be more empowered to take action against
suspect transactions, particularly those that fall under
catch-all provisions, if we are able to provide a higher
level of detail on the end-user data that led to our concern
about diversion of these dual use commodities. End Summary.
CW Precursor Chemicals in 2002
--------------
2. (S) We delivered Ref A points to Rao, Deputy Secretary
(DISA) Naveen Srivastava, and Under Secretary (DISA) Jayant
Khobargade, requesting GOI assistance in investigating
possible proliferation of chemical weapons (CW) precursor
chemicals to Iran's CW program through Indian entity Prachi
Poly Products Ltd. Srivastava clarified that the USG was
asking only for information at this time on Prachi Poly's
activities, and agreed to look into the transaction and
respond to us. Rao commented that the transaction in
question occurred in 2002, under a different Indian export
control regime.
GOI Wants More Info
--------------
3. (S) After PolCouns updated the DISA officials on the
status of the Sabero sanctions case (Refs B and C),Rao again
complained (Ref D) that the USG did not provide the GOI with
enough information to defend the blockage of the Sabero
transaction and the Prachi Poly case in court. Without more
detailed information demonstrating that the declared end-user
is connected with Iran's WMD or missile programs, the GOI
cannot legally block a shipment that complies with both
India's export controls and CWC obligations simply because
"the Americans told us to." Such an action, he pointed out,
would not stand up in court. "Does the US want India to stop
shipping anything to Iran?" he asked rhetorically. PolCouns
pushed back strongly, pointing out that while India has
strong bilateral trade links with Iran, the US has only
raised specific transactions in which we have good reason to
believe that the trade will benefit illicit Iranian programs,
which threaten India as well.
Following up: Mayurakshi, Arun Hurley, Balaji Amines
-------------- --------------
NEW DELHI 00000224 002.2 OF 002
4. (S) Srivastava said that India's intelligence agencies
had been investigating the Mayurakshi transaction (Ref D),
and he hoped to provide us an update within a few days. He
also agreed to check on the status of the Arun Hurley (Ref E)
and Balaji Amines (Ref F) cases, but pointed out that in the
case of Balaji Amines, the GOI has similarly requested
additional information from the UK on the end-user, which it
is still awaiting. The chemical in question for Balaji
Amines does not appear on either the Australia Group lists or
India's SCOMET lists, Srivastava explained, making additional
clarity on the end-user essential for action.
Comment: Can We Give Them Something?
--------------
5. (S) While the MEA appears to be willing to follow up on
our requests, we risk wearing thin their patience with a
stream of requests for action against Iranian destined
transactions, while withholding the basis for our request.
As Rao pointed out, without solid evidence that the materials
are destined for an entity of concern in Iran, the GOI would
not have a legal basis to stop a shipment of licit materials.
Post recommends that we review whether it is possible to
provide additional information on the end users, without
endangering US intelligence sources and methods.
6. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)
MULFORD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/MTR, ISN/CB, ISN/CPI, SA/RA AND SA/INS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL CBW ETTC MTCRE IR IN
SUBJECT: S57-05 AND MTAG: CW DEMARCHE DELIVERED, FOLLOWING
UP ON OTHER PROLIFERATION CASES
REF: A. STATE 3484
B. STATE 2371
C. 05 MUMBAI 2418
D. 05 NEW DELHI 9758
E. 05 NEW DELHI 5278
F. 05 NEW DELHI 6223
NEW DELHI 00000224 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (S) PolCouns and Poloffs delivered Ref A points to MEA
Joint Secretary (Disarmament and International Security
Affairs) Hamid Ali Rao and his deputies on January 10, and
followed up on several 2005 proliferation cases involving
Iran. Rao agreed to look into Ref A transaction, but pushed
back on US demarches, complaining that, despite repeated
requests, India has not received the required detail on
alleged transactions in order to take legal action to block
them. The GOI would be more empowered to take action against
suspect transactions, particularly those that fall under
catch-all provisions, if we are able to provide a higher
level of detail on the end-user data that led to our concern
about diversion of these dual use commodities. End Summary.
CW Precursor Chemicals in 2002
--------------
2. (S) We delivered Ref A points to Rao, Deputy Secretary
(DISA) Naveen Srivastava, and Under Secretary (DISA) Jayant
Khobargade, requesting GOI assistance in investigating
possible proliferation of chemical weapons (CW) precursor
chemicals to Iran's CW program through Indian entity Prachi
Poly Products Ltd. Srivastava clarified that the USG was
asking only for information at this time on Prachi Poly's
activities, and agreed to look into the transaction and
respond to us. Rao commented that the transaction in
question occurred in 2002, under a different Indian export
control regime.
GOI Wants More Info
--------------
3. (S) After PolCouns updated the DISA officials on the
status of the Sabero sanctions case (Refs B and C),Rao again
complained (Ref D) that the USG did not provide the GOI with
enough information to defend the blockage of the Sabero
transaction and the Prachi Poly case in court. Without more
detailed information demonstrating that the declared end-user
is connected with Iran's WMD or missile programs, the GOI
cannot legally block a shipment that complies with both
India's export controls and CWC obligations simply because
"the Americans told us to." Such an action, he pointed out,
would not stand up in court. "Does the US want India to stop
shipping anything to Iran?" he asked rhetorically. PolCouns
pushed back strongly, pointing out that while India has
strong bilateral trade links with Iran, the US has only
raised specific transactions in which we have good reason to
believe that the trade will benefit illicit Iranian programs,
which threaten India as well.
Following up: Mayurakshi, Arun Hurley, Balaji Amines
-------------- --------------
NEW DELHI 00000224 002.2 OF 002
4. (S) Srivastava said that India's intelligence agencies
had been investigating the Mayurakshi transaction (Ref D),
and he hoped to provide us an update within a few days. He
also agreed to check on the status of the Arun Hurley (Ref E)
and Balaji Amines (Ref F) cases, but pointed out that in the
case of Balaji Amines, the GOI has similarly requested
additional information from the UK on the end-user, which it
is still awaiting. The chemical in question for Balaji
Amines does not appear on either the Australia Group lists or
India's SCOMET lists, Srivastava explained, making additional
clarity on the end-user essential for action.
Comment: Can We Give Them Something?
--------------
5. (S) While the MEA appears to be willing to follow up on
our requests, we risk wearing thin their patience with a
stream of requests for action against Iranian destined
transactions, while withholding the basis for our request.
As Rao pointed out, without solid evidence that the materials
are destined for an entity of concern in Iran, the GOI would
not have a legal basis to stop a shipment of licit materials.
Post recommends that we review whether it is possible to
provide additional information on the end users, without
endangering US intelligence sources and methods.
6. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)
MULFORD