PRESIDENT KALAM IN BURMA: BALANCING REALPOLITIK WITH HUMAN RIGHTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 001806



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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016

TAGS: PREL, PHUM, KDEM, ECON, ELAB, EPET, ENRG, ASEAN, BM,

IN

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KALAM IN BURMA: BALANCING REALPOLITIK

WITH HUMAN RIGHTS



REF: A. NEW DELHI 1614

B. NEW DELHI 997

C. RANGOON 356



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Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)



1. (C) Summary: Although Indian President APJ Abdul Kalam

downplayed human rights in public statements during his time

in Burma, Kalam elaborated on his private discussions with

Than Shwe during his return journey to India, telling the

press he had raised Aung Sang Suu Kyi (ASSK) and Burma's path

to democracy. While the GOI would no doubt prefer a stable,

democratic Burma, New Delhi balances its relationship with

its neighbor between domestic pressure to advocate democracy,

and hard-nosed strategic interest, including cross border

militancy, energy and the need to counter Chinese influence

in the country. We will continue to push to make Burma an

important part of our growing international partnership with

India on democracy, but expect the GOI to persist in a

somewhat schizophrenic policy. End Summary.



"A VERY IMPORTANT VISIT TO A VERY IMPORTANT NEIGHBOR"

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2. (SBU) Kalam's visit was the first by a President of India

since independence and reciprocates the visit of General Than

Shwe to India in 2004. President Kalam's visit to Burma can

be seen as symbolic, reflecting his titular position in India

and his practice of remaining apolitical. Some analysts here

suggested that the choice to send Kalam was a compromise

meant to assuage the Burmese generals while not putting

Indian PM Singh in the uncomfortable domestic political

position of taking this trip. Nevertheless, the media here

reported that the GOB seized upon the visit of the Head of

State of the world's largest democracy in an effort to add

legitimacy to its regime. Neither Kalam nor Foreign

Secretary Saran appeared troubled by this incongruity and



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stuck to an agenda that reflected many of India's priorities,

notably energy, trade and transport. The Burmese regime and

the GOI reportedly signed two Memoranda of Understanding

(MOUs),one on energy and one on education, and a Framework

Agreement on remote sensing capabilities. The GOI also

advanced discussions on several other initiatives, including

a multimodal transportation project connecting the Burmese

port of Sittwe to Calcutta and the northeast Indian state of

Mizoram, a proposed rail link between Delhi and Rangoon, and

a fiber optic link between the two countries. The Indian

media also noted that the Indian Border Roads Organization

has begun surveying possible routes to connect India's

Mizoram state to Tidium in Burma by road, a project that

would help India advance economic development in its

Northeast region.



CAUTION ON AUNG SAN SUU KYI, LIMITED MESSAGE ON DEMOCRACY

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3. (SBU) From the start of this visit, it was evident that

the GOI sought a smooth summit unruffled by public spats over

democracy. In his pre-visit press conference, Foreign

Secretary Saran, a former Ambassador to Burma, only mentioned



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the Burmese leadership's "commitment to democracy," while

President Kalam called General Than Shwe a "friend." The

Indian delegation raised the subject of democracy publicly

only in the context of capacity building. In his press

conference following the bilateral talks, Saran told

reporters that Than Shwe briefed Kalam on the GOB's plan to

restore democracy and that the President of India "offered to

help in terms of institution building or capacity building,"

suggesting that India could assist with "establishing

impartial electoral machinery or giving some training in

parliamentary practice." When asked by a reporter if ASSK's

detention was among the topics of discussion with Than Shwe,



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Saran said the subject "did not come up."



CLARIFYING DEMOCRACY STANCE UNDER PRESSURE, ONLY AFTER THE

TRIP

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4. (C) Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Under Secretary

(Myanmar) Pooja Kapoor explained to Poloff on March 14 that

"the issue (of ASSK) was raised" after the official agenda of

bilateral discussions. Saran's response to the reporter's

question was a narrow statement on whether ASSK's detention

figured in the bilateral talks, but Kapoor told us "she was

not at liberty to say where or when" the subject did get

raised. Nevertheless, India's domestic critics of the

Burmese junta, including prominent members of the BJP-led

Parliamentary opposition, forced further public GOI

clarification on March 14, with President Kalam telling

reporters while returning from Mauritius (his next stop after

Burma) that "India is interested in the well being of ASSK,"

and that Than Shwe had committed to Kalam to discuss the

issues of democracy and ASSK with his colleagues and "come

back to us."



5. (C) Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was forced to go

farther than Kalam during Parliamentary debate on March 14 in

response to opposition criticism of the up-to-then lackluster

official statements on democracy. Singh told the Parliament,

"We have expressed our views to the authorities in Myanmar

without fear and mixing any metaphor. We have sympathy for

Suu Kyi and hope for her well-being." However, he continued,

reminding listener's of New Delhi's need for Burmese

assistance against insurgents in Northeast India, this

sympathy "does not mean that we should not engage with

Myanmar." Nevertheless, he concluded, "We are not supporting

repressive measures in Myanmar."



DOWN TO BUSINESS: AN AGREEMENT ON NATURAL GAS

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6. (SBU) Although rudimentary, the MOU on natural gas,

signed by Prabh Das, Indian Joint Secretary, Ministry of

Petroleum and Natural Gas, is significant for India. China

and Burma had earlier concluded a similar deal, which

underscored for New Delhi China's growing strategic presence

to the east. Through their agreement, India would receive

Burmese natural gas primarily from the exploration blocks

that India's state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation is

developing on the Arakan coast via a pipeline that would

either pass through Bangladesh or the northeast states of

India. ONGC is currently undertaking feasibility studies to

evaluate the viability of a pipeline circumventing

Bangladesh; Bangladeshi concerns regarding Nepalese exports

through Bangladesh and access to Bhutan hydropower are

reported to have slowed the deal. Any pipeline would also

likely be subject to opposition from environmental and labor

groups arguing the ecological sensitivity of the region and

Burma's history of using forced labor.



7. (C) Kapoor described the MOU itself as "nothing ground

breaking," but rather an agreement that formalizes the

on-going discussions between the two governments. When asked

about whether the pipeline would pass through Bangladesh, she

said that issue is largely for the Bangladeshis to decide.

She would not address the technical challenges and costs of

running the pipeline through northeast India. She noted the

feasibility study now underway, but emphasized that the MOU

does not preclude other options, including LNG shipments.

Saran himself, in his pre-visit press conference noted the

economic feasibility of LNG deliveries, given Burma's close

proximity to India.



A "GATEWAY TO ASEAN" FURTHERS "LOOK EAST" POLICY



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8. (SBU) In his pre-visit press conference, Saran described

Burma as India's "gateway to ASEAN." Poloff asked Kapoor if

she thought the Foreign Secretary was speaking figuratively

or literally, and she said both. India has a 1400 kilometer

land border with Burma, an ASEAN state, and shares with it

the strategically important Bay of Bengal, but Kapoor made

clear that the Indian partnership with Burma should be seen

as an effort to tie India more closely to the economies of

Southeast Asia as part of India's "look east" policy. The

proposed rail link between Northeast India and Rangoon, for

example, is the final leg of a promised rail line connecting

Delhi to Hanoi. Enhanced multimodal transport connections to

Burma will also enhance India's ability to trade with the

other ASEAN countries.



BALANCING STRATEGIC CONCERNS WITH DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS

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9. (C) As previously reported (Refs A and B),the GOI's

democratization agenda (driven by a strong domestic

constituency) is balanced by its competition with China for

influence in Burma. India also has important security

interests in combating cross-border insurgencies for which it

requires Burmese cooperation. As Saran reminded us at his

March 3 meeting with U/S Burns (Ref A),India's minimal

engagement with Burma from 1989 to 1996 -- a period during

which it had lauded ASSK's democracy efforts -- opened the

door for China to cozy up to Rangoon. China supplanted India

as Burma's main economic partner and developed deep military

and commercial ties to the country, which India perceives as

a threat. The GOI has therefore made a consistent effort

since 1996 to reverse its censure and seek deeper engagement

with Burma. Burma experts in India continue to believe (a

view that gets great traction in India's security

establishment) that too much pressure on democracy will

simply drive the Burmese back into Chinese arms. Preet

Mallik, another former Indian Ambassador to Burma, told

Poloff that "there is no way that the (Burmese) government

can come under real pressure (on democracy and human rights)

without China also doing it." What the hawks try to dismiss,

however, is a loud voice emanating from Indian human rights

NGOs and the political establishment criticizing the Burmese

regime's behavior and highlighting long-standing Indian ties

to the people of Burma.



BETTER OFF WITH THE DEVIL YOU KNOW?

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10. (SBU) Other factors may be influencing India's posture

on Burma, apart from the concerns about China and the border

security issues. Dr. Manmohini Kaul, Associate Professor for

Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific Studies at Jawaharlal

Nehru University told Poloffs recently that one important

consideration for India was a perceived need to demonstrate

continued foreign policy independence from the United States,

at a time when critics are citing US-India alignment on Iran

and civil-nuclear cooperation to suggest that India is

becoming an American client state. Kalam's trip to Burma,

coming immediately after President Bush's visit, offered an

opportunity to demonstrate foreign policy independence. Kaul

also posited that a democratic Burma was not necessarily in

India's interests. She cited Bangladesh, where a

"democratic" government that was expected to be a close ally

of India has instead become a frequent source of irritation

and conduit for instability. Likewise, India has had much

more success engaging Pakistani President Musharraf than it

ever had with that country's former, elected leaders, Benazir

Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Kaul noted that ASSK has been in

prison for a long time and may not represent a wide

cross-section of the "diverse" Burmese population. Democracy



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there, she suggests, may be less stable than the current

situation.



COMMENT: ANOTHER INDIAN BALANCING ACT

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11. (C) Although Burma would seem to be a prime candidate

for further US-India coordination to advance our shared

democratic values, the GOI sees shades of gray, as India

aggressively seeks to pursue its economic and security

interests on its eastern border. As in the case of Iran, the

perception of critical security, energy and economic

interests create a difficult balancing act for the GOI,

making full-throttle Indian support for the US agenda in

Burma a more difficult prospect. New Delhi's belief that

competition with China for influence in Burma is a zero-sum

game sets the stage for events like Kalam's visit, in which

India's foreign policy establishment took great pains not to

embarrass the regime while the visit was ongoing, but was not

averse to reiterating its support for democracy after the

fact and in the face of domestic political pressure.

Advocates of engagement with Rangoon assert hopefully that

growing Indian influence in Burma, coupled with India's

democratic traditions at home, might in the long run give the

regime an alternative to the China governance model to

follow. Nevertheless, we will need to continue pressing the

GOI to keep human rights at the top of their agenda in Burma,

regardless of competing national security interests.



12. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:

(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)

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