PRESIDENT KALAM IN BURMA: BALANCING REALPOLITIK WITH HUMAN RIGHTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 001806

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, KDEM, ECON, ELAB, EPET, ENRG, ASEAN, BM,
IN
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KALAM IN BURMA: BALANCING REALPOLITIK
WITH HUMAN RIGHTS

REF: A. NEW DELHI 1614
B. NEW DELHI 997
C. RANGOON 356

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Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

1. (C) Summary: Although Indian President APJ Abdul Kalam
downplayed human rights in public statements during his time
in Burma, Kalam elaborated on his private discussions with
Than Shwe during his return journey to India, telling the
press he had raised Aung Sang Suu Kyi (ASSK) and Burma's path
to democracy. While the GOI would no doubt prefer a stable,
democratic Burma, New Delhi balances its relationship with
its neighbor between domestic pressure to advocate democracy,
and hard-nosed strategic interest, including cross border
militancy, energy and the need to counter Chinese influence
in the country. We will continue to push to make Burma an
important part of our growing international partnership with
India on democracy, but expect the GOI to persist in a
somewhat schizophrenic policy. End Summary.

"A VERY IMPORTANT VISIT TO A VERY IMPORTANT NEIGHBOR"
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2. (SBU) Kalam's visit was the first by a President of India
since independence and reciprocates the visit of General Than
Shwe to India in 2004. President Kalam's visit to Burma can
be seen as symbolic, reflecting his titular position in India
and his practice of remaining apolitical. Some analysts here
suggested that the choice to send Kalam was a compromise
meant to assuage the Burmese generals while not putting
Indian PM Singh in the uncomfortable domestic political
position of taking this trip. Nevertheless, the media here
reported that the GOB seized upon the visit of the Head of
State of the world's largest democracy in an effort to add
legitimacy to its regime. Neither Kalam nor Foreign
Secretary Saran appeared troubled by this incongruity and

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stuck to an agenda that reflected many of India's priorities,
notably energy, trade and transport. The Burmese regime and
the GOI reportedly signed two Memoranda of Understanding
(MOUs),one on energy and one on education, and a Framework
Agreement on remote sensing capabilities. The GOI also
advanced discussions on several other initiatives, including
a multimodal transportation project connecting the Burmese
port of Sittwe to Calcutta and the northeast Indian state of
Mizoram, a proposed rail link between Delhi and Rangoon, and
a fiber optic link between the two countries. The Indian
media also noted that the Indian Border Roads Organization
has begun surveying possible routes to connect India's
Mizoram state to Tidium in Burma by road, a project that
would help India advance economic development in its
Northeast region.

CAUTION ON AUNG SAN SUU KYI, LIMITED MESSAGE ON DEMOCRACY
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3. (SBU) From the start of this visit, it was evident that
the GOI sought a smooth summit unruffled by public spats over
democracy. In his pre-visit press conference, Foreign
Secretary Saran, a former Ambassador to Burma, only mentioned

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the Burmese leadership's "commitment to democracy," while
President Kalam called General Than Shwe a "friend." The
Indian delegation raised the subject of democracy publicly
only in the context of capacity building. In his press
conference following the bilateral talks, Saran told
reporters that Than Shwe briefed Kalam on the GOB's plan to
restore democracy and that the President of India "offered to
help in terms of institution building or capacity building,"
suggesting that India could assist with "establishing
impartial electoral machinery or giving some training in
parliamentary practice." When asked by a reporter if ASSK's
detention was among the topics of discussion with Than Shwe,

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Saran said the subject "did not come up."

CLARIFYING DEMOCRACY STANCE UNDER PRESSURE, ONLY AFTER THE
TRIP
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4. (C) Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Under Secretary
(Myanmar) Pooja Kapoor explained to Poloff on March 14 that
"the issue (of ASSK) was raised" after the official agenda of
bilateral discussions. Saran's response to the reporter's
question was a narrow statement on whether ASSK's detention
figured in the bilateral talks, but Kapoor told us "she was
not at liberty to say where or when" the subject did get
raised. Nevertheless, India's domestic critics of the
Burmese junta, including prominent members of the BJP-led
Parliamentary opposition, forced further public GOI
clarification on March 14, with President Kalam telling
reporters while returning from Mauritius (his next stop after
Burma) that "India is interested in the well being of ASSK,"
and that Than Shwe had committed to Kalam to discuss the
issues of democracy and ASSK with his colleagues and "come
back to us."

5. (C) Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was forced to go
farther than Kalam during Parliamentary debate on March 14 in
response to opposition criticism of the up-to-then lackluster
official statements on democracy. Singh told the Parliament,
"We have expressed our views to the authorities in Myanmar
without fear and mixing any metaphor. We have sympathy for
Suu Kyi and hope for her well-being." However, he continued,
reminding listener's of New Delhi's need for Burmese
assistance against insurgents in Northeast India, this
sympathy "does not mean that we should not engage with
Myanmar." Nevertheless, he concluded, "We are not supporting
repressive measures in Myanmar."

DOWN TO BUSINESS: AN AGREEMENT ON NATURAL GAS
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6. (SBU) Although rudimentary, the MOU on natural gas,
signed by Prabh Das, Indian Joint Secretary, Ministry of
Petroleum and Natural Gas, is significant for India. China
and Burma had earlier concluded a similar deal, which
underscored for New Delhi China's growing strategic presence
to the east. Through their agreement, India would receive
Burmese natural gas primarily from the exploration blocks
that India's state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation is
developing on the Arakan coast via a pipeline that would
either pass through Bangladesh or the northeast states of
India. ONGC is currently undertaking feasibility studies to
evaluate the viability of a pipeline circumventing
Bangladesh; Bangladeshi concerns regarding Nepalese exports
through Bangladesh and access to Bhutan hydropower are
reported to have slowed the deal. Any pipeline would also
likely be subject to opposition from environmental and labor
groups arguing the ecological sensitivity of the region and
Burma's history of using forced labor.

7. (C) Kapoor described the MOU itself as "nothing ground
breaking," but rather an agreement that formalizes the
on-going discussions between the two governments. When asked
about whether the pipeline would pass through Bangladesh, she
said that issue is largely for the Bangladeshis to decide.
She would not address the technical challenges and costs of
running the pipeline through northeast India. She noted the
feasibility study now underway, but emphasized that the MOU
does not preclude other options, including LNG shipments.
Saran himself, in his pre-visit press conference noted the
economic feasibility of LNG deliveries, given Burma's close
proximity to India.

A "GATEWAY TO ASEAN" FURTHERS "LOOK EAST" POLICY

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8. (SBU) In his pre-visit press conference, Saran described
Burma as India's "gateway to ASEAN." Poloff asked Kapoor if
she thought the Foreign Secretary was speaking figuratively
or literally, and she said both. India has a 1400 kilometer
land border with Burma, an ASEAN state, and shares with it
the strategically important Bay of Bengal, but Kapoor made
clear that the Indian partnership with Burma should be seen
as an effort to tie India more closely to the economies of
Southeast Asia as part of India's "look east" policy. The
proposed rail link between Northeast India and Rangoon, for
example, is the final leg of a promised rail line connecting
Delhi to Hanoi. Enhanced multimodal transport connections to
Burma will also enhance India's ability to trade with the
other ASEAN countries.

BALANCING STRATEGIC CONCERNS WITH DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS
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9. (C) As previously reported (Refs A and B),the GOI's
democratization agenda (driven by a strong domestic
constituency) is balanced by its competition with China for
influence in Burma. India also has important security
interests in combating cross-border insurgencies for which it
requires Burmese cooperation. As Saran reminded us at his
March 3 meeting with U/S Burns (Ref A),India's minimal
engagement with Burma from 1989 to 1996 -- a period during
which it had lauded ASSK's democracy efforts -- opened the
door for China to cozy up to Rangoon. China supplanted India
as Burma's main economic partner and developed deep military
and commercial ties to the country, which India perceives as
a threat. The GOI has therefore made a consistent effort
since 1996 to reverse its censure and seek deeper engagement
with Burma. Burma experts in India continue to believe (a
view that gets great traction in India's security
establishment) that too much pressure on democracy will
simply drive the Burmese back into Chinese arms. Preet
Mallik, another former Indian Ambassador to Burma, told
Poloff that "there is no way that the (Burmese) government
can come under real pressure (on democracy and human rights)
without China also doing it." What the hawks try to dismiss,
however, is a loud voice emanating from Indian human rights
NGOs and the political establishment criticizing the Burmese
regime's behavior and highlighting long-standing Indian ties
to the people of Burma.

BETTER OFF WITH THE DEVIL YOU KNOW?
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10. (SBU) Other factors may be influencing India's posture
on Burma, apart from the concerns about China and the border
security issues. Dr. Manmohini Kaul, Associate Professor for
Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific Studies at Jawaharlal
Nehru University told Poloffs recently that one important
consideration for India was a perceived need to demonstrate
continued foreign policy independence from the United States,
at a time when critics are citing US-India alignment on Iran
and civil-nuclear cooperation to suggest that India is
becoming an American client state. Kalam's trip to Burma,
coming immediately after President Bush's visit, offered an
opportunity to demonstrate foreign policy independence. Kaul
also posited that a democratic Burma was not necessarily in
India's interests. She cited Bangladesh, where a
"democratic" government that was expected to be a close ally
of India has instead become a frequent source of irritation
and conduit for instability. Likewise, India has had much
more success engaging Pakistani President Musharraf than it
ever had with that country's former, elected leaders, Benazir
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Kaul noted that ASSK has been in
prison for a long time and may not represent a wide
cross-section of the "diverse" Burmese population. Democracy

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there, she suggests, may be less stable than the current
situation.

COMMENT: ANOTHER INDIAN BALANCING ACT
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11. (C) Although Burma would seem to be a prime candidate
for further US-India coordination to advance our shared
democratic values, the GOI sees shades of gray, as India
aggressively seeks to pursue its economic and security
interests on its eastern border. As in the case of Iran, the
perception of critical security, energy and economic
interests create a difficult balancing act for the GOI,
making full-throttle Indian support for the US agenda in
Burma a more difficult prospect. New Delhi's belief that
competition with China for influence in Burma is a zero-sum
game sets the stage for events like Kalam's visit, in which
India's foreign policy establishment took great pains not to
embarrass the regime while the visit was ongoing, but was not
averse to reiterating its support for democracy after the
fact and in the face of domestic political pressure.
Advocates of engagement with Rangoon assert hopefully that
growing Indian influence in Burma, coupled with India's
democratic traditions at home, might in the long run give the
regime an alternative to the China governance model to
follow. Nevertheless, we will need to continue pressing the
GOI to keep human rights at the top of their agenda in Burma,
regardless of competing national security interests.

12. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)
BLAKE