Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NEWDELHI1653
2006-03-09 12:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:
GOI COMPARES NOTES ON NEPAL WITH PDAS CAMP
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001653
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2016
TAGS: PREL MASS PTER IN NP
SUBJECT: GOI COMPARES NOTES ON NEPAL WITH PDAS CAMP
REF: A. KATHMANDU 607 (NOTAL)
B. KATHMANDU 606 (NOTAL)
C. NEW DELHI 1320
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001653
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2016
TAGS: PREL MASS PTER IN NP
SUBJECT: GOI COMPARES NOTES ON NEPAL WITH PDAS CAMP
REF: A. KATHMANDU 607 (NOTAL)
B. KATHMANDU 606 (NOTAL)
C. NEW DELHI 1320
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary: MEA Joint Secretary (North) Pankaj Saran
told visiting SCA PDAS Don Camp on March 7 that the GOI was
not worried about the RNA's ammunition supplies (Refs A and
B). New Delhi is "revisiting" its policies toward Nepal, but
continues to stand by supporting the seven-party alliance
while urging them to give no ground to the Maoists. Saran
warned that any remaining opportunities for reconciliation
between the King and the parties risk "being overtaken by
events." End Summary.
RNA Suffering from Low Morale, not Low Supplies
-------------- --
2. (C) Saran's presentation of New Delhi's perspective on
Nepal largely tracked his overview of February 22 (Ref C),
but provided more detail on the GOI's assessment of the RNA.
Giving no indication that he was aware of Ambassador
Moriarty's March 2 conversation with his counterpart in
Kathmandu (Ref B),Saran stated that the RNA's inability to
make headway fighting the Maoists was not a problem of
hardware, but of "fatigue and morale." The GOI was
particularly concerned by reports that Maoists had conducted
the release of abducted employees of the Surya corporation in
full view of garrisoned Nepalese security forces, who made no
move to detain the clearly identifiable insurgents. This
incident, and reports of Nepal Armed Police forces fleeing to
India to escape run-ins with Maoists, are "very disturbing,"
Saran observed.
3. (C) Saran noted that New Delhi is following the
ammunition situation closely, and if the GOI believed the RNA
was desperately in need of military assistance, India would
be "ready with all kinds of scenarios." Elements within the
GOI believe that India should provide more aid to the RNA, he
admitted, but "our" view (meaning the MEA) holds that
military assistance to the RNA "cannot be effective in
isolation." Without movement toward a political solution to
the governance stalemate and the insurgency, further arms
supplies would only "fuel the conflict." Renewal of military
assistance without any changes in Palace policy would send a
message to the King that he was right when he took power on
February 1, 2005, he added.
Political Parties Still the Key
--------------
4. (C) India's guiding principle remains to avoid a Maoist
takeover, but "the spectre of a takeover is overblown," Saran
stated. The GOI hopes the political parties will remain "in
the lead" in pressing for restoration of democracy, and New
Delhi believes the "best guarantee is to support the
parties." The GOI is "in the process of revisiting our
policy," Saran said, and has been contacting the political
parties to urge them to maintain the unity of the seven-party
alliance, and not "yield any ground" to the Maoists.
Unfortunately, he added, the King seems to be in a "dead
end," and growing public unhappiness could overtake any plans
the King has to ultimately achieve a solution to the
stalemate.
NEW DELHI 00001653 002 OF 002
Comment: Every Cloud Has a Silver Lining
--------------
5. (C) Saran remains hopeful that the political parties
could ultimately use the present crisis to resolve the "real
issues that face Nepal." New Delhi still maintains that the
monarchy should remain part of the outcome, but the MEA's
frustration with the palace's unwillingness to backtrack or
reach out to the political parties is increasingly apparent.
However, India's Nepal policy is weighed down by entrenched
interests throughout domestic society, and this baggage makes
it unlikely that the current approach would change solely
because of irritation with the Palace. Saran's recognition
of an "emergency option" should the RNA face a severe crunch,
however, points out that policy could shift rapidly should
New Delhi perceive a direct threat to its own security.
6. (U) PDAS Camp has cleared this cable.
7. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)
BLAKE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2016
TAGS: PREL MASS PTER IN NP
SUBJECT: GOI COMPARES NOTES ON NEPAL WITH PDAS CAMP
REF: A. KATHMANDU 607 (NOTAL)
B. KATHMANDU 606 (NOTAL)
C. NEW DELHI 1320
Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary: MEA Joint Secretary (North) Pankaj Saran
told visiting SCA PDAS Don Camp on March 7 that the GOI was
not worried about the RNA's ammunition supplies (Refs A and
B). New Delhi is "revisiting" its policies toward Nepal, but
continues to stand by supporting the seven-party alliance
while urging them to give no ground to the Maoists. Saran
warned that any remaining opportunities for reconciliation
between the King and the parties risk "being overtaken by
events." End Summary.
RNA Suffering from Low Morale, not Low Supplies
-------------- --
2. (C) Saran's presentation of New Delhi's perspective on
Nepal largely tracked his overview of February 22 (Ref C),
but provided more detail on the GOI's assessment of the RNA.
Giving no indication that he was aware of Ambassador
Moriarty's March 2 conversation with his counterpart in
Kathmandu (Ref B),Saran stated that the RNA's inability to
make headway fighting the Maoists was not a problem of
hardware, but of "fatigue and morale." The GOI was
particularly concerned by reports that Maoists had conducted
the release of abducted employees of the Surya corporation in
full view of garrisoned Nepalese security forces, who made no
move to detain the clearly identifiable insurgents. This
incident, and reports of Nepal Armed Police forces fleeing to
India to escape run-ins with Maoists, are "very disturbing,"
Saran observed.
3. (C) Saran noted that New Delhi is following the
ammunition situation closely, and if the GOI believed the RNA
was desperately in need of military assistance, India would
be "ready with all kinds of scenarios." Elements within the
GOI believe that India should provide more aid to the RNA, he
admitted, but "our" view (meaning the MEA) holds that
military assistance to the RNA "cannot be effective in
isolation." Without movement toward a political solution to
the governance stalemate and the insurgency, further arms
supplies would only "fuel the conflict." Renewal of military
assistance without any changes in Palace policy would send a
message to the King that he was right when he took power on
February 1, 2005, he added.
Political Parties Still the Key
--------------
4. (C) India's guiding principle remains to avoid a Maoist
takeover, but "the spectre of a takeover is overblown," Saran
stated. The GOI hopes the political parties will remain "in
the lead" in pressing for restoration of democracy, and New
Delhi believes the "best guarantee is to support the
parties." The GOI is "in the process of revisiting our
policy," Saran said, and has been contacting the political
parties to urge them to maintain the unity of the seven-party
alliance, and not "yield any ground" to the Maoists.
Unfortunately, he added, the King seems to be in a "dead
end," and growing public unhappiness could overtake any plans
the King has to ultimately achieve a solution to the
stalemate.
NEW DELHI 00001653 002 OF 002
Comment: Every Cloud Has a Silver Lining
--------------
5. (C) Saran remains hopeful that the political parties
could ultimately use the present crisis to resolve the "real
issues that face Nepal." New Delhi still maintains that the
monarchy should remain part of the outcome, but the MEA's
frustration with the palace's unwillingness to backtrack or
reach out to the political parties is increasingly apparent.
However, India's Nepal policy is weighed down by entrenched
interests throughout domestic society, and this baggage makes
it unlikely that the current approach would change solely
because of irritation with the Palace. Saran's recognition
of an "emergency option" should the RNA face a severe crunch,
however, points out that policy could shift rapidly should
New Delhi perceive a direct threat to its own security.
6. (U) PDAS Camp has cleared this cable.
7. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)
BLAKE