Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NEWDELHI1320
2006-02-22 14:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

INDIA AND THE US ON NEPAL: STILL NO DAYLIGHT, WE

Tags:  PREL PTER MASS IN NP PK 
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RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001320 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER MASS IN NP PK
SUBJECT: INDIA AND THE US ON NEPAL: STILL NO DAYLIGHT, WE
AGREE

REF: KATHMANDU 473

Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001320 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER MASS IN NP PK SUBJECT: INDIA AND THE US ON NEPAL: STILL NO DAYLIGHT, WE AGREE REF: KATHMANDU 473 Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: MEA Joint Secretary (North) Pankaj Saran sought reassurance on February 22 that India and the US were still reading off the same page on Nepal policy, and underlined that India still sees the Maoist insurgency as the principle problem in Nepal. He requested USG action to convince Pakistan to desist from arms sales to Nepal. Saran reported that the GOI continues to take a tough line with the King, and gave a gloomy outlook for chances of reconciliation. End Summary. Perspectives on Maoist Intentions -------------- ¶2. (C) Pankaj Saran, meeting with PolCouns and SA/RA Director John Schlosser, agreed that in a broad perspective, the US and India share the same "understanding of the issues" facing Nepal. The principle problem is the Maoist insurgency, Saran stated, and we agree that the solution ultimately rests in a political settlement. However, he continued, Ambassador Moriarty's February 15 speech led some in India to question whether the US might be taking a different tack, introducing a "degree of uncertainty at a very sensitive stage" by questioning the wisdom of the political party-Maoist twelve point understanding. He said "frankly" that the GOI faces severe domestic questioning on its Nepal policy, and lamented that critics have used Ambassador Moriarty's speech to argue that the US is now following a different policy. ¶3. (C) In response, PolCouns noted that the USG does not see any daylight developing between its position and the Indian position toward Nepal. The speech, PolCouns and Schlosser pointed out, reiterated previous USG concerns about Maoist intentions, particularly in light of vitriolic and anti-American language in interviews given by Maoist leaders. Saran agreed that recent Maoist violence and statements raised fears among GOI and Nepalese politicians about Maoist sincerity, adding that the GOI believes the "dominant mood" in the parties is to continue nonetheless with the twelve point understanding. Pakistan Arms Supplies -------------- ¶4. (C) Saran referred to earlier requests that the USG prevail on Islamabad to avoid supplying military equipment to Nepal, and said that the GOI had recent indications "within the p
ast four months" of continued arms sales both from the private sector in Pakistan and from government-run ordinance factories. He requested that Washington again demarche the GOP to refrain from stepping in to supply arms to Nepal. Next Steps for Nepal -------------- ¶5. (C) Saran reported that the GOI was, at HMGN's request, reviewing whether it could restart low-level, routine functional exchanges between Indian and Nepalese bureaucrats that had been suspended following the February 2005 takeover. The Nepalese Foreign Minister, he added, will be making an NEW DELHI 00001320 002 OF 002 unexpected visit in the next week to Varanasi to inaugurate, "of all things," a seminar at Benares Hindu University on democracy in Nepal. ¶6. (C) The GOI continues to say publicly that the monarchy has a role to play in Nepal, hoping to allay the palace's fears, Saran stated. However, the King's actions have put him in the situation he faces today where the Maoists and parties have jointly opposed the monarchy. "If you ask me today," India's policy is to support the "twin pillars" of constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy, Saran said, but "the situation is changing in Nepal." Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran told Gyanendra in December that "if he doesn't watch out, he will no longer be part of the solution," Saran reported, adding, "if he doesn't listen to that advice, he will face the consequences." ¶7. (C) The Nepal of 2006 is no longer the Nepal of 1990, Saran continued. The King cannot roll back twelve years of experience with democracy and hope for a return to panchayat rule. While the parties are imperfect, Nepalese society has adopted civil institutions of democracy like political parties and human rights activists, and the King cannot ignore this. The majority of political parties are not resolutely opposed to a monarchy, Saran observed, but "each situation has a timeline." The GOI has told Gyanendra that doing nothing may eventually lead to a republic with no role for the monarchy. COMMENT: WORRIED, BUT STILL IN SYNC -------------- ¶8. (C) Saran was clearly unnerved by speculation in the Delhi and Kathmandu press arguing that Ambassador Moriarty's criticism of the twelve point agreement indicated that the US was preparing to more strongly back the King and implicitly attacking Indian foreign policy. He welcomed our reassurance that we not only have not changed our (negative) assessment of the Palace's actions in the past year, but also accord a high value to staying in step with India. That said, India's plan B continues to be hoping that plan A (pressing the King to back down) will eventually yield fruit before Nepal descends further into crisis. ¶9. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website: (http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) MULFORD

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