CHAD/DARFUR: FOREIGN MINISTER BRIEFS ON KHARTOUM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000950 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT. FOR AF, AFC, DRL, PRM S/CRS LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER NAIOBI FOR OFDA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KCRS PHUM CD SUBJECT: CHAD/DARFUR: FOREIGN MINISTER BRIEFS ON KHARTOUM TALKS -------------- SUMMARY: -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Chad's Foreign Minister says he proposed to Khartoum a kind of reciprocal withdrawal of sanctuary for armed groups. Sudan suggested joint Chad/Sudan patrols of the common border. Neither side gave formal responses to the other's proposals. Chad awaits a follow-on mission from Khartoum in the near future, though no date has been set. END SUMMARY. -------------- TALKING TO THE SUDANESE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Ambassador called on Chad's Minister for Foreign Affairs and African Integration, Ahmed Allam-mi for a briefing on recent bilateral discussions the Minister had undertaken with his Sudanese counterpart. Allam-mi reported that, on the margins of the AU Summit in Banjul, President Idriss Debi Itno, Libya's al-Qadhafi, and Sudan's al-Bashir had met in an attempt to relax the atmosphere between the Chadian and Sudanese leaders. The two were able to engage with each other, and agree to begin exchanging high-level missions to explore resolving their difficulties along their common border. ¶3. (SBU) Allam-mi undertook the first such mission to Khartoum, arriving on/about July 10. The Chadian was instructed to reiterate N'Djamena's official positions: that Chad supports the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),and has encouraged Darfur's rebel groups to sign on to it; and as such, Chad was committed to helping ensure that those Sudanese groups that do not join in the DPA do not use Chad as a rear base for military moves against those who have signed the agreement. ¶4. (SBU) The Minister said he had proposed a kind of reciprocal withdrawal of support for armed groups using territory of one country to launch attacks into the other. Practically speaking, this would mean that Chad would continue to pursue all available support to make secure refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in Eastern Chad, including the deployment in Chad of foreign peacekeepers or other forces if such were to come available. Chad would not allow those people who were essentially "political activists" rather than refugees to carry out activities in Chad against either Sudan or the DPA -- they would be given over to AU hands. Chad would make every effort to secure its border, with the help of the international community, if possible. In exchange, Chad expected Sudan to do the same -- provide protection to Chadians who requested refugee status, but cease paying Chadian "mercenaries" to create instability, and end support to Chadian "defectors" in Sudan. ¶5. (SBU) Allam-mi reported that his interlocutors responded to the proposals with their own. He said Sudan again stated opposition to AU or any other foreign deployment in Chad, as an intervention in Chad's internal affairs (never mind that Chad was quite ready to cede sovereignty to obtain help in securing the area and the border). The Sudanese preferred to organize joint Chad/Sudan border patrols to secure the area. Sudan committed to send a high-level mission to N'Djamena soon (no date set) to continue the dialogue. ¶6. (SBU) The Minister stressed that he had listened to Sudanese proposals, but not made a formal reply. He NDJAMENA 00000950 002 OF 002 expressed his opinion to Ambassador that the likelihood was slim that Sudanese and Chadian forces could jointly patrol the border. He noted the close family and clan ties of forces originating in these regions would create significant tensions among such troops -- and that forces drawn from other regions of either Sudan or Chad would be ineffective working in the border area. He said he could imagine Sudanese and Chadian military observers working along international peacekeepers, but not armed joint patrols. ¶7. (SBU) Allam-mi suggested that the Sudanese seemed to be searching for a way out of their current predicaments, and came to the Chadians as "demandeurs". He said that Chad is "condemned" to talking with Khartoum, but would be extremely skeptical of Sudanese offers -- "We remain vigilant." Nonetheless, Allam-mi thought that perhaps the first step toward more normal dialogue had begun, and said he awaited word from Khartoum as to when they would be ready to send a mission to N'Djamena. -------------- WHAT ARE THE DARFURIANS DOING? -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Allam-mi touched briefly on recent activities of Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) factions and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),saying he could not figure out where Minni Arkou Minawi's actions were taking him and his movement. "They seem intent on killing each other; we have some influence with them, through family ties, but only some. In the end, we may have to let them fight it out among themselves." The Minister said it seemed the JEM fighters were intent on battling all the way to Khartoum, a goal he could not imagine them having any chance of achieving. ¶9. (SBU) Ambassador again questioned the Minister regarding reports of support to SLM/A factions opposed to the DPA. Allam-mi's answer was much more direct than during past discussions. He said "support" was a matter of interpretation: The President had charged his half-brother Daoussa Deby, and the Minister of Territorial Administration, Mahamat Ali Abdallah Nassour, with managing relations with the factions of the SLM/A -- drawn largely from Deby's own Zaghawa ethnic group. They had made and maintained contacts with the Sudanese side of "the family", and those contacts were in conflict with Minni Arkou Minawi. Allam-mi said that Chad thought the SLM/A should have united behind Abdel Wahid Mohammed Nour, and never imagined that he would have led a faction away from signing the DPA. Thus, although Chad's national interest and stated policy was to support the DPA, Daoussa Deby's and Mahamat Ali's key contacts were in the faction that did not sign. "It's a complicated situation," he concluded. ¶10. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered. WALL