CHAD: MARAUDING YOUTH THREATEN HUMANITARIAN WORKERS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000929 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT. FOR AF, AFC, DRL, PRM, S/CRS ALSO FOR DS/IP/AF AND DS/IP/ITA LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER NAIROBI FOR OFDA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KCRS ASEC PHUM CD SUBJECT: CHAD: MARAUDING YOUTH THREATEN HUMANITARIAN WORKERS -------------- SUMMARY: -------------- ¶1. (SBU) A tense day of stand-off between local youths ostensibly demonstrating for employment, and humanitarian NGOs working in the Sudanese refugee camps outside the eastern Chadian town of Bahai ended July 7 with one locally engaged staff member of the International Rescue Committee injured. The incident was a culmination of growing tensions in the town. NGOs have suggested a set of concrete actions they expect of the Chadian authorities, without which they may have to pull back to only essential activities. Although relatively simple actions might address the security of the NGO staff, the broader issue of the location of the Bahai-based refugee camps also needs to be addressed. END SUMMARY -------------- UNDER SIEGE IN BAHAI -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Field offices of humanitarian organizations in the eastern Chad town of Bahai reported to headquarters in N'Djamena July 7, 07:30 local time, that their compounds were surrounded by "marauding youth" and that they were being "held hostage" in their compounds. Post's Democracy and Development Officer was also telephoned with the news. The organizations under threat included the French NGO ACTED, the U.S.-based International Rescue Committee (IRC),the World Food Program (WFP),and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Youths demanding employment, as well as some individuals in military uniforms, in groups of 15-20, blocked access to the compounds, effectively trapping the occupants inside. The youth threatened violence, and some were armed with batons and knives. Some appeared to be communicating among themselves and among the groups with hand-held two-way radios. IRC reports that the youths beat up one of IRC's locally engaged staff members. ¶3. (SBU) This incident was the culmination of a sequence of events that had begun on June 30, when youths demanding employment had demonstrated against the humanitarian organizations in Bahai, again blocking ACTED staff in their compound as quasi "hostages". UNHCR, IRC, and ACTED Heads of Mission met on July 4, and issued a joint letter to the local authorities (at the "Prefet" level) to express their opinion that such a situation was unacceptable. They held a four-hour follow-up meeting with the local authorities and youth representatives on July 6, only to find themselves confronted with even more virulent demonstrations the next day. ¶4. (SBU) The July 7 standoff continued throughout the day. Over time, international and locally engaged staff were able to depart individual organization compounds to group together at the UNHCR facility. Post's RSO, acting on reports from the Democracy and Development Officer, made contact with IRC's head in Bahai, as well as with security officers for UNHCR. He intervened with the National Gendarmerie Director in N'Djamena and requested immediate action. Ambassador Wall discussed the situation in the course of the day with the IRC head, and then met with the UNHCR's Director for Chad to coordinate our eventual responses. The UNHCR Director had himself intervened at the level of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and African Integration, and of National Territory, and met with the French Ambassador. The Delegation of the European Commission (EC) urgently demarched the Government of Chad (GOC),noting that the local authorities appeared unable to control the situation, expressing its deep concern, and NDJAMENA 00000929 002 OF 003 asking that immediate measures be taken to ensure the safety of the NGOs and UN organizations. By evening, locally based gendarmes had dispersed the youth, and two-officer units had been placed at each of the ACTED, IRC, and UNHCR compounds for the night. ¶5. (SBU) IRC was informed that evening that the GOC had redeployed some troop units from Tine (south of Bahai) to secure the town. Stand-by evacuation flights were organized in Abeche. The weekend of July 8-9 has passed without further incident. -------------- ESSENTIAL ACTIVITIES ONLY -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The affected organizations' field office heads gathered later on July 7 to discuss the security constraints under which they were working, and to outline short- and medium-term measures they believe must be taken in order for them to resume normal operations. They have presented these recommendations to the UNHCR Director. The IRC head provided them to post. They state that: (a) An increase in security is necessary to continue normal operations. (b) The return of the Prefet to Bahai to restore order, and a visit from the regional Governor to address continuing attacks and demonstrations, are required. (c) The environment of impunity must be addressed, with the aggressors who had attacked staff members, whose identities are known to the authorities, arrested and brought to justice. (d) If security cannot be guaranteed through these and/or other actions, IRC and ACTED will decrease their expatriate and locally engaged staff, and will conduct only essential activities. -------------- WHAT WORKED; WHAT DOESN'T -------------- ¶7. (SBU) It would appear that RSO's intervention with the National Gendarmerie command structure, and that of the UNHCR Director at the Ministerial level, may have been the deciding factors in getting GOC action to defuse the situation on July ¶7. That said, the essential problems facing NGOs and UN organizations in Bahai remain unresolved. At the micro level, there are real questions that can be asked about hiring practices among these organizations. While well-meaning Chadians agree that merit must govern the employment of locally engaged staff, they have pointed out that there are positions that may not require much in the way of qualifications. Setting some of these aside for individuals hailing form the region might engender better will. ¶8. (SBU) However, stepping back, it is clear that the authorities have been insufficiently responsive to the overall security concerns of these organizations, whose staff are providing services to camps of Sudanese refugees located outside Bahai. And at the macro level, the UNHCR Director points out that these camps are in no way placed geographically so that they can be properly managed in any other than a short-term, maintenance-oriented fashion. He noted that their close proximity to the Sudanese border made them vulnerable to both attack and recruitment, as had been NDJAMENA 00000929 003 OF 003 recently seen. He suggested that, while this might be tolerable for a short time, it was untenable in the longer term. He wondered within what time frame he should realistically be working -- one which saw the refugees returning home to Sudan as part of a successfully implemented Darfur Peace Agreement, or one that took a longer view, more in keeping with typical patterns of refugee flows. ¶9. (SBU) This longer time frame, in keeping with broad African and international patterns, implied planning for the refugees in this area of Chad to be encamped for the next 10 or more years. The UNHCR Director noted that the area around Bahai was totally unacceptable with such a time frame in view. He reported that the Minister for Territorial Administration had brought up the same question, noting that Chad simply could not provide security to the refugees camped so close to the Sudanese border. The UNHCR Director felt that, while some limited improvements to Gendarme coverage in Bahai (and local authorities' attitudes) could address the immediate security concerns of humanitarian NGOs, much more would be needed to make a significant change to the environment of the camps they served. ¶10. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered. WALL