CHAD/DARFUR: NEW PATTERNS IN EASTERN CHAD'S

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000906

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR AF, AFC, DRL, PRM, S/CRS
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER
NAIROBI FOR OFDA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM KCRS CD
SUBJECT: CHAD/DARFUR: NEW PATTERNS IN EASTERN CHAD'S
INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE


SUBJECT: CHAD/DRFUR: NEW PATTERNS IN EASTERN CHAD'S
INTER-ETHNIC ATTACKS.

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SUMMARY:
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1. (SBU) Human rights groups and international NGOs point to
an apparent shift toward ethnically or racially motivated
attacks in eastern Chad in the area bordering Darfur. The
period of September 2005 through May 2006 saw numerous such
attacks; the month of June has been relatively quiet.
Allegations point to Janjawid fighters as the perpetrators,
but the distinction is blurring among Sudanese Janjawid,
"Arabs" from either Sudan or Chad, and allied Chadian ethnic
groups. "African" victims from particular ethnic groups are
sustaining repeated attacks until they are robbed of all
possessions and either displaced en masse or killed. Chadian
security forces, focused on confronting threats to the Deby
regime or shielding allied ethnic groups, provide no
protection to the victimized populations. Attackers may be
motivated by a quest for land, a desire to enrich themselves
through simple criminality, the obstruction of transit routes
for SLA and JEM activities, or Sudan's use of Janjawid and
Chadian groups as proxies in the simmering conflict with
Chad's Deby regime. END SUMMARY

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NGOS PERCEIVE NEW
PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE
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2. (SBU) Reports published in June from Human Rights Watch
(HRW) and Amnesty International (AI) on violence in the
region of eastern Chad bordering Darfur reach strongly
similar conclusions regarding the upsurge in attacks seen
since at least December 2005. HRW states in "Violence Beyond
Borders: The Human Rights Crisis in Eastern Chad" notes "...
an evolution in the pattern of attacks on civilians since
January and February 2006 that raises serious concerns about
the potential for inter-ethnic or communal violence in
eastern Chad." AI's report, "Chad/Sudan - Sowing the Seeds
of Darfur - Ethnic targeting in Chad by Janjawid militias
from Sudan" states that "... the Janjawid ... have targeted a
diverse range of ethnic groups who identify themselves and
are identified by others as "African" rather than "Arab" ...
while others have been exempted or have become active
participants with the Janjawid in attacking their neighbors."



3. (SBU) The rights groups state first that these attacks
have reached a new intensity that goes beyond one group
seeking to pillage from another. They report that attacks on
a given village or group are now often conducted over several
days, until the victims are stripped of everything of value,
and either displaced en masse away from the Chad/Sudan border
-- in either direction -- or are killed. This differs from
attacks prior to at least December 2005, which were
characterized by simple robbery, with victimized populations
left alive if they did not actively resist.


4. (SBU) Second, AI and HRW note that particular ethnic
groups from among those generally considered to be "African"
rather than Arab" are the targets of the attacks. AI
described on June 13 to Ambassador and POL/ECON Officer three
zones along the border, in each of which the victimized
populations appear to be drawn from different ethnic groups,
who have in common (a) relative wealth, (b) sedentary
lifestyles, and (c) little direct connection to either Chad's
Deby regime, or to the largest rebel forces confronting Deby.

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According to AI, the victims in the northern-most area,
following the Chad/Sudan border from the Chadian town of Adre
south to Ade, hail largely from the Masalit and Wadai tribes.
Continuing south from Ade to the Wadi Azoum watercourse, in
the Dar Silla administrative area, the targeted communities
are mostly of Dadjo origin. In the southern-most area, from
the Wadi Azoum to the Chadian town of Tissi, it is again the
Masalit, Wadai, and Dadjo, along with the Fur, who are
sustaining most of the attacks.


5. (SBU) Lastly, the rights organizations point to a number
of Chadian ethnic groups who appear to be (a) exempted from
attack, (b) helping the attackers with information, or (c)
actively participating in the violence. Some are generally
seen as "Arab" in the region, but others were in the past
considered "African" -- either in Chad, or among the same
ethnic populations in Sudan, or both. In AI's analysis, the
"African" communities in the northern Adre-to-Ade area that
seem to have allied themselves with Janjawid fighters are the
Mimi and Tama; heading south, there are reports of Mimi and
Wadai (the latter group often among the victims in other
areas). Farther south, the Tama seem to be joined by the
Gimr and Fellata clans in attacking their neighbors with the
cross-border raiders.

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ICRC CONFIRMS, SEES THREAT
TO HUMANITARIANS
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6. (SBU) The Head of Delegation for the International
Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC),Thomas Merkelbach told us
that he and his staff perceive the pattern of attacks in much
the same way as AI and HRW. His staff note as well hearing
criticisms of humanitarian agencies working in the region
that are reminiscent of those heard in Darfur as the violence
there began to intensify. Local populations seen to be
assisting the Janjawid attackers complain that aid
organizations are assisting only particular ethnic groups,
implying some kind of discrimination in the allocation of
aid. Merkelbach said the echoes of these complaints now
heard inside Chad were causing him to more carefully
calculate how he was sending ICRC Delegates into the field,
and trying to enlarge contact networks in the affected areas
to enhance his staff's security.

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SULTAN OF DAR SILLA: OUR
MEDIATION ROLE IS IGNORED
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7. (SBU) Ambassador met June 30 with Seid Ibrahim Mustafa
Bakhit, the Sultan of Dar Silla region (a traditional
hereditary title). The Sultan, of the Dadjo group, holds
court over the middle and southern areas in the AI construct.
He confirmed the broad outlines of the HRW and AI analyses,
placing the emphasis on the helplessness of his people in the
face of (a) well armed, marauding thieves; (b) equally well
armed Chadian rebel groups looking westward, and Sudanese
rebels looking east; and (c) the Chadian and Sudanese
governments, intent on carrying out their feud at the expense
of their people. He said that attacks had indeed fallen off
in June, but attributed that to the lack of anything else to
steal, and any more people to displace in the area accessible
to the Chad/Sudan border.


8. (SBU) The Sultan painted a clear picture of the scorched
earth tactics of the raiders, as well as the cooperation they
receive from local Mimi, Tama, and Wadai "visitors" (these
groups having arrived in the area from the north during the

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famine of 1984, and intermingled with the indigenous Dadjo
peoples). He regretted the fact that the environment had
become so poisoned among peoples who had lived quietly
together for decades -- in the case of the 1984 migrants --
and sometimes centuries, when speaking of the local Arab
groups. "It was our traditional role as Sultan to mediate
conflicts among the different groups. But it required a kind
of balance of power. We cannot mediate now, because our
Dadjo people are armed with arrows and spears, while the
raiders and their Chadian allies have sophisticated automatic
weapons. How can we assure the security of the border in
such circumstances? That is the Chadian Government's task."

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WHERE IS CHADIAN SECURITY?
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9. (SBU) The absence of protection from attack from the
Government of Chad's security forces seems tied to slightly
different factors in each of AI's three zones. In the
Adre-to-Ade area, groups ethnically tied to President Deby's
clan of the Zaghawa have been left largely in peace. In
fact, most large-scale attacks north of Adre, into the
Zaghawa heartland from which both Deby and the rebel group
FUCD draw their recruits, ceased as long ago as March 2006,
given these populations' ability to call on armed defenders.
In addition, SLM/A forces around the towns of Bihari and Tine
have helped to provide a buffer against vengeance and other
attacks. Further south, however, the Masalit and Dadjo are
not important to Deby's power base. This fact makes it
easier for the GOC to position its forces outside the areas
of Dar Silla and Dar Masalit, between Ade and Tissi.


10. (SBU) The GOC may also be calculating from where the next
concerted attack on the Deby regime is likely to come, and
keeping its forces along those axes, facing the threat.
Conventional wisdom and past history would lead those forces
to be positioned outside of AI's two southern-most zones,
leaving the populations there exposed and vulnerable to
marauders. According to the Sultan of Dar Silla, that area,
especially south of the Wadi Azoum, is now "ungovernable".

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MOTIVATIONS
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11. (SBU) As noted above, there seems to be a shift in the
intensity of the attacks in the region, away from relatively
straightforward banditry, and toward clearing the regions of
the long-settled "African" populations. Although theft is
still a common theme to the attacks of the last 6-10 months,
it seems to be theft with a vengeance -- whole populations
are reportedly attacked again and again until they are forced
to flee -- then attacked again in their place of refuge,
until they are far enough away from the border area as to
have abandoned their traditional homes. These tactics seem
to be born of the ethnic elements mentioned above, but also
may have roots in the broader political-military environment
of the region -- the spilling over of the conflicts between
(a) Chadian President Deby and Sudan's Khartoum regime; (b)
the Chadian rebels seeking to oust Deby; and (c) the SLA/SLM
and the Khartoum regime in Darfur -- including the internal
fighting among the SLA/SLM factions. A key element among
these influences is certainly Khartoum's use of the Janjawid
as a proxy in efforts to destabilize President Deby's
government in N'Djamena.


12. (SBU) AI points to other, more localized elements that
may be at play, such as the need for land of pastoralists
whose traditional migratory routes are dirupted by the

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movement of armed Chadian and Sudanese rebel groups such as
the FUCD, the SLA or the JEM. Lastly, a purely ethnic
element may be involved, with conflicts among competing
groups that had in the past been resolved through mediation
by elders and traditional authorities now being left to
explode, given the disproportionate power relationships among
the groups, and the marginalization of the traditional
leaders.

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COMMENT
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13. (SBU) While AI and HRW make strong calls for Chadian and
Sudanese authorities to protect the helpless, stop the
wicked, and halt their feud, the reality is that both the
solutions to the problems underlying these vicious attacks,
and the problems themselves, are anything but obvious. It
would be unhelpful to single out any one influence in the
upsurge of violence -- such as Sudanese use of the Janjawid
as their proxy combatants -- as the only cause, and expect
that simply pushing for an end to that will resolve the
situation. Perhaps AI has it most right: this appears to be
the sowing of the seeds of the conflict in Darfur in Eastern
Chad, and the crop that comes up threatens to have similarly
pernicious results for the surrounding environment as those
now festering in Western Sudan. END COMMENT.
WALL