CHAD/DRFUR: AU-UN JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION BRIEFS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000853 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT. FOR AF, AFC, DRL, PRM, S/CRS LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER NAIROBI FOR OFDA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KCRS CD SUBJECT: CHAD/DRFUR: AU-UN JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION BRIEFS ON IMPRESSIONS FROM EASTERN CHAD, GOC REF: KHARTOUM 1402 Classified By: POL/ECON OFFICER MICHAEL P. ZORICK, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). SUMMARY: -------------- ¶1. (C) UN U/S General for Peacekeeping Operations reported in N'Djamena that expectations of the impact of a UN PKO in Darfur are unrealistic on both sides of the Chad/Sudan border. He called the logistical challenge of standing up the force "a nightmare", and cautioned that it would be at least January 2007 before the force could be stood up. END SUMMARY -------------- UNREASONABLE EXPECTATIONS -------------- ¶2. (C) Jean-Marie Guehenno, UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations (U/SG DPKO) briefed members of the N'Djamena diplomatic community June 16 on the activities of DPKO's technical assessment mission to Darfur. Guehenno stressed his impressions from his June 13-15 meetings in El Fasher, El Geneina, and Nyala. He said that the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is a positive step, necessary to allow a transition toward peace, but vulnerable to being used to polarize attitudes among refugees and IDPs on both sides of the Chad/Sudan border. He said he had heard IDPs express the expectation that a UNPKO in the region would supplant the Government of Sudan, expectations which he called completely unrealistic. On the other hand, Arab peoples had called any deployment a "UN invasion" to be feared. ¶3. (SBU) Regarding his June 16 meetings in N'Djamena, Guehenno called them useful for getting a regional perspective. The DPKO/AU mission had met earlier in the day with Chadian President Deby, and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Territorial Administration. They had been briefed at the French Embassy, and at France's military base in N'Djamena. Guehenno said it was clear from these conversations that the Darfur conflict "interferes and intersects with Chad's domestic political schisms". He said he had seen considerable evidence that armed groups opposed to President Deby were established and active in Western Darfur. -------------- PKO FOR DARFUR -- NOT CHAD -------------- ¶4. (C) The U/SG said President Deby had expressed strong support for a PKO, but again, expectations were out of line with reality. Guehenno said that managing the transition from AMIS to a UNPKO in Darfur would be enormously complex, and there would not be room for this force to become "integrated into the Chadian conflicts." ¶5. (C) Ambassador Wall raised the questions of (a) any role for a UN PKO in the Chad border region in providing protection for refugees and IDPs, and (b) what the U/SG may have learned about reports of Chadian support for groups opposing the DPA. Guehenno called getting a PKO into Darfur "a logistical challenge -- more like a nightmare", and cautioned that providing security for the region's refugees and IDPs was equivalent to trying to police several cities of 20,000 to 30,000 people. He stressed that there could be no expectation that a PKO could "lock up" 1,000 kms of Chad/Sudan border, although the technical assessment mission was trying to come up with ways to maximize visibility and monitoring capabilities. He noted that the affected areas in Chad along the Sudan border amounted to region of roughly 250 NDJAMENA 00000853 002 OF 002 kms by 800 kms, an area the PKO would not be able to take on. He urged his audience to entertain no illusions about what would be possible in Chad from a UN presence in the region. Last, he gave the date of January 2007 as the soonest any troops would be on the ground in Darfur. ¶6. (C) Regarding DPA spoilers, Guehenno confirmed having received reports of Chadian support for elements opposing Minni Minnawi's faction of the SLA/SLM. He noted observing increasing fragmentation between Zaghawa and Fur elements, and within the Zaghawa clans. He said that while it was a positive thing that Minnawi had signed on to the DPA, we must not lose sight of the fact that Minnawi himself does not command full spport. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) U/SG Guehenno was straight-forward and direct in his commentary regarding how the technical assessment mission is looking at its probable impact on and involvement in Chad. He stressed repeatedly the need to control and reduce expectations. END COMMENT. ¶8. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered. WALL