CHAD: UNDP ON POST-ELECTION "FRAMEWORK"

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000788 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICAWATCHERS, ACCRA FOR WARP; NAIROBI FOR OFDA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM UNDP CD SUBJECT: CHAD: UNDP ON POST-ELECTION "FRAMEWORK" REF: NDJAMENA 779 ¶1. (SBU) Summary. United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Resident Coordinator Amaning sees a two-month window for the government and the opposition to agree to a framework for shared supervision of political and economic reforms. He was concerned that the government might succeed at co-opting members of the opposition, thereby decreasing the pressure for institutional reform. He intends to encourage President Deby to seize the opportunity to leave a positive legacy, and assure him that a credible reform package will garner technical and financial support from the international community. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) DCM and visiting S/CRS Director Janet Beik met with UNDP Resident Coordinator Kingsley Amaning June 2 to further develop the ideas for a post-election framework (floated earlier during a lunch with visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary Don Yamamoto). Amaning felt that the opposition was SIPDIS divided into two camps: the CPDC camp was disinterested in elections; their goal was a national conference. FAR president Youroungar, on the other hand, was focused on holding proper elections. Amaning noted that the reason for the difference of opinion was that Youroungar firmly believed that he would do well in a free and fair election; the CPDC on the other hand was not so confident. Amaning also shared the concern expressed by French Ambassador Bercot (reftel) that the opposition might find the temptation to make personal deals too great. Amaning was concerned by the corrosive impact this would have on the political system. He emphasized that there should be no private deals. The goal was not just power-sharing, but "responsible management of power." ¶3. (SBU) Amaning's post-election framework includes: an electoral system accepted by all participants, strengthening of political parties in Chad and a mechanism for allowing shared supervision of reforms in the armed forces, the judiciary and the economic sector. He added as well the need to work on restructuring of the civil service and decentralization. Amaning noted that considerable work had already been done on a number of these sectors (i.e, the reports of the "Etats Generaux" on reform of the army and the judiciary; existing UN work on decentralization and World Bank and IMF work on economic reform.) ¶4. (SBU) Amaning discussed establishing a steering committee for each reform group. Asked whether Chad would benefit from a "Friends of Chad" group, Amaning opined that a donors' support group would be helpful. Such a group could be composed of the United States, France, the EU, Germany, the UN and the African Union (AU). ¶5. (SBU) Amaning noted that he hoped to see President Deby shortly. His pitch to the President will highlight the positive legacy that President Deby was in a position to leave if he chose to do so. He will encourage the President to "take ownership" of the needed reforms and assure him that the UN and the international community would be there to support him financially and technically (with the caveat that eventually Chad would need to use its own oil revenues as well). According to Amaning, some of the younger and more progressive members of Deby's group sought these reforms. He mentioned Minister of Finance Tolli, and Minister of Infrastructure Younousmi. 6.(SBU) Amaning cautioned that these plans needed to have France on board. He felt that France was thinking too short term -- focusing only on an opposition Prime Minister, whereas reform of institutions and structures needed to be considered as well. He was also concerned that cabinet re-shuffling would be seen by participants as a purely "commercial transaction" and would not require the government to embark on the kind of reforms which were so urgently needed. Queried about the views of the armed rebels on such reforms, Amaning opined that if sufficient progress was being made, the political opposition "could bring in the armed NDJAMENA 00000788 002 OF 002 groups." ¶7. (SBU) In closing, Amaning stated that a "gentleman's agreement" was needed sometime before the third week of June. A formal process needed to be launched before the end of June. Participants in the joint supervisory groups needed to be sitting together by mid-July to agree to a program of work. Before the mid-July, the President would also need to have narrowed his choice for Prime Minister. Amaning concluded by emphasizing that the President needed to understand that his survival depended on political and policy choices -- not just on his military ability. WALL