CHAD: FRANCE ON POST-ELECTION STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000779 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICAWATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM KCRS CD SUBJECT: CHAD: FRANCE ON POST-ELECTION STRATEGY REF: NDJAMENA 775 Classified By: LUCY TAMLYN, DCM, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) ¶1. (C) Summary. In a meeting with Ambassador Wall, French Ambassador Bercot outlined the Paris-blessed strategy for expanding a political dialogue and establishing the foundations for better economic and political governance in Chad after elections. He cautioned that the regime's ongoing efforts to buy off individual members of the opposition (and their willingness to be bought off) threatened any serious political dialogue. End summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador Wall met with French Ambassador Jean-Pierre Bercot at his request on June 2. DCM (notetaker) also attended. Ambassador Bercot was eager to relay information from his most recent meeting with President Deby (which had taken place after the visit of AF Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) Don Yamamoto),and also to explain France's SIPDIS post-election strategy. President Deby Reactions to U.S. Visit -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador Bercot said that President Deby had been surprised that DAS Yamamoto had publicly raised the issue of naming an opposition Prime Minister in his meeting with President Deby. Deby acknowledged that this had been discussed between him and Ambassador Bercot, but noted that this had been done one-on-one. If he subsequently named an opposition Prime Minister, President Deby complained, he would be seen as acting on the recommendation of the United States, and this would "expose him to his enemies." Ambassador Bercot reported that he had assured President Deby that he should take advantage of the fact that the United States was now focused on Chad. He reported that President Deby had described DAS Yamamoto's visit overall as positive, and confided to Bercot that he hoped to be invited to the United States next year for a visit -- even a short one. ¶4. (C) As far as protection of refugees, Ambassador Bercot reported that President Deby was open to an international force, on the condition that he would be able to vet the selection of troop-contributing countries. On the subject of such an international force, Ambassador Bercot pointed out that having French gendarmes (in such a mission) next to French soldiers stationed in Chad would be extremely confusing, and he would prefer not to confuse France's mandate in Chad. Bercot noted in passing that President Deby believed that the United States was "manipulated" by SLM leader Minni Minawi, and reiterated that President Deby believed that the recent skirmishes in Darfur had been the result of Minni's attacks on JEM positions. President Deby reported that in his three meetings with Minni last week, threats from SLM breakaway groups or JEM had never been brought up. Ambassador Bercot commented: of course, (Deby's half-brother) Daussa Deby and (Minister of Territorial Administration) Mahamet Ali "have a gun at his back." France's "Road-Map" for Chad -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador Bercot explained that Paris had now formally blessed a proposed political road-map for Chad (described reftel) which included 1) naming an opposition prime minister, who would be allow to name his government, and who would stay in place for at least a year; and 2) implementation of a plan for reform of the army, the electoral system, the justice system and economic reform. Bercot showed Ambassador two letters from French President Chirac and French Prime Minister de Villepin in which Deby was congratulated on his election, but was also directed to commence a political dialogue. Ambassador Bercot reported that he understood that some in the President's office might be in touch with former Prime Minister Jean Alingue. Bercot explained that the thinking was that Alingue would be allowed to pick his own government as long as President Deby retained control over defense issues. Bercot reported that he had told President Deby that insisting on leaving the current Minister of Finance, Abakar Tolli, was equally important in terms of maintaining continuity and good relations with donors. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador clarified that DAS Yamamoto had only mentioned naming an opposition Prime Minister as one of several possible steps that President Deby could take to show an opening. Other options, including reform of the electoral system, were mentioned. Furthermore, the idea of an opposition Prime Minister was not a new one. He noted, however, that the meeting did not leave the impression that President Deby was looking to the international community to facilitate the process. True, commented Ambassador Bercot, but the international community has an important role as a "verifier." ¶7. (C) Turning to the opposition groups which make up the CPDC, Ambassador Bercot noted with concern that practically all of the smaller parties therein could be bought -- and some for a fairly low price. He was concerned that the President's political party, the MPS, would be systematically picking off the CPDC, thereby corrupting the process. He agreed with the Ambassador that the significant members of CPDC (i.e, Kamougue, Garba, etc) were not seen as having a price, but he also noted that the opposition groups were still holding out in the hope that the donors would deny the results of the elections, rather than taking the initiative to put forward concrete proposals. WALL