CHAD: FRANCE CITES CHADIAN INVOLVEMENT IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000775 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT. FOR AF, AFC, DRL, PRM LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM CD SUBJECT: CHAD: FRANCE CITES CHADIAN INVOLVEMENT IN UNDERCUTTING DPA NDJAMENA 00000775 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: POL/ECON OFFICER MICHAEL P. ZORICK, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary. In a meeting May 29, French Ambassador Jean-Pierre Bercot made a pitch to Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) Yamamoto for USG efforts in the UN Security Council for sanctions against individual Chadian political and armed opposition leaders whom he called directly engaged in activities that threaten the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Bercot also set out a timeline of French actions over the next three months to influence President Deby and improve his chances of staying in power peacefully. France hopes to move President Deby towards a multi-ethnic power sharing agreement with a strong focus on good governance. Bercot stressed that time for effective action would end in October 2006, when the rainy season ends and rebel attacks could begin again unless there is a solution. By 2007, Chad's windfall profits from indirect oil revenues would obviate any chance of moving towards a peaceful solution to Chad's political crisis. End summary. THE PRESIDENT WEAKENS -------------- ¶2. (C) PRM DAS Don Yamamoto met French Ambassador Jean-Pierre Bercot May 29 with Ambasador Wall at the latter's residence. AF/C Director, S/CRS Director, DCM, and Pol/Econ officer (notetaker) attended. Ambassador Bercot stated Chadian President Idriss Deby Itno's grip on power is weakening -- and that the President knows it. Bercot claimed that President Deby is unable to control events transpiring in Eastern Chad, and stated that the intersection of the Darfur conflict with Chad's domestic political intrigues would be "instrumentalized" within the next six months. This will be facilitated, according to Bercot, by Deby's recent tendency to appease un-named Zaghawa clan and Arab leaders in Eastern Chad who are determined to carve up the country into individual fiefdoms. Ambassador Bercot claimed that Khartoum is squarely behind this attempt to dismember Eastern Chad as a method of blocking the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). KHARTOUM'S STOOGES -------------- ¶3. (C) Bercot made a case that five key Chadian players were the instruments of this plan, engaged in activities that would threaten the implementation of the DPA, Chad's territorial integrity, and Idriss Deby Itno's future as President. He made a direct pitch to DAS Yamammoto for USG efforts in the UN Security Council for sanctions against these individual Chadian political and armed opposition leaders (presumably after the AU has forwarded its list to the UN),based on their blocking of DPA implementation. His "Top Five" on the hit list: President Deby's half-brother, Daoussa Deby; Minister of Territorial Administration, General Mahamat Ali Abdallah Nassour; the brothers Tom and Timan Erdimi; and Mahamat Ali Adoum, President Deby's Deputy Chief of Staff (Chef du Cabinet Adjoint). ¶4. (C) The French Ambassador called the first two -- Daoussa Deby and General Ali -- the two greatest dangers as regards Chadian interference in Darfur. He linked them directly to the arming and equipping of groups in Darfur and Chad's bordering regions opposed to the implementation of the DPA. He accused the two of purchasing weapons, ammunition, and vehicles with funds provided by Libya and Saudi Arabia. ¶5. (C) The French envoy saw the nexus of interests among these individuals as being the CFA 5-6 billion (over USDOL 10 million) in annual black market trade all along Chad's eastern border with Sudan. He claimed Daoussa Deby to be the deus ex machina of this trade, using his ability to work within all the Zaghawa clans in the area. Bercot connected General Ali to the Erdimi brothers in this trade, with the Erdimis as the "visible part of the iceberg", hiding General Ali below the surface. NDJAMENA 00000775 002.2 OF 003 ¶6. (C) As for Mahamat Ali Adoum, Bercot stated only that the President's Deputy Chief of Staff is deeply involved in blocking the implementation of the DPA, referring to GOF telephone intercepts as evidence of this. Bercot stated that he had informed President Deby that if France obtained evidence of Chad helping non-signaturies -- "you are dead." In response, President Deby had responded that he didn't have enough vehicles for his own army -- why would he be arming Sudanese rebels? THE LIBYAN'S TOO -------------- ¶7. (C) Ambassador Bercot stated that Libya's Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi has also sought to influence the events in Darfur and Eastern Chad. Bercot claimed that Qadhafi's particular concern was to keep UN peacekeeping forces out of the region. He reported that Qadhafi had told President Deby that the he (Qadhafi) would attend Deby's investiture in August only if three conditions were met. Deby is to (a) re-establish diplomatic relations with Khartoum; (b) refuse to allow UN PKO forces in the region; and (c) give key posts in his government to the Gorane (a northern Chadian ethnic group) and to leaders of the armed movements. Bercot speculated that such a position showed the Libyan leader's lack of understanding of Chadian power dynamics, indicating that Qadhafi sought only a northern counterbalance to southern political power in N'Djamena. Bercot claimed Tripoli sees this as its best opportunity in 20 years to exercise control over its southern neighbor. TIME IS RUNNING OUT -------------- ¶8. (C) The French Envoy estimated that the international community had very little time in which to act. He set the end of Chad's rainy season -- roughly early October -- as the moment when armed combat on a number of fronts would certainly resume unless action is taken to forestall it. ¶9. (C) Bercot said Deby does not take seriously multilateral institutions like the EU, AU and UN, believing that (a) he will never change the minds of his detractors in the EU, but will have the undying love of France; (b) he can handle the AU's "council of elders under the baobab tree; and (c) only the USG matters at the UN. FRANCE WILL ACT -------------- ¶10. (C) Bercot set out a timeline of French actions over the next three months set to influence President Deby, and to improve his chances at staying in power peacefully. First, Bercot reported he had told the President he has a very small window of opportunity in which to launch a credible political dialogue -- defined as 28 May (the official declaration of the election results) to 8 August (date of Deby's investiture as President for another five-year term). He said France believed such a dialogue must take as its goal multi-ethnic power sharing within the new government. To move the President toward this, France's Minister Delegate for Cooperation, Development and Francophony, Brigitte Girardin, would visit Chad on 16-17 June to sign a five-year "partnership framework document". This new partnership agreement would be very specific about good governance benchmarks; furthermore, unlike previous partnership agreements, the new one would allow France (or Chad) to quit the agreement at any time if objectives were not being met. Bercot stated that Deby knew that something concrete related to a political dialogue would need to be announced before 15 June. ¶11. (C) Ambassador Bercot said France wanted Deby to name a Prime Minister (PM) from the opposition CPDC grouping (Coordination of the Political Parties for the Defense of the Constitution). The PM must be allowed to build his cabinet from those parties willing to participate, without interference from Deby. The President, however, would be NDJAMENA 00000775 003.2 OF 003 expected to deliver his program to the PM for implementation. France would expect the first year of that program to include four elements: (a) judicial reform; (b) armed forces reform; (c) financial and governance reforms; and (d) electoral reforms. These reforms needed to be put in place before the arrival of windfall oil revenues; after that, Bercot believed, Chad would become "ungovernable." The new government would need to be named before October and would stay in place until the next legislative elections, at which point the new Prime Minister would be chosen based on party representation in the National Assembly. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) France understands that, even with the defeat of rebel attacks on 13 April, the 3 May Presidential elections, and the finalizing of the DPA behind it, the Deby regime still faces significant challenges that must be addressed. We sensed both a new activism to find solutions, and new concern on their part that time may be running out. ¶13. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. WALL