Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NDJAMENA775
2006-06-01 14:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

CHAD: FRANCE CITES CHADIAN INVOLVEMENT IN

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM CD 
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VZCZCXRO4855
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0775/01 1521413
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011413Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3851
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1150
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0643
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1071
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1417
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2692
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1808
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1201
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0779
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0228
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000775 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR AF, AFC, DRL, PRM
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: FRANCE CITES CHADIAN INVOLVEMENT IN
UNDERCUTTING DPA


NDJAMENA 00000775 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: POL/ECON OFFICER MICHAEL P. ZORICK, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000775

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR AF, AFC, DRL, PRM
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: FRANCE CITES CHADIAN INVOLVEMENT IN
UNDERCUTTING DPA


NDJAMENA 00000775 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: POL/ECON OFFICER MICHAEL P. ZORICK, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D).


1. (C) Summary. In a meeting May 29, French Ambassador
Jean-Pierre Bercot made a pitch to Deputy Assistant Secretary
(DAS) Yamamoto for USG efforts in the UN Security Council for
sanctions against individual Chadian political and armed
opposition leaders whom he called directly engaged in
activities that threaten the implementation of the Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA). Bercot also set out a timeline of
French actions over the next three months to influence
President Deby and improve his chances of staying in power
peacefully. France hopes to move President Deby towards a
multi-ethnic power sharing agreement with a strong focus on
good governance. Bercot stressed that time for effective
action would end in October 2006, when the rainy season ends
and rebel attacks could begin again unless there is a
solution. By 2007, Chad's windfall profits from indirect oil
revenues would obviate any chance of moving towards a
peaceful solution to Chad's political crisis. End summary.

THE PRESIDENT WEAKENS
--------------


2. (C) PRM DAS Don Yamamoto met French Ambassador Jean-Pierre
Bercot May 29 with Ambasador Wall at the latter's residence.
AF/C Director, S/CRS Director, DCM, and Pol/Econ officer
(notetaker) attended. Ambassador Bercot stated Chadian
President Idriss Deby Itno's grip on power is weakening --
and that the President knows it. Bercot claimed that
President Deby is unable to control events transpiring in
Eastern Chad, and stated that the intersection of the Darfur
conflict with Chad's domestic political intrigues would be
"instrumentalized" within the next six months. This will be
facilitated, according to Bercot, by Deby's recent tendency
to appease un-named Zaghawa clan and Arab leaders in Eastern
Chad who are determined to carve up the country into
individual fiefdoms. Ambassador Bercot claimed that Khartoum
is squarely behind this attempt to dismember Eastern Chad as
a method of blocking the implementation of the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA).

KHARTOUM'S STOOGES
--------------


3. (C) Bercot made a case that five key Chadian players were
the instruments of this plan, engaged in activities that
would threaten the implementation of the DPA, Chad's
territorial integrity, and Idriss Deby Itno's future as
President. He made a direct pitch to DAS Yamammoto for USG
efforts in the UN Security Council for sanctions against

these individual Chadian political and armed opposition
leaders (presumably after the AU has forwarded its list to
the UN),based on their blocking of DPA implementation. His
"Top Five" on the hit list: President Deby's half-brother,
Daoussa Deby; Minister of Territorial Administration, General
Mahamat Ali Abdallah Nassour; the brothers Tom and Timan
Erdimi; and Mahamat Ali Adoum, President Deby's Deputy Chief
of Staff (Chef du Cabinet Adjoint).


4. (C) The French Ambassador called the first two -- Daoussa
Deby and General Ali -- the two greatest dangers as regards
Chadian interference in Darfur. He linked them directly to
the arming and equipping of groups in Darfur and Chad's
bordering regions opposed to the implementation of the DPA.
He accused the two of purchasing weapons, ammunition, and
vehicles with funds provided by Libya and Saudi Arabia.


5. (C) The French envoy saw the nexus of interests among
these individuals as being the CFA 5-6 billion (over USDOL 10
million) in annual black market trade all along Chad's
eastern border with Sudan. He claimed Daoussa Deby to be the
deus ex machina of this trade, using his ability to work
within all the Zaghawa clans in the area. Bercot connected
General Ali to the Erdimi brothers in this trade, with the
Erdimis as the "visible part of the iceberg", hiding General
Ali below the surface.


NDJAMENA 00000775 002.2 OF 003



6. (C) As for Mahamat Ali Adoum, Bercot stated only that the
President's Deputy Chief of Staff is deeply involved in
blocking the implementation of the DPA, referring to GOF
telephone intercepts as evidence of this. Bercot stated that
he had informed President Deby that if France obtained
evidence of Chad helping non-signaturies -- "you are dead."
In response, President Deby had responded that he didn't have
enough vehicles for his own army -- why would he be arming
Sudanese rebels?

THE LIBYAN'S TOO
--------------


7. (C) Ambassador Bercot stated that Libya's Mu'ammar
al-Qadhafi has also sought to influence the events in Darfur
and Eastern Chad. Bercot claimed that Qadhafi's particular
concern was to keep UN peacekeeping forces out of the region.
He reported that Qadhafi had told President Deby that the he
(Qadhafi) would attend Deby's investiture in August only if
three conditions were met. Deby is to (a) re-establish
diplomatic relations with Khartoum; (b) refuse to allow UN
PKO forces in the region; and (c) give key posts in his
government to the Gorane (a northern Chadian ethnic group)
and to leaders of the armed movements. Bercot speculated
that such a position showed the Libyan leader's lack of
understanding of Chadian power dynamics, indicating that
Qadhafi sought only a northern counterbalance to southern
political power in N'Djamena. Bercot claimed Tripoli sees
this as its best opportunity in 20 years to exercise control
over its southern neighbor.

TIME IS RUNNING OUT
--------------


8. (C) The French Envoy estimated that the international
community had very little time in which to act. He set the
end of Chad's rainy season -- roughly early October -- as the
moment when armed combat on a number of fronts would
certainly resume unless action is taken to forestall it.


9. (C) Bercot said Deby does not take seriously multilateral
institutions like the EU, AU and UN, believing that (a) he
will never change the minds of his detractors in the EU, but
will have the undying love of France; (b) he can handle the
AU's "council of elders under the baobab tree; and (c) only
the USG matters at the UN.

FRANCE WILL ACT
--------------


10. (C) Bercot set out a timeline of French actions over the
next three months set to influence President Deby, and to
improve his chances at staying in power peacefully. First,
Bercot reported he had told the President he has a very small
window of opportunity in which to launch a credible political
dialogue -- defined as 28 May (the official declaration of
the election results) to 8 August (date of Deby's investiture
as President for another five-year term). He said France
believed such a dialogue must take as its goal multi-ethnic
power sharing within the new government. To move the
President toward this, France's Minister Delegate for
Cooperation, Development and Francophony, Brigitte Girardin,
would visit Chad on 16-17 June to sign a five-year
"partnership framework document". This new partnership
agreement would be very specific about good governance
benchmarks; furthermore, unlike previous partnership
agreements, the new one would allow France (or Chad) to quit
the agreement at any time if objectives were not being met.
Bercot stated that Deby knew that something concrete related
to a political dialogue would need to be announced before 15
June.


11. (C) Ambassador Bercot said France wanted Deby to name a
Prime Minister (PM) from the opposition CPDC grouping
(Coordination of the Political Parties for the Defense of the
Constitution). The PM must be allowed to build his cabinet
from those parties willing to participate, without
interference from Deby. The President, however, would be

NDJAMENA 00000775 003.2 OF 003


expected to deliver his program to the PM for implementation.
France would expect the first year of that program to
include four elements: (a) judicial reform; (b) armed forces
reform; (c) financial and governance reforms; and (d)
electoral reforms. These reforms needed to be put in place
before the arrival of windfall oil revenues; after that,
Bercot believed, Chad would become "ungovernable." The new
government would need to be named before October and would
stay in place until the next legislative elections, at which
point the new Prime Minister would be chosen based on party
representation in the National Assembly.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) France understands that, even with the defeat of
rebel attacks on 13 April, the 3 May Presidential elections,
and the finalizing of the DPA behind it, the Deby regime
still faces significant challenges that must be addressed.
We sensed both a new activism to find solutions, and new
concern on their part that time may be running out.



13. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
WALL

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