DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT: CHADIAN OFFICIALS DENY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000772 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT: CHADIAN OFFICIALS DENY ASSISTANCE TO ANTI-DPA FORCES REF: A. STATE 85835 ¶B. NDJAMENA 748 NDJAMENA 00000772 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: P/E Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Assistant Secretary Don Yamamoto raised the reports of Chadian support for groups undermining the Darfur Peace Agreement with President Idriss Deby Itno on May 30 and with his close advisor, Minister of Territorial Administration General Mahamat Ali Abdullah on May 29. Deby and Ali denied that Chad could financially afford to support dissident Sudanese rebel groups. Deby said that he has made efforts to persuade Dr. Khalil Ibrahim to sign the agreement and would throw him out of the country if needed. Deby did not react to the likelihood that the African Union is considering sanctions against non-signatories and those undermining the DPA. We did not find either Deby or Ali persuasive in their denials. The Chadian Government is not convinced that the DPA will succeed and may calculate that it can deflect allegations of support by blaming the parties themselves. We will continue pressing the issue at various levels, but can make a stronger case if the African Union conducts a thorough investigation of the reports. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Deputy Assistant Secretary Don Yamamoto met President Idriss Deby Itno May 30 to raise U.S. concerns about reports of Chadian support for Sudanese rebel groups opposed to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) per ref A. He was accompanied by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population, Migration, and Refugees Bill Fitzgerald, Office for Central African Affairs Director Jane Gaffney, Ambassador Wall, and P/E officers. On May 29, DAS Yamamoto raised the reports with Minister for Territorial Administration Gen. Mahamat Ali Abdullah. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - DEBY READY TO KICK OUT KHALIL - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) DAS Yamamoto thanked Deby for Chad's continued engagement on Darfur issues. The United States has worked hard to meet Chad's requests for assistance on external �00A;security. The signing of the DPA and deployment of U.N. forces on the border will improve Chad's security and stability. DAS Yamamoto told Deby that the United States is concerned about reports from various sources that weapons are transiting Chad to Sudan with Chadian military escort for groups opposed to the DPA. He advised Deby that the African Union (AU) and U.N. are preparing to sanction groups that have not signed the agreement and those supporting attacks on Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minnawi. DAS Yamamoto requested that Deby investigate and stop arms transfers to various parties. In addition, Yamamoto suggested that a public statement in support of the peace agreement would help, particularly one that asks Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)'s Dr. Khalil Ibrahim and SLM's Abdelwahid Nur to sign the DPA. ¶4. (C) President Deby assured DAS Yamamoto that, even though Chad was not part of the mediation effort on the DPA, Chad is ready to assist and support the agreement. He stated that Chad is the country that has suffered the most from the Darfur crisis. Deby said he is closely monitoring the situation in the east and that Chad knows about the problems between Minni Minnawi and his ex-commander Adam Bahkit, which arose during the Haskenita Conference in October 2005. Deby said that he advised Minni, with whom he met three times over the past week, on the need for dialogue. Deby said he met with Dr. Khalil Ibrahim three times as well and described a joint meeting with both the leaders. Deby stated that he advised both of them (who are both operating in the same region) that stability in Darfur means stability in Chad. Deby said he spent over three hours with Khalil trying to convince him to sign the agreement. He noted that the Chadian Government made these efforts on their own, without any consultation with the African Union. Deby said he called NDJAMENA 00000772 002.2 OF 003 Libyan leader Qaddafi on May 29 to see if Minni was still there. He said he would send an investigative team to Tripoli to strengthen the agreement because Chad has information that there are mercenaries being trained to enter Chad from Sudan. ¶5. (C) Deby asserted that Chad is a victim of Sudanese aggression, janjaweed attacks, militias, Sudanese rebellion, as well as the presence of the refugees, some of whom do not behave very well. He added that Chad is the victim of the international community's belief that Chad has the means to give arms to various groups when it cannot equip its own troops to protect the country. He outlined the costs of land cruisers and noted the availability of vehicles and arms throughout the region as a result of the Darfur crisis. Deby alleged that arms are so plentiful, that one has to buy them in bulk in arms markets near El Geneina. He also complained that the AU has not made any statements about what is going on in Darfur and Chad. He said that a U.N. force was necessary to implement the DPA, which is an agreement not signed by all parties. Deby also stated that he would never give weapons to one Zaghawa group to kill other Zaghawas. He accused the Government of Sudan of misleading people as part of its destabilization campaign against Chad. Deby concluded by saying that he was ready to make a public statement and, if it is helpful, to expel Dr. Khalil Ibrahim and the SLM dissidents. Those who have not signed the DPA, can leave Chad, Deby said. ¶6. (C) PRM DAS Fitzgerald praised Chad's continuing hospitality for the 200,000 Sudanese refugees and said that the U.S. is interested in helping to bolster camp security measures. He stated that recruitment in the refugee camps by various groups over the past months is unacceptable and wondered if this was related to the lack of security for the camps. Deby agreed that it is difficult to provide security for so many refugees when the number of gendarmes and equipment is severely limited and the government is hard-pressed to provide security. Deby welcomed any assistance to improve security and told Fitzgerald that many gendarmes have been killed protecting the camps. He blamed dissident SLM commander Khamis Abdullah for the recruitment. Deby said that his government is talking to the U.N. and European Union about providing forces to protect the camps. ¶7. (C) DAS Yamamoto expressed appreciation for Chad's efforts and commitment to stop the arms flows and then outlined for Deby the AU's plan to sanction those who impede the peace process or do not sign the agreement. He told Deby that there would be an AU meeting next week to discuss next steps on preparing a list of those to be sanctioned for Darfur violations. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ONLY CHAD UNDERSTANDS DARFUR'S COMPLEXITIES - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) The previous day, DAS Yamamoto discussed the reports of Chadian facilitation of arms flows to dissident Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) members and other forces against the DPA with Minister of Territorial Administration Gen. Mahamat Ali Abdullah. Yamamoto described U.S. efforts to negotiate the peace deal, which is needed to get U.N. troops along the Chad/Sudan border. He told Ali that the presence of U.N. forces could significantly improve Chad's security situation. However, delivery of weapons and support for dissident Sudanese rebel groups is counterproductive to the DPA and Chad's own security situation and should cease. ¶9. (C) Ali responded by describing Chad's efforts to broker a durable, just peace deal. He complained that Khartoum is trying to destabilize Chad and that a solution is needed. He outlined the complexities of the situation, including differing agendas among the Sudanese rebel groups and emphasized that Chad understands these realities better than the African Union and international partners. Ali compared the N'Djamena Humanitarian Cease-fire Agreement with the DPA and claimed there was little difference between the two. Ali NDJAMENA 00000772 003.2 OF 003 criticized the African Union for not reconciling the parties and stated that a lot of money has been wasted. ¶10. (C) Gen. Ali restated his opinion that the DPA is not complete and that the agreement does not resolve the crisis' underlying issues. He said that the movements needed to be integrated together and that some were more important than others. Minni Minnawi has the larger military forces and Abdelwahid Nur is more politically-oriented. He criticized international support for Minni Minnawi, who as a Zaghawa-Tuer does not represent all Darfurians. Abdelwahid Nur represents the majority Fur tribe. Ali stated that allegations that the Justice and Equality Movement are receiving weapons from Chad are made up. Weapons and cars can be purchased anywhere in the region. Many Chadian vehicles came across the border into Sudan with the Chadian military deserters and he assured DAS Yamamoto that no official cars were given. In addition, Chad has not chosen any one group over another because the same ethnic groups live on both sides of the border. ¶11. (C) The Chadian Government does not even give its own military weapons, according to Ali, and would never disarm its own military to arm rebels. President Deby is making every effort to counter Sudanese aggression. The DPA needs to be signed by other groups and it may be too late as the agreement is insufficient. Ali said that Adam Bahkit, one of Minni's ex-commanders, leads an important faction and that the international community needs to make supplementary efforts for peace. Ali said that there is a deficit of information on the DPA. There is fear because no one understands it, in his view. Ali stated that Minni came to N'Djamena after Abuja and requested Chadian passports for ten members of his group, the use of Radio Chad to give messages to the refugees on the DPA, and vehicles. In response, the GOC told Minni to get Sudanese passports. - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶12. (C) It comes as no surprise that the President and Minister denied Chadian involvement in supplying JEM and dissident SLM members. Deby did not react when the possibility of sanctions was raised. We will continue pressing the Chadians and other principal actors (Ref B) at various levels and in more private settings. The African Union needs to thoroughly investigate the reports about am armed camp near Bahai. This would make it more difficult for the Chadians to deny their involvement and possibly deter more deliveries to JEM mercenaries and SLM dissidents. It will be hard for Deby, however, to completely cut these groups off, because he may calculate that he needs them to provide a counter-force to the Sudanese-backed Chadian rebels. Chadian officials may believe that they can attribute failure of the agreement to the fact that there is only one signatory. As a result, they can deflect blame if it fails. WALL