DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT: TOUGH SELL IN REFUGEE CAMPS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000755

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA,
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT: TOUGH SELL IN REFUGEE CAMPS

NDJAMENA 00000755 001.2 OF 004



1. (SBU) Summary: Sudanese refugees say they will support
the Darfur Peace Agreement if Sudan Liberation Movement
faction leader Abdelwahid Nur signs and their need for
individual compensation are adequately met. From May 23 to
27, P/E officer traveled to six of twelve refugee camps to
explain what the Darfur Peace Agreement offers refugees, the
dynamics of the Abuja peace process, and the next steps in
the peace process. The refugees' priorities are: security in
Darfur guaranteed by an international force, individual
compensation to replace lost possessions, and justice for the
perpetrators of criminal acts. Power-sharing issues were
rarely mentioned. The refugees complained that they were not
part of the negotiations and want to be consulted and
involved in the implementation of the peace agreement.
Support for or against the agreement is personality-driven
more than issue-based as refugees expressed support for the
positions of individual leaders, rather than the agreement
itself. Given the high-level of misinformation being spread,
particularly by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in
the camps, we recommend that a sustained public diplomacy
effort focusing on compensation, security, and justice issues
be undertaken to educate the refugees and displaced Sudanese
what the agreement does for them as individuals. End Summary.

- - - - - -
BACKGROUND
- - - - - -


2. (SBU) Post reproduced and bound 250 copies of the Darfur
Peace Agreement in Arabic, French, and English for the twelve
Sudanese refugee camps in Chad. In addition, each refugee
committee received factsheets in English and Arabic and
copies of relevant UNSC and African Union resolutions. UNHCR
arranged for P/E officer (who was a member of the USDEL at
the Darfur Peace Talks) to visit six of the twelve camps over
a four day period (May 23-27) to discuss the agreement with
the refugees. Refugee committees and non-governmental
organizations in the six other camps received copies of the
peace agreement, factsheets, and resolutions. During each
meeting, P/E officer emphasized the importance of signing an
agreement for bringing in a UN force, the provisions within
the agreement for compensation and reconstruction, and
creation of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultations to
bring more Darfurians, especially refugees and displaced
persons, into the implementation of the agreement.

- - - - - - - -
GOZ AMIR-KOUKOU
- - - - - - - -


3. (SBU) On May 23, the primarily Masselit refugees at
Koukou were skeptical of the Darfur Peace Agreement because
"the authors of criminal acts" (i.e the janjaweed) are still
at large and attacking closer and closer, threatening the
18,000 camp residents. The disarmament of the janjaweed and
restoration of security in Darfur by an international force
are their top priorities. They also were concerned about
individual compensation for property and livestock losses
incurred by janjaweed attacks. Nonetheless, the refugees
said that they will do whatever Sudan Liberation Movement
(SLM) faction leader Abdelwahid Nur instructs them to do. If
Abdelwahid signs on, they will support the agreement. The
refugee leaders accused SLM faction leader Minni Minnawi of
signing the agreement for his own interests.

- - - - - - - - -
GOZ BEIDA-DJABAL
- - - - - - - - -


4. (SBU) The refugees at nearby Djabal Refugee Camp
(population 14,000),also dominated by the Masselit and Fur
tribes, focused on receiving compensation for their destroyed
homes and looted possessions and livestock during the
discussion on May 24. The refugees complained bitterly about
the African Union force's inability to stop janjaweed
attacks, which they argued continue on a daily basis. They
noted that the janjaweed are "everywhere" now that they have

NDJAMENA 00000755 002.2 OF 004


been integrated into the security services. The group said
that an international force must disarm the janjaweed before
they consider returning to Sudan. The refugees asked how
they will be included in the Darfur-Darfur dialogue.
Finally, they stated that they will support the agreement if
SLM faction leader Abdelwahid Nur signs on.

- - - - - - - - - -
BAHAI-OURE CASSONI
- - - - - - - - - -


5. (SBU) The 29,000 refugees at Oure Cassoni crossed into
Sudan from the so-called "liberated areas" now controlled by
SLM faction leader Minni Minnawi. The camp is overwhelmingly
Zaghawa and pro-Minni. On May 25, refugee leaders said that
the majority of the refugees at Oure Cassoni supported the
agreement. Refugees were interested in the dynamics of the
negotiations and why Abdelwahid and Justice and Equality
Movement's (JEM) Khalil Ibrahim did not sign. They demanded
that individuals be compensated for their losses and a
mechanism be developed to assist the thousands of widows and
orphans created by the crisis. In addition, the refugees
requested an international force to secure Darfur.


6. (SBU) Women refugees spoke up and said that they do not
care who signs the peace agreement, they will accept any
peace that allows for the respect of their basic human
rights. One woman asked what will be done to redress the
harm caused by the rape of women and girls and the
traumatization of children forced to flee burning villages.
The women also asked that their possessions be replaced and
stated that they would return once the security situation was
stable.


7. (SBU) A JEM supporter, and known camp agitator, said
that the rebel movements deserve the presidency, not the
fourth position in government. He also said that only a
minority tribe signed the agreement and began a slew of
personal insults against Minni Minnawi. Another refugee
countered that Minni's Vice President is a Fur and his
Secretary General a Tunji. The other refugees silenced the

SIPDIS
JEM supporter, but he continued to interject and interrupt
the session, which ended in a shouting match between him and
the rest of the camp. Tensions in the camp are elevated due
to the presence of a large encampment of JEM-led mercenaries
and dissident SLM members at nearby Carriari lake. On May
23, members of this group drove through the camp in a display
of force and may have recruited a few residents. The aim of
the JEM-SLM group which is receiving material support from
the Chadian Government, according to a defector, is to attack
Minni Minnawi and then to attack Chadian rebels along the
border.

- - - - -
BREDJING
- - - - -


8. (SBU) At Bredjing on May 26, the primarily Masselit and
Fur population (29,000) was highly organized politically for
the discussion. This camp closely identifies with Abdelwahid
and expressed their support for the agreement if Abdelwahid
signs it. A recent forced recruitment drive, supported by
local Chadian authorities and dissident SLM commander Khamis
Abdullah, included the abduction of the camp's refugee
committee leader who opposed the recruitment. The refugees
at this camp, said that an agreement signed by Minni Minnawi
alone is not enough. They stated that they "agree" with
Abdelwahid that their possessions must be replaced and that
700 million USD is not enough to reconstruct Darfur. The
refugees said that they want to be paid "one-by-one" for
their losses. The group criticized AU Commission President
Alpha Omar Konare and Darfur Negotiations Special Envoy Salim
Salim as being Government of Sudan collaborators. Finally,
the refugees expressed their support for a UN force and
stated that the African Union cannot provide security with
its current mandate. Their posters and drawings included
slogans such as: "we need individual recompensation for the

NDJAMENA 00000755 003.2 OF 004


losing of our properties. The agreement doesn't express
about compensations and rehabilitation", "the international
security council should disarmament of janjaweed militia",
and "we all need Darfur in one region". The refugees also
demanded to know why the agreement does not address criminal
justice issues.

- - - - -
TREGUINE
- - - - -


9. (SBU) The refugees at Treguine, located fifteen minutes
from Bredjing with a predominately Masselit and Fur
population of 14,000, were less organized politically, but
clear in their conditions for their return to Darfur. First,
international intervention is needed to restore the security
situation in Darfur. Second, those responsible for
committing crimes against the local populations must be
brought to justice. Third, individuals must be compensated
for their losses. Fourth, all armed elements (Sudanese and
Chadian) in Darfur must be disarmed and demobilized. The
refugees at Treguine were concerned that a peace agreement
signed by one person cannot bring peace. The camp residents
are supporters of Abdelwahid Nur and want him to sign to make
a "lasting peace". Nonetheless, the refugees were largely
satisfied with the agreement and asked specific questions on
how the compensation scheme would work. They are also
supporters of Abdelwahid Nur.

- - - - -
FARCHANA
- - - - -


10. (SBU) Farchana, the first camp established in Chad in
2004, hosts a largely Masselit population of 17,000. Camp
residents are supporters of Abdelwahid Nur. European Union
Special Envoy Pekka Haavisto had met with the refugee leaders
on May 23 to outline the peace agreement. As a result, the
group had more specific follow-up questions for P/E officer
on May 27. First, the leaders asked how long will it take to
get international troops to Darfur and what will be the
mandate. They asked why President Bashir continues to oppose
a peacekeeping force in Darfur. Second, the group emphasized
how important the title Vice President is and expressed
concern that the U.S. did not support their demand for one.
Third, the group stressed the importance of replacing the
refugee's personal possessions. The group of leaders said
that it wants Abdelwahid to sign the agreement. They
expressed discontent with SLM dissident Khamis Abdullah, who
they charged, was spearheading the recruitment in the camps
to create his own force in collaboration with the Chadians.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
COMMENT: LESSONS LEARNED
- - - - - - - - - - - - -


11. (SBU) During the course of the refugee camp briefings,
the agreement's provisions on power-sharing, integration of
forces, and wealth-sharing were completely overshadowed by
the personal losses incurred by the refugees. We began to
tailor the discussions to focus on the compensation
provisions (individual, reconstruction, refugee return
packages, free education at all levels). A factsheet brought
down to the individual level could be more persuasive with
refugee and displaced populations and their leaders.
Additional discussions of the agreement with Sudan Liberation
Movement members on May 28 revealed a total lack of
comprehension of the compensation provisions in the
agreement. It is very clear that this lack of understanding
hinders their ability to support or sell the agreement. We
found that the refugees need to be able to envision what
their return will look like and how the various funds will
work. In addition, highlighting the justice mechanisms, such
as the International Criminal Court and UNSC sanctions, as
well as the types of discussions that will be held during the
Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultations on bringing
individuals to justice, helped answer some of the refugees

NDJAMENA 00000755 004.2 OF 004


concerns. The Sudanese refugees in Chad were not strongly
opposed to the agreement itself, but instead the dislike for
SLM faction leader Minni Minnawi clouded refugee opinions of
the accord's prospects. It will be critical to include large
numbers of representatives from the refugee and displaced
persons camps in the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue to overcome their
feeling of marginalization in the peace process.
WALL