EQUIVOCAL MESSAGES ON DARFUR PEACE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000747

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SU CD
SUBJECT: EQUIVOCAL MESSAGES ON DARFUR PEACE



1. (SBU) Summary. Key Darfur interlocutors in N'djamena
explained their reasons for dissatisfaction with the recently
signed Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in meetings with
Ambassador Wall May 24 and 25. JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim
poured venom on SLM leader Minni Minawi, whom he described as
"dead to the people of Darfur." He claimed that his own
popularity was rising with Darfurians as a result of not
having signed the Darfur Peace Agreement. For his part,
"first half-brother" Daoussa Deby said that unless Darfur
could be placed under a UN mandate, the DPA was not the
answer to Darfur's problems. Daoussa reaffirmed that
President Deby has asked all parties to sign the DPA and that
JEM leader Khalil would have no reason to be in N'djamena
after the 31st. In a meeting with SLM breakaway members Dr.
Sharif Harir and Adam Shogar, Sharif and Shogar said that
Minni's self-appointed role as "policeman for Darfur" had
alienated Darfurians and that his support was rapidly
diminishing. End summary.


2. (SBU) Ambassador and DCM (notetaker) met with Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) President Khali Ibrahim, President
Deby's brother Daoussa Deby and with SLM leaders Sharif Harir
and Adam Shogar on May 24 and 25 in N'djamena to discuss the
DPA and conflicting reports of inter-SLM clashes in Birzamma,
Sudan on May 24 (discussed septel).


3. (SBU) Meeting with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, Ambassador
Wall stressed that it was in JEM's interest to sign the DPA.
It might not be perfect, but it provided a basis for
security, compensation and representation. Without an
agreement, there would be no peace, and the people of Darfur
would suffer. He encouraged Khalil to consider the fact that
the DPA was only the beginning of the process. The United
States was serious about ensuring its success; we would work
with all of those parties that wished to make it work. The
agreement itself was not the end of the process; putting it
in place was the process by which Darfur leaders would have a
chance to make a difference. Parties that didn't play the
game would be marginalized.


4. (SBU) Khalil countered that the majority of Darfurians
did not support the peace agreement. Darfur had a distinct
historical and cultural identity. This identity needed to be
recognized, and Darfurians needed to fully control their
destiny. Khalil explained that now, more than ever he
realized that he had made the right decision in refusing to
sign. He noted that Abdel Wahid's popularity "had soared"
after his refusal. Minni Minawi had only signed because he
was "finished on the ground." Minni, in fact, had accepted a
proposal from Khartoum that was only a "first draft" that was
very far from Khartoum's bottom line. The Government of
Sudan, in fact, couldn't believe its good fortune that the
agreement had been accepted. Minni, according to Khalil, was
now "dead" to the people of Darfur. Those who had gained the
confidence of the international community, had lost the
confidence of their people. The reverse was also true.
Khalil reported that tribal leaders were spontaneously coming
to him and telling him that he was right not to sign.


5. (SBU) Turning to the details of the agreement, Khalil
explained that a referendum would never work in Darfur. The
results would be manipulated by Khartoum. On the question of
disarming the janjaweed, the Darfurians knew that the
Government of Sudan (GOS) would never disarm them. And then
there was the question of compensation. Darfurians wanted
compensation for their burned huts and other losses. The DPA
was not the bible -- clearly it could be amended if
necessary. Asked why he had not sought these amendments
during the negotiations, Khalil responded that he had -- but
they had not been accepted. On relations with Chad, Khalil
stated that they were "normal." He reiterated that President
Deby had told him to sign. However, he also expected
President Deby to "kick him out" and he was "ready to be
kicked out."


6. (SBU) Khalil expressed his disappointment that Minni had
been favored because international partners thought that only
Minni could maintain security. But just looking at
"security" would not solve the problems of Darfur -- the root
causes of Darfur's economic, social and political root crisis
needed to be examined as well. Minni may have been powerful
once, but other groups would be powerful in the future.
Minni might have troops on the ground, but JEM was
"politically smart." People had faith that JEM would do the
right thing. And finally, Minni was only a "self-declared"
leader -- he had never even been to Khartoum. No one believes
in Minni, and he had cheated the other movements.


7. (SBU) Looking ahead, Khalil stated that "many things
would change -- and change fast" as Darfurians realized that
the DPA was not in their best interests. President Deby was
also encouraging him to sign -- but signing, according to

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Khalil, would be suicide. JEM's first priority was to make
amendments - achieve Darfur as a single region, and have a
Vice President. He explained why the current arrangements in
the DPA were not satisfactory. The Senior Assistant position
was not a real job -- and if Darfur was not a region, there
was no way that Darfurians could control the territory and
ensure security.


8. (SBU) As far as options, Khalil was ambivalent on
whether they could stand by and watch and "be observers." He
opined that much depended on what happened on May 31st.
Khalil stated that he was waiting to see what the AU Peace
and Security Commission would decide. Would the treaty truly
close on the 31st? Would amendments be offered? Khalil
asked the United States to help the JEM sign by agreeing to
amendments.


9. (SBU) Khalil was interested to know whether the United
States would then consider JEM an "illegitimate group" after
May 31st. Asked point blank by the Ambassador whether JEM
would fight, Khalil responded "If I don't have anything --
what do you advise me?" Asked whether he would fight Minni,
Khalil stated "I will never attack Minni -- unless Minni
attacks me -- then I must fight in self-defense." Ambassador
Wall asked that Khalil at least not be a "spoiler." Khalil
took umbrage at this, saying that one could not call a
legitimate confrontation with the government spoiling.


10. (SBU) In a separate meeting, Daoussa Deby (half-brother
to the President) said that Chad's position vis-a-vis Sudan
was clear. They did not consider the GOS to be serious in
its approach to peace. Abuja was not the answer -- Darfur's
problems would not be solved by the DPA. According to
Daoussa Darfur needed to be placed under a UN mandate and
with UN-held elections. That being said, President Deby had
indeed told the rebel movements to sign. Daoussa vehemently
denied that the GOC was assisting the non-signatory rebel
movements.


11. (SBU) Daoussa said that that he thought that Minni was
sincere, but the Government of Sudan was certainly not; it
would try to occupy as much land as possible before the
arrival of the UN force. The DPA could be seen as a minimum
step, but already it was dividing the rebel movements as they
jockeyed for posts. Minni needed to understand that he could
not militarily defeat the other rebels -- if he continued to
act in this way, the situation would be radicalized quickly.
In closing, Ambassador Wall emphasized that the United States
was very serious about supporting the process; we will
support those who sign. There will be consequence for those
who do not sign.


12. (SBU) SLM breakaway members Adam Shogar and Dr. Sharif
Harir called Minni an obstacle to peace who had developed an
inflated notion of his self-worth during the negotiations and
who was surrounded by paid agents of the Sudanese
intelligence chief. They argued that a debate was necessary
on the DPA -- something as important as peace in Darfur
required a serious give and take. They said that they would
never recognize the agreement in its current form as it went
against the will of the Darfur people. They did not advocate
violence, but at the same time could not accept aggression by
other movements. They criticized Minni's "assumption of
responsibility" for peace and security in Darfur and
complained that he had threatened to kill all those who
didn't agree with the DPA. Dr. Sharif told the Ambassador
that "someone needs to tell Minni that he is not the police
of the region." Meanwhile, they believed that his support on
the ground was diminishing every day. Like Khalil, they
stated that they were not encouraging opponents of the peace
agreement to fight, but that if threatened, they would defend
themselves.

WALL