Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NDJAMENA737
2006-05-23 06:41:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

CHAD: OPPOSITION MEMBERS HOPE U.S. WILL PLAY

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL EPET CD 
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DE RUEHNJ #0737/01 1430641
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230641Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3799
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0709
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1791
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1400
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000737 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, DRL, INR

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EPET CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: OPPOSITION MEMBERS HOPE U.S. WILL PLAY
LARGER ROLE

REF: N'Djamena 589

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000737 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C, DRL, INR E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EPET CD SUBJECT: CHAD: OPPOSITION MEMBERS HOPE U.S. WILL PLAY LARGER ROLE REF: N'Djamena 589 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: During recent meetings two opposition leaders of the CPDC coalition reiterated that the May 3 presidential election was a farce and said it was "too late" to negotiate with President Idriss Deby Itno, at least without the significant involvement of and pressure from the international community. One of the opposition leaders discussed the reasons why Deby would not relinquishing power without sustained international pressure and spoke favorably of the prospect of a coup by Sudanese-backed rebels, whom he said the opposition knew and could work with to form a democratic government. The Opposition leaders outlined their roadmap for a post-Deby transition, emphasizing the urgent need for "an alternative" to France and greater involvement by the United States. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) During two May 10 meetings, just prior to the announcement of preliminary presidential election results, two opposition leaders of the CPDC coalition, Salibou Garba and Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh, reiterated that the May 3 presidential election was a farce and said it was "too late" to negotiate with President Idriss Deby Itno, at least without the significant involvement of and pressure from the international community. "We have been trying since 2001 to establish a national dialogue that would foster credible elections and a democracy, but today there is nothing left to discuss," Garba said matter-of-factly. "We, the opposition, are for democracy, but Deby is not a democrat. He wants to be a dictator." ¶3. (SBU) Despite his deep pessimism over prospects for opening up a national dialogue to foster a transitional government, Garba and Ibni Oumar firmly ruled out the possibility of joining the rebel movements, saying that they and their colleagues in the opposition would continue to fight for peace and democracy without resorting to violence. While both Garba and Ibni Oumar lamented the "illegitimate path" taken by the rebels, they explained that the dialogue that the CPDC favors must include the armed opposition, not just civil society and the political opposition. Ibni Oumar cautioned that while civil society must be included, groups such as CASCIDOH who were created by and are financed and influenced by Deby s
hould not be allowed to participate (NOTE: CASCIDOH was one of three local umbrella groups, along with COGONET and CGASCOET, who observed the May 3 election. In a joint statement on May 5, the three groups judged the election favorably overall, despite noted problems such as overly liberal rules regarding nomad voting and the presence of children at polling stations. The statement asserted that turnout was poor in N'Djamena but strong in other parts of the country, and it called for an all-inclusive national dialogue. The election assessment of these three groups was harsher than that of the international election observers, hailing from African countries such as Burkina Faso, but was nonetheless favorable. END NOTE). ¶4. (SBU)In addition, Garba said it is not enough for Deby to talk about promoting peace and to offer cushy positions in the government to opposition members, particularly since any power-sharing arrangement offered by Deby (in the absence of international pressure) would not provide the opposition with any real decision-making power. To be meaningful, Garba said, the dialogue would have to focus on security issues, significant electoral system reforms, and the establishment of transparency in the budgetary regime, all of which Deby would reject, unless he were strongly compelled by the international community. -------------- Why Deby Will Never Step Down -------------- ¶5. (SBU) During an October 13, 2003 conversation, Deby confided in Garba that he planned to die in office. Garba said that because Deby did not see any promising post-presidential future for himself, the only way Deby would leave power was "with a bullet to the head." He said he thought Deby would not relinquish power voluntarily, at least not without significant international pressure, for several reasons. First, Deby is very conscious of international efforts to prosecute NDJAMENA 00000737 002 OF 004 former President Hissene Habre for crimes against humanity. Deby realizes, Garba said, that "he would have serious problems" and would be vulnerable to international prosecution efforts if he were to step down. ¶6. (SBU) Garba's point was underlined a few days later on May 19, when the United Nations Committee against Torture, whose verdicts have moral authority but no legal power, ruled in favor of seven Chadian nationals who alleged they were victims of abuse during Habre's rule between 1982 and 1990. The committee also ruled that Senegal was breaking international human rights law, as outlined in the UN Convention against Torture, by not trying to extradite Habre on charges of mass murder and torture. A Belgian arrest warrant for Habre was issued in September 2005 by a Brussels magistrate under the country's universal jurisdiction law, which allows Belgian judges to prosecute human rights violations regardless of where they are committed. In November 2005 Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade turned the matter over to the African Union, which decided in January to consult a committee of African lawyers. The committee's recommendation on how to handle the Habre question is expected in July. ¶7. (SBU) Second, Garba said Deby had good reason to fear the loss of the protection of the presidency, particularly since his departure from power would expose him to vendettas from victims and the families of those he was responsible for killing. Garba cited the example of Adoma, a former Deby confident convicted of murder. Adoma appealed his conviction; however, out of fear that his fellow Zaghawa would share information about killings Deby condoned, Deby signed a decree to have Adoma executed, effectively annulling his right to an appeal. This and other cases in which Deby eliminated potential threats to his survival as president would continue to haunt Deby and prevent him from stepping down. ¶8. (SBU) Third, Deby's health remains poor, Garba said, and as president he has access to quality medical care, including large quantities of morphine, that he would not likely have if he were to step down. Fourth, Garba alleged, has commissioned the construction of numerous presidential or personal villas abroad, which he has refused to pay for. If he were to leave power, he would be subject to a wave of lawsuits and prosecution for failing to pay. Fifth, Deby has long been involved in what Garba called "mafia-esque affairs," which involve operations focused on money laundering, the production of counterfeit money, dirty business deals (including business deals with Charles Taylor),and other forms of severe corruption. Garba said Deby knows that his departure from power could usher in an era of increased transparency, exposing his corrupt activities to the light of day. In addition, without the protection of the presidency, he would be targeted by numerous business associates whom he had wronged or cheated over the years. -------------- Sudan: Drinking the Dirty Water -------------- ¶9. (SBU) On Deby's imminent election victory, Garba said Deby would be lucky if he were able to serve two more years as president (barring the occurrence of a meaningful national dialogue and serious reforms),citing the rebel threat as well as the possibility that a popular non-rebel uprising might abruptly end his rule. When asked if a coup by Sudanese-supported rebels and a potential puppet government controlled by Khartoum might be worse for Chad than five more years under Deby, Garba laughed and explained that although Sudan and Libya still represent a threat to Chad, there is nonetheless a need for an external force to end Deby's rule. In the absence of concerted international pressure on Deby, he likened the options currently available to Chadians to a thirsty man walking in the desert. Weakened by the desert sun, the thirsty man who comes upon an oasis offering dirty water is going to drink the dirty water to survive, regardless of the potential health risks. "Sudan offers dirty water," Garba said, "but we NDJAMENA 00000737 003 OF 004 are dying of thirst." Besides, Garba added, Sudan had been behind Deby's and Habre's rise to power, but no puppet governments were established by Khartoum in those cases. If the rebels succeed in overthrowing Deby, Sudan will not try to control Chad's government; rather, the extent of manipulation by Sudan would be limited to contracts and business, he said. -------------- Democratic Rebels? -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The opposition knows the rebels very well, Garba said. "We can talk with them," he said, "and they will listen to us-they will have to since we represent what they will have to work with to make a new government work." He explained that if the rebels came to power, it would not be similar to Deby's rise to power in 1990, when there were no political parties and no civil society to form a base for democracy. This time, he said, the presence of a much stronger civil society made it very unlikely that another dictator would emerge from the change of power. Garba said he believed the rebels would allow for a national dialogue and a new transition that could potentially be good for Chad. -------------- Opposition Road Map for Chad -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Garba said he wished that the United States would become a stronger partner for Chad. Because civil war could break out in the very near future, it is essential that the U.S. continue to take an active interest in fostering peace as well as democratic governance in Chad, he said. He maintains the belief that the U.S., with cooperation from the French (acting increasingly through the EU),could pressure Deby into agreeing to form a transitional government that would be under international (U.S. and French) supervision. The first step would be a strong statement from the U.S. expressing disappointment over the presidential election. Under U.S. and EU pressure, Chad would establish an inclusive national dialogue, suspend the existing constitution and National Assembly, place the army under international supervision, rewrite the electoral code, reform the electoral system, form a new and truly independent electoral commission, conduct a credible national census, and nominate a new prime minister from the opposition to serve under President Deby, who would remain as a figure head. Ibni Oumar said the ideal scenario would be to install an opposition prime minister within the next year or two; he envisaged a prime minister who would hold the real power of the government while Deby served out his five years as a figure who was president in title only. When asked if the opposition could agree on a single leader to be prime minister, Ibni Oumar said it would not be a problem but declined to speculate on who it would be. -------------- Wanted: An Alternative to France -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Chad direly needs "an alternative" to France, Garba said. Citing the scandal involving Elf Aquitaine that culminated in the 2003 conviction of two top oil executives, he said that France does not want to see increased transparency in the oil sector and that "mafia-esque" arrangements concerning Chadian oil continued to provide secret funds for political parties in France. With oil as its motivation, France was clearly behind the coup that brought Bozize to power and Deby's attempt to destabilize Sudan, he said. (NOTE: This view seems to be shared by many Chadians. Another variation involves accusations that France somehow secretly encouraged the FUC's April 13 attack on N'Djamena in order to sow instability that it hoped would eventually help scare off Esso (Exxon),leaving Chad's oil sector open to French control. END NOTE.). Garba said he hoped the departure of Chirac, who is nearing the end of his tenure and whose personal ties to African leaders are not shared by his successors, would change the nature of relations between France United States. NDJAMENA 00000737 004 OF 004 -------------- -------------- An Opposition Victory Despite the Farcical Election -------------- -------------- ¶11. (SBU) On the presidential election, Garba said he viewed the boycott as a tremendous victory for the opposition since it helped expose to the world the farcical nature of the country's electoral system. He said Deby did exactly what the opposition was hoping he would do when the CENI announced a voter participation rate of more than 60 percent, which "clearly exposed the election as a fiction to the world." He added that the overwhelming majority of African Union member states refused to send election observers to show their disapproval of another rigged Chadian election. The four AU member countries that did send AU election observers, including Cameroon, were pressured into doing so by current AU Chairman and Congo-B President Denis Sassou Nguesso, who was under considerable pressure from Chirac, according to Garba. -------------- -------------- Darfur Peace Accord: Nothing to Do with Us -------------- -------------- ¶14. (SBU) On the Darfur peace agreement, Garba said the accord had "no impact" on the opposition or the current impasse in Chad. Except for the agreement's potential effect on the refugee situation, Garba said the agreement had "nothing to do with us." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶15. (SBU) While Ibni Oumar offered little new information, Garba's willingness to discuss favorably the prospect of a Sudanese-supported coup suggests that the opposition is far from convinced that the international community is willing and able to apply enough sustained pressure on Deby to effect a meaningful national dialogue and a transition to a democratic government. In addition, Garba's emphatic and lengthy explanation of why Deby would prefer death over relinquishing power belied his assertion that the international community was capable of convincing Deby to agree to serve as a figurehead while an opposition prime minister held the real power of the government. ¶16. (SBU) Garba's comments on the likely diminishing role in Africa of a post-Chirac France underlined the increasing hope held by many Chadians that the United States will play a larger role in Chad's affairs, particularly in the promotion of democracy and human rights. His disdain for French support for Deby and his perception that the French will go to ruthless lengths to pursue oil interests in Chad are not uncommon complaints among average Chadians. It is not just the rebels who claim that France is propping up a dictator. Many Chadians say France's calls for democracy in Africa are severely undermined by its track record of friendly relations with despots over the years. Regardless of his less than positive view of France, Garba, like most Chadians, understands that France has a significant role to play and its significant influence in Chad and Africa is not going to disappear. His comments underline the need for the international community to apply sustained and concerted pressure on Deby with a view to fostering a democratic transition. END COMMENT Wall

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