DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT UPDATE: N'DJAMENA ACTIVITIES

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000706 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF CD SU SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT UPDATE: N'DJAMENA ACTIVITIES REF: A. STATE 078589 ¶B. NDJAMENA 646 ¶C. NDJAMENA 663 NDJAMENA 00000706 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) faction leader Minni Minnawi was warmly welcomed in N'Djamena, where he is consulting with the Chadian Government, SLM followers in Chad, non-governmental organizations, and the media. Minni described his meetings with President Idriss Deby as positive. Deby told Justice and Equality Movement President Dr. Khalil Ibrahim that if he does not sign the Darfur Peace Agreement by May 31, he must leave Chad. Minni remains concerned about attempts by Khalil, Dr. Sharif Harir, and Khamis Abdullah to attack and/or undermine him. He believes that the Government of Sudan will do all it can to get Abdelwahid to sign the DPA. In response to Ref A, post's DPA implementation activities have focused on providing advisory and administrative support to Minni Minnawi; briefing Chadian Government officials at all levels on the DPA; working with the DPA's opponents in Chad, including Dr. Sharif Harir, Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, and National Movement for Reform and Development; and dissemination of information about the agreement to international and local journalists, refugee camps, and local authorities. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - CHADIAN RED CARPET - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) faction leader Minni Minnawi was surprised by his warm welcome in Chad on May 12. Members of the Chadian Mediation team and Special Advisor to the President Abderahamane Moussa met Minni as he disembarked from the aircraft upon arrival from Abuja. The Chadian Government has also put Minni up in the Novotel Hotel. Minni has had two meetings with President Idriss Deby. In the first, he reviewed the peace agreement with Deby and explained the benefits for Chad of the disarmament of the jandjaweed and the foreign combatants in Sudan. According to Minni, Deby responded positively. Other members of Deby's inner circle, such as Minister of Territorial Administration Gen. Mahamat Ali Abdullah, remain skeptical of the Government of Sudan's intentions, but are supportive of the agreement. In the second (three-hour) meeting, on May 16, Deby included Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) President Dr. Khalil Ibrahim without telling Minni. According to Minni and the Chadian mediators present, Deby told Khalil that the African Union Peace and Security Council will brand him an outlaw if he does not sign the Darfur Peace Agreement by the end of May. At that time, Deby said, Khalil would no longer be welcome in Chad. Minni said that Khalil was visibly shaken and surprised at Deby's position. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - RECRUITMENT FROM REFUGEE CAMPS BY ROGUE SLA ELEMENTS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) Meanwhile, SLM's (former) Vice Chairman Khamis Abdullah, JEM's Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, one of Minni's former commanders Adam Bahkit, and a cousin of Deby named Bidet are responsible for the heavy recruitment of men and boys from the refugee camps in Chad, according to a variety of sources. Reports last week from Treguine and Breidjing camps indicate they are forcibly taking children from the camps. Approximately 4,000 Sudanese refugees have been recruited. In addition, the Abdullah-Khalil group was seen in Iriba with 17 landcruisers with weapons supplied by President Deby's brother Daoussa. ¶4. (SBU) Theories about Khamis and Khalil's objectives abound. The most likely explanation is that they are recruiting forces to defend Deby against Chadian rebels. A second likely rationale is that they are recruiting to attack Minni and Abdelwahid. A third motivation, but more likely a cover story, is that they are arming the refugees to defend themselves against increasing jandjaweed incursions. Members NDJAMENA 00000706 002.2 OF 003 of the groups claim that the refugees at Goz Amir were attacked by Chadian rebels and jandjaweed earlier in April because of their ties to the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army. - - - - - - - - - - - MINNI MEETS THE PRESS - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (SBU) The Chadian Government arranged a widely-attended press conference for Minni at a local hotel. The questions focused on whether or not Minni was pressured into signing the agreement and what effect the peace agreement will have on the deteriorating security situation in eastern Chad. Minni said that he was not pressured into choosing peace over war in Darfur. Rather, those who did not choose peace may have been pressured. He stated that members of his faction are in Darfur meeting with militants explaining the gains that will come with the agreement and that it will be adopted by the Revolutionary Council of SLM soon. One reporter asked him about a recent agreement signed in Khartoum. (Minni has a copy of an agreement between Adam Shogar and Mutrif Sadiq signed in Khartoum which contains verbatim some text from the DPA.) Minni reminded the journalists that the DPA is the only agreement signed between the rebels and the Government of Sudan this year and it has the support of the international community. He expressed his hope that the other rebel movements will sign the accord and said he is open to dialogue with Abdelwahid and Dr. Khalil. Regarding Chad's security, Minni cited provisions for the disarmament of the jandjaweed and foreign combatants that could help alleviate border tensions. ¶6. (SBU) Embassy facilitated an interview for Minni with CNN's Nic Robertson on May 15. The series of programs entitled "Crisis in Chad" began airing on CNN International on May 17 and is examining the recruitment of children out of the refugee camps and increased jandjaweed attacks in southeastern Chad. Minni outlined the benefits of the agreement for Darfur and for Chad. He also told Robertson that his former SLA colleagues were behind the recruitment in the camps. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - OUTREACH TO NAYSAYERS, SPOILERS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (SBU) On May 16, P/E officer met with Dr. Sharif Harir and Adam Shogar, two of Minni's and the DPA's greatest detractors. Ambassador and DCM had met previously with Harir (Ref B). Harir's only explanation for his opposition, after reading the two copies provided by Embassy, was that the DPA does not meet the central demand of the refugees for compensation. P/E officer asked Harir to go through the agreement again and return to provide suggestions that the implementation process could address. Embassy is also reaching out to Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, who is in N'Djamena, to see if he might have changed his position now that the Chadian Government has weighed in with him. National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) is meeting with P/E officer on May 19. ¶8. (SBU) Minni has recently met with some of Dr. Sharif Harir's supporters. Perhaps as a result of this, for the first time, he has expressed concern about the lack of an amnesty provision in the accord this week. Harir told P/E officer on May 16 that no one should avoid prosecution, even signatories to the agreement, implying Minni. Harir bears a grudge from the spring of 2005 when he received support from the Government of Chad to go to the border area to undermine Minni. Minni's forces prevented Harir from entering Darfur and instead spread money and their message in the refugee camps and in the Tine area. Harir said that Minni's troops tried to kill him last year. According to UNHCR, Harir used one of his relatives in Oure Cassoni refugee camp as a focal point to buy supporters. At that time, the Chadian NDJAMENA 00000706 003.2 OF 003 Government unceremoniously pulled Harir and Shogar back from the border, seizing their landcruisers, money, and Thuraya telephones. ¶9. (SBU) For his part, Minni told us that he does not trust the British because they favor the Fur tribe in Darfur. He said that the British do not trust the Zaghawa and will work hard to give Abdelwahid whatever he wants to sign. P/E officer responded that each international partner can play a different role and if the U.K. can deliver Abdelwahid's signature, that only helps the agreement's credibility, and by extension, Minni's. Nonetheless, SLM-Minnawi faction suspicions of U.K. intentions were circulated frequently by members of Minni's inner circle from January through March in Abuja. This distrust is a reality for Minni and his associates. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - POST ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF DPA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (SBU) P/E officer returned to N'Djamena with Minni and the other rebel movements. P/E officer meets with Minni daily to provide advice, consult with him on implementation, and furnish information packages, which include African Union and U.N. communiques and other press articles, and connecting Minni with AU mediators working with Abdelwahid Nur. In addition, post is preparing an implementation calendar for Minni to clarify tasks and upcoming deadlines. On May 14, post arranged for Minni to meet with the director of INTERNEWS, the non-governmental organization running radio stations in the refugee camps in Chad, to discuss dissemination of information about the peace accord via radio. Post also provided Chadian Government officials and Minni with copies of the DPA in Arabic, English, and French for their roundtable discussion with Minni on May 13. On May 16, P/E officer briefed UNHCR and its NGO partners on the agreement and discussed options on how best to deliver the agreement to the refugee committees. P/E officer will travel with UNHCR Country Director from May 22-25 to brief refugees in Chad and local Chadian officials on the benefits of the agreement as well as deliver copies of the agreement to each camp. ¶11. (U) Ambassador Wall hosted Minni, the Chad Mediation team, and the Minister of Territorial Administration for lunch in recognition of their role as peacemakers on May 17. He discussed the issue with President Deby May 9 (ref C) and has raised it repeatedly in meetings with Chadian officials and civil society leaders in N'Djamena and during a trip to eastern Chad May 10-11. Over the last week he explained the importance of the agreement and highlighted U.S. efforts to implement it in interviews with local and international journalists (e.g., CNN, BBC, Reuters). - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶12. (SBU) Minni continues to perform well in N'Djamena, despite being under significant pressure. We need to help focus him on implementation of the agreement, including nominations for positions and setting up physical infrastructure in Darfur. He has had virtually no contact with the African Union since his arrival in N'Djamena, a connection post continues to pursue by updating the AU on his activities and passing along contact information to various officials. N'Djamena will continue to grow in importance as a platform for key actors involved in making the DPA a reality, and post's reporting, negotiating, advising, and facilitating services will be similarly called upon. With the planned departure of post's Pol/Econ officer, Pol/Econ staffing at Embassy N'Djamena must remain a priority. WALL