SLM EXCLUDED FROM ABUJA WARN OF CIVIL WAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000618 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICAN WATCHERS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED SIGNATURE) E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV SU SUBJECT: SLM EXCLUDED FROM ABUJA WARN OF CIVIL WAR IF SIGNING OCCURS Classified by: POL SMCRAMPTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: As peace negotiations enter an extra 48-hour inning in Abuja, three Chad-based Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) representatives told the Ambassador during a May 1 meeting that their delegation had been effectively excluded from the Darfur peace talks in Abuja by the AU, which instructed them to join one of the two SLM factions holding a seat at the negotiating table. Senior SLM members Dr. Sharif Harir, Adan Shogar and Khamis Abdullah told the Ambassador that the proposed peace agreement is "debatable" but needs to be amended in some important ways, and they will not be bound by any outcome unless they are allowed to participate independently (as a third SLM faction) in the negotiations. They warned that if the proposed Darfur peace agreement is signed by the three parties negotiating with the GOS, it could lead to civil war among the parties involved as the SLM representatives in Abuja no longer represent the field commanders in Darfur. They have asked the African Union to set a new round of negotiations after the movements have had an opportunity to organize themselves and pick a new leader. The SLM representatives claimed not to be aware of SLM forces fighting alongside the Chadian army against Chadian rebels or of the SLM's recruitment in refugee camps, despite reports to the contrary. End summary. -------------- Third SLM Faction at our Doorstep? -------------- ¶2. (C) Three SLM Chad-based representatives, Dr. Sharif Harir, Spokesman Adam Shogar, and "Acting Chairman" (formerly Vice-Chairman) Khamis Abdullah told the Ambassador in a May 1 meeting that their 17-member delegation remains in Abuja, but had been excluded from the Darfur peace talks by the AU, which cited guidelines outlined by the AU Peace and Security Commission (PSC) obligating them to join one of the two SLM factions holding a seat at the negotiating table (that of Abdul Wahid Mohamed Nour or Minni Arkou Minawi). They informed the AU that as long as they are excluded from participating independently in the negotiations, they will not be bound by any outcome that might be reached. They warned that if the proposed Darfur peace agreement is signed by the movements' representatives involved in negotiations, many of SLA fighters in the field would reject it, which could trigger a civil war. ¶3. (SBU) Dr. Harrir asserted that although "the world would be disappointed in us," it would be better to have no agreement signed. Abdul Wahid Mohamed Nour had established back channels with Khartoum without the consent of the SLM coalition and was intending to sign an agreement with Khartoum that would be unacceptable to them. They said Abdul Wahid had consequently been placed under an "executive freeze" for going beyond his mandate, essentially preventing him from committing the SLM to any peace agreement. Khamis Abdullah is now the acting Chairman of the SLM. As the highest ranking SLM member after Abdul Wahid and Minawi, Khamis is known as a unifier among the SLM political factions, they asserted, and is well respected by SLA commanders in the field. They noted, however, that some commanders only recognize Jamoah Haggar (phonetic). While acknowledging good relations with the JEM, they ruled out the idea of falling in line behind JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim. Khamis will continue as acting Chairman until the next congress can be held to name a new Chairman. -------------- Why the Agreement Cannot Be Signed -------------- ¶4. (C) Dr. Harrir said Abdul Wahid and Minawi were too willing to appease the Arab government and that their negotiation efforts were primarily motivated by their desire to secure "good jobs" for themselves in Khartoum. The proposed peace agreement is "debatable" and "discussable" but should not be passed in its current form, Dr. Harrir said. The three men said the proposed agreement does not adequately address some of the root problems of the Darfur conflict, including how to deal with refugees. Some of the major points of contention for the three men are the provision allowing President al-Bashir to select or appoint members of the movements to fill certain government positions and the allocation of too much power (including veto power over anyone in the movements) to Abdul Wahid, Khalil, and Minawi, the latter of whom Dr. Harrir said is "becoming another Bashir." The three men underlined the need for the movements to have their own standing force (a la CPA, in the event the government went back on its word) and deemed unacceptable the provision that would integrate the movements' forces into the Sudan Armed Forces ("the worst army in the world") and other security services (NOTE: Dr. Harrir said Minawi is under significant pressure to reject the agreement because of this provision alone. END NOTE). ¶5. (C) Reminding the Ambassador that Khartoum has thus far refused to disarm the janjaweed armed militia, Dr. Harrir also emphasized that the provision entrusting the Arab government to "neutralize" the janjaweed is problematic to say the least. By "asking for a job" as a Senior Assistant to the President (essentially a VP in all but name, as outlined by the proposed agreement),the movements weakened their negotiating position, Dr. Harrir added: the ideal would have been to discuss fundamental "principles" rather than a specific position. They noted that the President still had the authority to appoint Governors of the three Darfur regions, and therefore a "Senior Assistant" to the President would have no real power. According to Dr. Harrir, Khalil recently said the proposed agreement needed "major overhauling" and would not sign it. He added that Abdul Wahid was "scared now" and lacked confidence in his ability to make good decisions, and that Minawi is under pressure from and having problems with his followers, who are reminding him constantly that he will be responsible for whatever he might decide to sign. What is needed, they said, is for the AU to program a new round of talks after the movements have had an opportunity to hold a Congress and pick new leadership. -------------- -------------- The AU's Misteps: The Doctor Has Become More Important than the Patient -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) On the current situation in Darfur, Dr. Harrir lamented the weak mandate held by the AMIS force of approximately 7,000 men, which does not provide for the protection of civilians, and said the transition to a UN force of 14,000 would be a very positive development. Nevertheless, he said he was very disappointed in the work of the AU and its chie mediator Salim Ahmend Salim, who had unwisely wrked to produce what was essentially an agreemen between the AU and the GOS--one that had negleted totake into account the key demands of the movements. Evidence of the AU's inexperience and lack of wisdom in the negotiations was the fact that the 17 delegates representing the three men were essentially excluded from the talks but still allowed to remain in Abuja, spending per diem and running up hotel bills on the AU's tab; "Only in Africa!" he exclaimed. The exclusion of their faction and the misguided actions of mediators such as the Nigerian president was a clear "case of where the doctor has become more important than the patient." Calling the movements and the people of Darfur "guinea pigs" in an AU experiment, Dr. Harrir underlined the need for more direct involvement from the USG and other members of the international community to ensure an adequate level of competency in the ongoing mediation. It is taken for granted that the AU mediators have an adequate understanding of human rights and democracy, said Dr. Harrir, but largely undemocratic and have poor human rights records. -------------- SLA: Deby's Ally in time of Need? -------------- ¶7. (C) On the anti-Deby rebellion and the upcoming elections in Chad, Dr. Harrir predicted that the rebels would "try again." Although they might not make it to N'Djamena, they would attack other towns in Chad. Underlining the differing agendas of the FUC and SCUD rebel groups, he called their alliance temporary. Nour's FUC is a "front for Arabs," he said, and if the group were able to topple President Idriss Deby Itno, it would show a completely different face after the victory, one that closely resembled the Khartoum regime. Dr. Harrir said he was not aware of SLA efforts or plans to fight alongside Chadian armed forces against the Chadian rebels and did not think the SLA fought alongside the Chadian armed forces in Adre on April 13. However, he said the janjaweed had attacked SLA positions in Darfur a week ago and said it was possible that SLA forces might be forced to fight Chadian rebels if similar incidents occurred. ¶8. (C) Responding to the Ambassador, Shogar said after meeting with and keeping in close contact with the UNHCR, he did not think SLA forces were recruiting combatants from refugee camps. If the UNHCR confirmed that recruitment activities were being conducted by the SLA in refugee camps, he said he would visit the Adre area and that the SLM was prepared to halt its activities if such recruitment was occurring. Asked if they were aware of Chadian recruitment in the refugee camps, they responded that this was not happening as far as they knew. ¶9. (C) Dr. Harrir mused that after 15 years, Deby had finally "discovered that al-Bashir was a dictator." Although the SLM had not met Deby in "a while," the SLM now enjoyed much freer freedom of movement in Chad, Dr. Harrir said, noting that even members of JEM were now allowed to come to Chad (whereas in the past they were sometimes imprisoned). -------------- Signing Not the End of the Crisis -------------- ¶10. (C) Apologizing for his broken English, Khamis Abdullah spoke only briefly through a translator. He thanked the Ambassador and the USG for being the first government to recognize that genocide had been perpetrated in Darfur. After assuring the Ambassador that the SLM's interests were in Sudan, not in Chad, he acknowledged the need to establish greater cohesiveness within the SLM and committed himself to seek unity, peace, and democracy. In closing, the three men lamented that any signing of the proposed peace agreement would not bring an end to the crisis but said they were committed to establishing peace in Darfur. WALL