DAS YAMAMOTO VISIT TO CHAD APRIL 24-25

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NDJAMENA 000604 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, INR, DRL, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM CD SU SUBJECT: DAS YAMAMOTO VISIT TO CHAD APRIL 24-25 REF: A. NDJAMENA 600 ¶B. NDJAMENA 599 Classified By: P/E HAYWOOD RANKIN FOR REASON 1.4 (B,D). ¶1. (C) Summary: During his April 24-25 visit to Chad, DAS Yamamoto conveyed to President Deby a message from the Secretary calling for postponement of the May 3 election and SIPDIS initiation of constructive political dialogue. Deby refused to postpone the election, citing a constitutional void that would lead to violence, but he implied that he would pursue political dialogue after the election. DAS Yamamoto met political party and civil society leaders, who insisted that without postponement of the election, Deby would continue in his old mold, which would lead to violence. They did not seem to rule out dialogue if the U.S. were involved. The French Ambassador balked at the idea of postponement and political dialogue, holding to his view that the only way forward -- if there were a way forward -- was an immediate announcement by Deby that he would appoint an opposition government. DAS Yamamoto met an African Union delegation visiting Chad to investigate the Sudanese role in the Chadian rebel attacks on Sudan (it concluded that Sudan aided but did not direct the rebel attacks),look at the validity of the May 3 election, and explore ways to promote political dialogue in Chad (they were skeptical about the May 3 election -- even though the AU had decided to send observers). DAS Yamamoto met the director of ExxonMobil in Chad and the Chadian Oil Minister and dispelled the view that the U.S. was pursuing a mediatory role in the World Bank-Chad imbroglio. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Donald Yamamoto visited Ndjamena April 24-25, the first visit of a senior State Department official in the sixteen years of the Deby era. After meeting Foreign Minister Ahmad Allam-mi, he called on President Idriss Deby Itno and delivered a message from the Secretary. He met a cross-section of signficiant political-party and civil-society leaders. He also met a visiting African Union delegation and the director of EssoTchad. President and Foreign Minister -------------- ¶3. (C) After DAS's midday arrival from Addis Ababa April 24, his first call was on Foreign Minister Ahmad Allam-mi. DAS emphasized to Allam-mi that the U.S. was a close friend of Chad and sought to help it through its present external and internal crises. The U.S. had condemned any attempt at overthrow by force of this legitimate government, and the U.S. had stressed, in particular, its displeasure with Sudan for its support of groups attempting to overthrow Chad. Chad had played a critically important role in counterterrorism, in hosting refugees, and in starting the peace process between Sudan and the Darfur rebels. On the internal side, the U.S. did not seek to interfere in Chad's affairs but to support it toward a constructive political dialogue. Such a dialogue would not be a sign of weakness but of strength and would have the full support of the international community. DAS said that the international community would like to be able to support a strong and transparent election in Chad. Allam-mi's response was to emphasize that the May 3 election had to be held, else the country would be thrust into a constitutional void with resultant chaos, at a time of external aggression orchestrated by Sudan. He said that it was too late to talk about delaying the election, though any subject would be open for dialogue after the election. ¶4. (C) Between the meeting with Allam-mi and the following meeting with President Deby, the Department transmitted a letter from the Secretary for delivery by DAS to Deby, specifically calling on Deby to delay the election until the international community could assist Chad in reforming its electoral system. Per ref A, the letter was conveyed to Deby orally in French (and subsequently delivered in writing). DAS emphasized to Deby the U.S.'s desire to support Chad to hold credible elections and promote public confidence in the political system. Deby did not react hostilely to this demarche, but in calm tones related that it would not be possible for him to delay the May 3 election, NDJAMENA 00000604 002 OF 005 giving reasons similar to those cited by the Foreign Minister. However, Deby appeared to make a commitment to discuss with the U.S. a dialogue with the opposition. He stated a desire to visit Washington. He stressed that continuation of the Darfur crisis would have serious consequences for Chad's stability and for protection of refugees. He lamented that Chad was the only oil-producing country in the world being treated unfairly by the World Bank. DAS said that if the May 3 election went forward, the U.S. would necessarily make a public statement, but the U.S. sought to work positively with Chad. The Ambassador told Deby that U.S. suggestions were designed to find a way forward for a more stable future for Chad. French Ambassador -------------- ¶5. (C) In a two-hour breakfast meeting with French Ambassador Jean-Pierre Bercot April 25 (ref B),DAS noted that he had recently met Bruno Joubert, head of the Africa Division at the Quai d'Orsay, would be seeing Joubert again soon, and hoped to work out a concerted approach with the French. He emphasized that, while Deby had refused to consider delaying the May 3 election, Deby had made a commitment to commence a constructive dialogue with the opposition. Bercot suggested that a political dialogue would only produce delay and bickering. A more useful approach, he believed, would be to get Deby to commit at once and publicly to appointing an opposition government with real power to govern. The Ambassador said that Bercot's idea would not likely be accepted by the opposition if Deby went forward with the May 3 election, unless perhaps Deby could be persuaded to hold a proper election within a year's time, to which Bercot was lukewarm. Bercot said that, in contrast to the U.S., France would probably praise the May 3 election, as France had no interest in attacking Deby's legitimacy. DAS stressed that our call for delay of the election was meant to underline the deeper need to create institutions that would promote stability, a need with which Bercot agreed. He said that he had recommended a reduction in France's military presence. He was not optimistic about Chad's future. AU Delegation -------------- ¶6. (C) DAS met the six-person AU delegation visiting Chad April 21-26. Delegation leader Pierre Yere (Ivorian based in Kinshasa) said that the delegation was following up on the communique of the AU's Peace and Security Council April 13 (the day of the rebel incursion into Ndjamena),condemning rebel attacks on Chad and urging the Chadian government to initiate a dialogue with all political forces in Chad. He said that the investigation, which included talking to prisoners, had not turned up clear proof that the incursion had been directed by Sudan, although the rebels had staged from Sudan, some of the prisoners appeared to have been born in Sudan, and vehicles and arms appeared to have come from Sudan. The delegation would try to go to Sudan to verify information on vehicles and arms and to speak to Chadian rebels. ¶7. (C) Yere said that the delegation had insisted on meeting opposition figures, and President Deby had therefore declined to meet it. Yere recounted that opposition and civil-society leaders with whom the delegation had spoken had unanimously called for delay of the May 3 elections. The Ambassador asked Yere whether the delegation had taken a position on the issue. Yere said that the delegation's initial view had been that the election would lead to greater violence and should be delayed, but the delegation had been taken by surprise the previous evening when it had learned that the AU had apparently made a decision to send observers to the election, a reversal of what the delegation had understood to be the AU position. DAS recognized divisions with the AU, noting that certain African leaders had urged that the U.S. give full support to Deby in this period. DAS said that it was important for the U.S., AU, EU, and France to work together as effectively as possible to help Chad, even if there were divergences of opinion with France and within the EU and AU; all could agree on the need to promote good governance and constructive political dialogue in Chad and agree to hold Deby to his commitment to move in that NDJAMENA 00000604 003 OF 005 direction. Oil Discussions -------------- ¶8. (C) DAS separately met EssoTchad Manager Ron Royal and Minister of Petroleum Mahamat Nasser Hassan April 25. Royal said that an order to stop oil production would have grave consequences for Chad and he doubted that Deby or most of his ministers understood the implications. He said that Exxon-Mobil was considering sending a letter to the Chadian government to urge it to come to an agreement with the World Bank. The Ambassador cautioned against giving the government the false impression that the Consortium could influence the Bank (a view held by many in the Chadian government). DAS said that the United States would firmly oppose any action by Chad that harmed Exxon-Mobil's activity. Minister of Petroleum Hassan told DAS he was pleased with DAS's intervention to delay the stop-order. He said that Chad wanted to maintain positive relations with the World Bank and would rather not have to call on Esso to halt production. However, Chad had little choice if it did not begin to receive oil revenues. DAS stated that the U.S. would not intervene to mediate a resolution but hoped for an amicable outcome that was beneficial to both the Bank and Chad. Opposition, Civil Society, and Government -------------- --- ¶9. (U) The Ambassador hosted separate dinners for political-party leaders, civil-society leaders, and government officials. For the political-party gathering April 24, he had invited two of the senior figures in the ruling party (MPS),Secretary General Mahamat Hissein, and MPS leader in the National Assembly, Idriss N'dele, but neither of them showed up. (Note: They are heavily engaged in the ongoing electoral campaign, and we do not believe they were absent because opposition leaders were invited. End Note) Present were independent oppositionist Ngalejy Yorongar and four leaders in the coalition CPDC, Lol Mahamat Choua, Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue, Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh, and Salibou Garba. They were unanimous on the need to delay the election until the electoral process could be completely reconstituted under stringent international oversight. They had no objection to Deby as transitional leader or candidate, so long as the electoral process were above board, as they all believed Deby had little popular following. ¶10. (U) DAS and Ambassador stressed to the opposition leaders the importance of the opposition taking a strong stance against the overthrow of a government by armed force and regretted that the opposition had not taken a clear public position. Ibni Oumar, spokesman for the CPDC, said that he had given a clear statement in interviews with the foreign press, but admitted that the CPDC was reluctant to condemn Sudan or the rebels directly, even though the CPDC strongly opposed the use of force. Lol, Kamouge, and Salibou said that Deby was responsible for the Darfur crisis and turmoil in Central African Republic, and the opposition could not be expected to take a public position to shift blame away from where it belonged, i.e., on Deby. Yorongar differed from the others in saying that if Deby held to the election, he would never condemn the rebels. ¶11. (U) All the opposition leaders emphasized how often they had urged Deby to pursue a political dialogue and electoral reform (the CPDC as recently as September 2005),without ever receiving a response. Yorongar said Deby's talk about a constitutional void was a red herring, as Deby had thought nothing of delaying the constitutionally-mandated National Assembly elections twice. All had harsh words for France, believing (incorrectly) that French jets had bombed civilians during the April 13 rebel incursion. To the Ambassador's question why people did not turn out in the streets in popular demonstrations, Kamougue and Yorongar said the public was just too afraid of immediate and brutal repression. ¶12. (U) The civil-society gathering April 25 included human rights leaders Delphine Kamneloum, Dobian Assingar, Massalbaye Tenebaye, and Daniel Passalet Deuzoumbe, union leader Michel Barka, and journalists Sy Koumbo Gali and NDJAMENA 00000604 004 OF 005 Nodjimkimo Benoudjita. All are from the Southern, Christian minority. They were united in an impassioned plea to delay the election and convene a national forum for peace and reconciliation, although some were more cynical than others about the possibility of ever overcoming Deby's determination hold on to power. Delphine said that the May 3 election and the months following it would be increasingly violent, given the prevalence of arms and rebels, with the likelihood that those who stood for peace would be increasingly pushed to the background. Barka said that civil society, having given up on France, had long waited for the United States to come forward to press Deby to stop the electoral charade and convene a national dialogue, as the only way to avoid a huge explosion. Benoudjita blamed Deby for the Darfur crisis and said the only party that deserved blame for instability in the region was Deby. Massalbaye asserted that the only explanation for the otherwise inexplicable French support for Deby was Deby's infusions of direct aid to Chirac's electoral campaigns. Delphine and Dobian said that the French concept of stability was no stability at all, but rather a system of repression, corruption, and impunity that ensured atrocious governance, massive poverty, and widespread discontent and increasing resort to armed rebellion. The French concept of Deby as a geostrategic partner was similarly flawed, as it was Deby who had sowed crisis in neighboring countries. DAS said that Deby had now committed himself to constructive dialogue and he hoped the opposition and civil society would participate responsibly in this process. ¶13. (C) At the final event for DAS, a dinner with government officials, several who had accepted (most important, the Minister of Territorial Administration) were called away by exigencies of the campaign. (Note: There was no political signal here, we believe. End Note.) Foreign Minister Allam-mi was present and held the floor. Presidential Advisor for Education Aziza Baroud (on detail to the Electoral Commission) and UN Resident Coordinator Kingsley Amaning also came. Allam-mi believed that the extension of Deby's mandate to a third term was the cause of the intensity of opposition bitterness, but he took the view that the Darfur crisis had pushed Deby to have to seek a third term. The Ambassador noted that the Foreign Minister had spoken at length about the danger of a constitutional vacuum, but asked what he thought about the danger of a political vacuum, which prompted Allam-mi to speak at still greater length about importance of respecting the constitution in a state so fragile as Chad. He saw Sudan as the root of Chad's present ills, even while he admitted that governance was at a very low level in the country and a long-term solution to Chad's problems lay in a serious effort to improve governance. On DAS's urging an immediate move toward constructive dialogue, Allam-mi cautioned that a "round table" (national conference) would not be the way to move forward but would only be divisive. Amaning agreed that political dialogue was not the key; simply getting on with reforming the electoral process was the key. Allam-mi took umbrage to the opposition's unwillingness to condemn Sudan and the rebels. He claimed that if Yorongar came to power, he would be a dangerous dictator, while Deby's relationship with the CPDC was one of people who had long worked together and knew each other too well, like a marriage that had gone bad. Press Conference -------------- ¶14. (U) Before the dinner with government officials, DAS held a press conference with both international and local media. Present were correspondents from Reuters and AP newswires, BBC, RFI, and NPR, and a stringer from the Times (London). The Chadian French- and Arabic-language press was well represented. Questions centered around two topics: oil and the May 3 election. On oil, DAS was asked about Deby's statements that he needed oil revenues for security and would use the money to buy arms. DAS responded that every country had an inherent right to self-defense but that the Chadian government had entered into an agreement with the World Bank to use oil revenues for poverty reduction; discussions between the World Bank and Chad were on-going in Washington, and the United States was not privy to World Bank discussions. "Whatever the World Bank decides, we will support," in the same way that the United States had NDJAMENA 00000604 005 OF 005 supported the initial agreement between the World Bank and Chad. ¶15. (U) The press asked a series of questions about postponement and legitimacy of the election and how to create political space and openness for the opposition. DAS focused on the positive, emphasizing the need for the government and opposition to devote themselves immediately to a political dialogue to produce credible elections and institutions of good governance. When pressed on whether he had directly asked Deby to postpone the election, DAS replied that he had "held a very direct and private discussion on the issue with the president," without going into further detail. WALL