FOREIGN MINISTER EMPHASIZES CHAD'S FRAGILITY

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000555 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, INR, DRL, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS BUJUMBURA FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY YAMAMOTO E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM CD SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER EMPHASIZES CHAD'S FRAGILITY ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Foreign Minister Allam-mi and Ambassador agreed to disagree April 17 on the urgency of political dialogue, Allam-mi saying the absolute priority was going forward with the May 3 election to ensure preservation of the outward form of rule of law at a time of external aggression and impending chaos. He criticized the democratic opposition for not decisively condemning the rebels. He obliquely acknowledged that the President had not done all he should to promote a political dialogue, but insisted that it was too late and the wrong moment, with fighting raging and the election due May 3. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) In a gloomy conversation with Ambassador Wall April 17, Foreign Minister Ahmad Allam-mi said that Chad was an extremely weak state beset by strong enemies. The essential priority was to consolidate what little state apparatus existed and try to preserve stability in the face of concerted aggression and a multiplicity of armed rebel groups. It was essential to distinguish between the armed and democratic opposition, the former presenting an immediate threat of state collapse, with dire consequences for the region, the latter presenting no such threat. He saw no good result emerging from criticism of the election or talk of political dialogue. It was too late to begin a dialogue, since it was essential to go forward with the election and the immediate issue was fighting on all sides. Dialogue with whom? There was nothing to be gained by a dialogue and all to be lost. The armed opposition was not interested in dialogue and its objectives were not democratic, while the democratic opposition was peaceable and no immediate threat. The latter, in any case, were purely tribe-based, with little sense of good of the nation. ¶3. (SBU) Allam-mi said that it was no time to encourage experimentation that would lead to disorder. A constitution existed, even if it had been amended. It embodied the rule of law, such as existed in Chad, and it had to be embraced. The head of state was the guarantor of the state's fragile security. There must not be a constitutional void, especially at so perilous a time, but rather everything should be done to support the head of state. The rebels were �0A;the enemy both of the head of state, with all that his continuity implied in maintenance of security and order, and of the democratic opposition, who professed to stand for peaceful transition. In fact, it was regrettable that the democratic opposition had not publicly condemned the rebellion. Their lack of condemnation of the many armed groups gave succor to them and only hastened the possibility of state collapse, which would have repercussions especially on the democratic opposition. ¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador said that the democratic opposition was opposed to the taking of power by violent means, but the absence of a credible political process in the country engendered in them a profoundly negative view but also helped stoke the rise of armed groups. There would be no stability in Chad without a credible political process. Allam-mi asked whether the Ambassador were seriously suggesting pursuing a dialogue now, in the context of war? There was no point in talking about trying to create a political consensus in Chad. There had never been a political consensus, there had never been one single satisfied Chadian. There was no interest in dialogue on the part of the armed groups; they were motivated by poverty and years of ethnic oppression and raw ambition for power. Political dialogue at this juncture would only pour oil on the fire. Of course there was widespread injustice, poor governance, and generalized absence of a state of law in Chad, but it was not possible just to turn a switch, have a round table in the midst of war in the lead-up to elections, and expect to produce anything but bitter diatribes on the part of myriad parties that had no concept of how to compromise for the national good. This was not serious. What was serious was a proxy invasion of Chad by Sudan. Did the Ambassador believe that Sudan's intention to "liberate" Chad was to bring democracy to Chad? The Ambassador said obviously not, as indicated by the U.S. government's strong public condemnation of Sudan's role in supporting the rebels. ¶5. (SBU) The Ambassador said that conditions at present were not at all propitious for beginning the necessary political initiative, but there would be no stability in the country without it, and the President needed now more than ever to exercise his leadership to end the impasse. The democratic opposition would be ready to make a compromise, but only in the context of a move toward free and fair elections leading to the possibility of political transition. Allam-mi said that the Ambassador did not appear to understand the reality of Chad. The armed elements were more numerous and powerful than the democratic opposition, uninterested in dialogue, and an immediate threat to state survival, while the democratic opposition had failed publicly to condemn the resort to violence and even civil society had abandoned its mediatory role and taken sides against the government. The Ambassador asked if Allam-mi believed that going forward with this election would improve the situation, when the opposition considered the election as a fait accompli staged only to amuse the gallery? Allam-mi said that whatever one thought about the legitimacy of the election, having the election was preferable to a state of confusion. The Ambassador pointed out that there had previously been no problem delaying the holding of legislative elections. Allam-mi said the legislative and presidential elections were not to be compared, since the President was the guarantor of security and embodiment of sovereignty, to which the Ambassador observed such was all the greater reason to delay in order to ensure a proper election. ¶6. (SBU) Allam-mi said if the international community were determined to have anarchy, then it should have it. Its focus ought to be on stabilizing Chad now, at this moment, when Chad was being invaded. The recent incursion into Ndjamena was a mere police action, a trifle, compared to what was brewing at Adre. The Ambassador said that there was no doubt that Chad had to confront the armed rebels, but there was a huge political dimension involved in coping with both armed and peaceful opposition. The Ambassador said that he had spent two years in Chad, he was a real friend of the country, and he was convinced that Chad's survival as a secure state depended on genuine initiative to find a political solution. Delay of the election and a round table were only two of several possible approaches. Allam-mi said, in riposte to the Ambassador's assertion that there would be no military solution without a political solution, that the immediate requirement was military, while the political problem must be deferred to a more tranquil future. The Ambassador asked why the President had not taken advantage of many requests for dialogue by the democratic opposition and civil society -- for example, the overture made by the coalition CPDC in September? Allam-mi said that he was not a party to such overtures and responses, but he acknowledged that the matter had been mishandled by both sides. An opportunity had been lost, whoever's fault it might have been, but now it was too late. ¶7. (SBU) Allam-mi urged the Ambassador not be deceived by the fine words of the democratic opposition. Chad was an ethnically-divided country with a history of terrible violence. Aspirants to power, even when they spoke nicely about democracy, harbored deep bitterness and an urge to revenge. The real Chad was not about round tables and national dialogue, the real Chad was about grinding poverty and a seething reflex to violence. The first priority was maintaining security, and the second priority was paying salaries and beginning to move toward good governance. Most of these oppositionists had held posts in the government and been completely ineffective. Patience was essential. Some little progress had been made in the President's fifteen years at the helm. No man was essential forever, but there were junctures when one man was absolutely essential to holding a country together and moving forward in stability. ¶8. (SBU) Comment: These comments by Foreign Minister Allam-mi, one of the more thoughtful observers of the Chadian scene in official circles, bring into sharp focus the depth of the impasse blocking progress toward a political settlement in Chad today. End Comment. WALL