FOREIGN MINISTER EMPHASIZES CHAD'S FRAGILITY

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000555

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, INR, DRL, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA;
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS
BUJUMBURA FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY YAMAMOTO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM CD
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER EMPHASIZES CHAD'S FRAGILITY



1. (SBU) Summary: Foreign Minister Allam-mi and Ambassador
agreed to disagree April 17 on the urgency of political
dialogue, Allam-mi saying the absolute priority was going
forward with the May 3 election to ensure preservation of the
outward form of rule of law at a time of external aggression
and impending chaos. He criticized the democratic
opposition for not decisively condemning the rebels. He
obliquely acknowledged that the President had not done all he
should to promote a political dialogue, but insisted that it
was too late and the wrong moment, with fighting raging and
the election due May 3. End Summary.


2. (SBU) In a gloomy conversation with Ambassador Wall April
17, Foreign Minister Ahmad Allam-mi said that Chad was an
extremely weak state beset by strong enemies. The essential
priority was to consolidate what little state apparatus
existed and try to preserve stability in the face of
concerted aggression and a multiplicity of armed rebel
groups. It was essential to distinguish between the armed
and democratic opposition, the former presenting an immediate
threat of state collapse, with dire consequences for the
region, the latter presenting no such threat. He saw no good
result emerging from criticism of the election or talk of
political dialogue. It was too late to begin a dialogue,
since it was essential to go forward with the election and
the immediate issue was fighting on all sides. Dialogue with
whom? There was nothing to be gained by a dialogue and all
to be lost. The armed opposition was not interested in
dialogue and its objectives were not democratic, while the
democratic opposition was peaceable and no immediate threat.
The latter, in any case, were purely tribe-based, with little
sense of good of the nation.


3. (SBU) Allam-mi said that it was no time to encourage
experimentation that would lead to disorder. A constitution
existed, even if it had been amended. It embodied the rule
of law, such as existed in Chad, and it had to be embraced.
The head of state was the guarantor of the state's fragile
security. There must not be a constitutional void,
especially at so perilous a time, but rather everything
should be done to support the head of state. The rebels were
the enemy both of the head of state, with all that his
continuity implied in maintenance of security and order, and
of the democratic opposition, who professed to stand for
peaceful transition. In fact, it was regrettable that the
democratic opposition had not publicly condemned the
rebellion. Their lack of condemnation of the many armed
groups gave succor to them and only hastened the possibility
of state collapse, which would have repercussions especially
on the democratic opposition.


4. (SBU) The Ambassador said that the democratic opposition
was opposed to the taking of power by violent means, but the
absence of a credible political process in the country
engendered in them a profoundly negative view but also helped
stoke the rise of armed groups. There would be no stability
in Chad without a credible political process. Allam-mi asked
whether the Ambassador were seriously suggesting pursuing a
dialogue now, in the context of war? There was no point in
talking about trying to create a political consensus in Chad.
There had never been a political consensus, there had never
been one single satisfied Chadian. There was no interest in
dialogue on the part of the armed groups; they were motivated
by poverty and years of ethnic oppression and raw ambition
for power. Political dialogue at this juncture would only
pour oil on the fire. Of course there was widespread
injustice, poor governance, and generalized absence of a
state of law in Chad, but it was not possible just to turn a
switch, have a round table in the midst of war in the lead-up
to elections, and expect to produce anything but bitter
diatribes on the part of myriad parties that had no concept
of how to compromise for the national good. This was not
serious. What was serious was a proxy invasion of Chad by
Sudan. Did the Ambassador believe that Sudan's intention to
"liberate" Chad was to bring democracy to Chad? The
Ambassador said obviously not, as indicated by the U.S.
government's strong public condemnation of Sudan's role in
supporting the rebels.

5. (SBU) The Ambassador said that conditions at present were
not at all propitious for beginning the necessary political
initiative, but there would be no stability in the country
without it, and the President needed now more than ever to
exercise his leadership to end the impasse. The democratic
opposition would be ready to make a compromise, but only in
the context of a move toward free and fair elections leading
to the possibility of political transition. Allam-mi said
that the Ambassador did not appear to understand the reality
of Chad. The armed elements were more numerous and powerful
than the democratic opposition, uninterested in dialogue, and
an immediate threat to state survival, while the democratic
opposition had failed publicly to condemn the resort to
violence and even civil society had abandoned its mediatory
role and taken sides against the government. The Ambassador
asked if Allam-mi believed that going forward with this
election would improve the situation, when the opposition
considered the election as a fait accompli staged only to
amuse the gallery? Allam-mi said that whatever one thought
about the legitimacy of the election, having the election was
preferable to a state of confusion. The Ambassador pointed
out that there had previously been no problem delaying the
holding of legislative elections. Allam-mi said the
legislative and presidential elections were not to be
compared, since the President was the guarantor of security
and embodiment of sovereignty, to which the Ambassador
observed such was all the greater reason to delay in order to
ensure a proper election.


6. (SBU) Allam-mi said if the international community were
determined to have anarchy, then it should have it. Its
focus ought to be on stabilizing Chad now, at this moment,
when Chad was being invaded. The recent incursion into
Ndjamena was a mere police action, a trifle, compared to what
was brewing at Adre. The Ambassador said that there was no
doubt that Chad had to confront the armed rebels, but there
was a huge political dimension involved in coping with both
armed and peaceful opposition. The Ambassador said that he
had spent two years in Chad, he was a real friend of the
country, and he was convinced that Chad's survival as a
secure state depended on genuine initiative to find a
political solution. Delay of the election and a round table
were only two of several possible approaches. Allam-mi said,
in riposte to the Ambassador's assertion that there would be
no military solution without a political solution, that the
immediate requirement was military, while the political
problem must be deferred to a more tranquil future. The
Ambassador asked why the President had not taken advantage of
many requests for dialogue by the democratic opposition and
civil society -- for example, the overture made by the
coalition CPDC in September? Allam-mi said that he was not a
party to such overtures and responses, but he acknowledged
that the matter had been mishandled by both sides. An
opportunity had been lost, whoever's fault it might have
been, but now it was too late.


7. (SBU) Allam-mi urged the Ambassador not be deceived by
the fine words of the democratic opposition. Chad was an
ethnically-divided country with a history of terrible
violence. Aspirants to power, even when they spoke nicely
about democracy, harbored deep bitterness and an urge to
revenge. The real Chad was not about round tables and
national dialogue, the real Chad was about grinding poverty
and a seething reflex to violence. The first priority was
maintaining security, and the second priority was paying
salaries and beginning to move toward good governance. Most
of these oppositionists had held posts in the government and
been completely ineffective. Patience was essential. Some
little progress had been made in the President's fifteen
years at the helm. No man was essential forever, but there
were junctures when one man was absolutely essential to
holding a country together and moving forward in stability.


8. (SBU) Comment: These comments by Foreign Minister
Allam-mi, one of the more thoughtful observers of the Chadian
scene in official circles, bring into sharp focus the depth
of the impasse blocking progress toward a political
settlement in Chad today. End Comment.
WALL