CHAD: REFUGEES, RECRUITMENT, IDPS, PRISONERS, AND

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000547

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, INR, DRL, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA;
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: REFUGEES, RECRUITMENT, IDPS, PRISONERS, AND
WOUNDED



1. (SBU) Summary: ICRC accounts for 250 prisoners (of whom
some are Sudanese) and 250 war-wounded from the fighting
April 13. ICRC has withdrawn staff from the eastern border
for the time being but affirms a continued movement of IDPs
to Goz Beida. UNHCR has cut its international staff in the
East in half and is similarly unable to track IDPs at
present. Recent recruitment of refugees in two camps was by
SLM, under the direction of the sous-prefet. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Poloff called on ICRC Chief of Delegation Thomas
Merkelbach and UNHCR Deputy Representative Rufin-Gilbert
Loubaki April 15 for a read-out on prisoners and wounded
after the fighting April 13 and the refugee and IDP situation
in the East. The meetings followed the announcement by the
Chadian Government, earlier in the day, of rupture of
diplomatic relations with Sudan and the requirement that
refugees be moved out of Chad if the Darfur crisis is not
solved by the end of June.

ICRC
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3. (SBU) Merkelbach said that he believed the Chadian
authorities had given ICRC relatively rapid access to all the
prisoners and war-wounded in the aftermath of the fighting.
He sent a strong message of official complaint to the
government about the display of prisoners at the parade
ground on April 14. His staff had counted approximately 250
prisoners, of whom 70-80 were wounded and were at present at
Central Military Hospital. The remaining 170-180 prisoners
were not wounded or only lightly wounded and in cramped
quarters, but ICRC believed they would soon be transferred to
a larger setting; the government had not been prepared for
this number of prisoners or wounded. ICRC had observed over
200 wounded persons at the military hospital (of whom the
70-80 prisoners, plus approximately 130 Chadian military),
while the French had transported 30-40 wounded Chadian
military to France for treatment. Meanwhile, he said, MSF
had observed 85 wounded civilians at the general hospital.
(Note: The latter figure, of civilian wounded, appears to be
very low, on the basis of eye-witness accounts that many
civilians were caught in cross fire, provided by our FSNs and
Muslim contacts living in the sections of the city most
affected by the fighting. End Note.)


4. (SBU) On the issue of nationality of the prisoners,
Merkelbach said that ICRC had not been able to do in-depth
interviews as yet, but it appeared there were "some" men of
Sudanese nationality among the prisoners. However, ICRC was
treating the issue as Chadian-versus-Chadian, an internal
conflict, in which Sudan was not attacking Chad but
supporting Chad's dissidents, just as Chad supported Darfur
rebels (witness, Merkelbach said, the assistance just offered
by the SLM in attacking Chadian rebels around Adre). As for
the ages of prisoners, ICRC had not been "shocked" by what it
had seen -- many of the rebel soldiers were young, late
adolescents, but none appeared to be early adolescents.


5. (SBU) On the situation in the East, Merkelbach said ICRC
had withdrawn its staff for the time being into Abeche so it
was not able to keep close tabs on the Chadian IDPs. The
ICRC team that had been near the Sudanese border at Dogdore
(near Mongororo) had departed for Abeche the night of April
12 when a group of Chadian military arrived and demanded ICRC
transport ten wounded Chadian soldiers to Abeche. These
soldiers had been wounded in fighting at Tizi, at the
tri-juncture of the Sudanese, Chadian, and CAR borders.
Merkelbach said he did not know how soon he would have people
back at the border to keep track of IDPs (MSF was also gone),
but it was clear that IDPs had continued to move from the
border into the prefectural capital of Goz Beida, with
perhaps 7,000 IDPs present there now. Merkelbach was
concerned that UNICEF and others were chomping at the bit to
begin major deliveries of assistance, which would, in his
opinion, guarantee a major increased flow of IDPs toward Goz
Beida.

UNHCR

NDJAMENA 00000547 002 OF 002


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6. (SBU) Loubaki had just returned from a swing through the
southern (i.e., mainly Masalit) refugee camps. After the
rebel occupation of the office in Koukou and the camp at Goz
Amer April 10, the refugees were nervous about the
possibility of further such incidents. The rebel force
appeared to have come from the south, where there had been
fighting, and appeared to depart in the direction of Goz
Beida, where the Chadian armed forces had been staging major
reinforcement, but they had never arrived in Goz Beida and
simply disappeared from the area. UNHCR had no personnel on
the border and was unable to say much on the status of IDPs
(mainly Dadjo) there, but it was clear that the numbers of
IDPs moving into Goz Beida were increasing. Meanwhile, there
was reduced pressure from Masalit IDPs on Gaga camp further
north, as the IDPs realized no new camp was being set up for
them, and they chose to return to their Masalit area along
the border, which was relatively calm at present.


7. (SBU) Loubaki said that UNHCR had decided to reduce its
international staff in the East from over 20 to approximately
10, keeping two at each of the 5 field offices (Bahai, Iriba,
Farchana, Goz Beida, Goz Amer),in addition to the local
staff. There had been no other recent security problems,
except for the brief rebel takeover at Koukou - Goz Amer.


8. (SBU) Loubaki said that there had been thus far no
repercussions on the refugee camps or in IDP movements due to
the recent fighting in Adre, though his staff was aware of
movement of casualties to Guereda and Farchana. UNHCR staff
in El-Geneina, being significantly closer to Adre than UNHCR
staff in eastern Chad, had reported hearing heavy and
prolonged bombardments.


9. (SBU) Following the announcement earlier in the day of
the "deadline" to remove refugees from Chad, Loubaki said,
the UNHCR Representative and he had met with the Minister of
Territorial Administration Mahamat Ali for a clarification of
the Chadian position. Mahamat Ali had not seemed to dwell on
the "deadline" but rather on the urgent need for a clearer
statement by the international community condemning Sudanese
aggression, increased assistance to Chad in caring for and
protecting the refugees, and a speeding up of stationing UN
troops on the border. Loubaki said that the "deadline" did
not seem serious in itself. The government had presumably
thrown refugees into the mix of rupture with Sudan and of oil
production as a way to get international attention. It
seemed hardly plausible for the government to contemplate
forcing refugees out when the majority of the refugees were
Zaghawa (same ethnicity as the ruling regime) and when the
Zaghawa rebels in Darfur were now offering the Chadian
government considerable help in attacking Chadian rebels
present in Darfur.


10. (SBU) Loubaki offered an update on the discovery of
recruitment in the Bredjing and Treguine camps. The facts
remained as reported earlier, but further witness accounts
confirmed two key elements. First, the recruitment was for
the Masalit wing of the SLA under the command of Col. Khamis
(formerly with the SPLA in Eritrea). Second, the sous-prefet
at Hadjar Hadid was more than complicit, he was deeply and
actively involved. He had organized recruitment gatherings,
ordered recruits to depart, and ordered gendarmes to
facilitate their travel. He had hotly denied any
foreknowledge and even threatened to take UNHCR to court, but
UNHCR was certain of his guilt.
WALL