CHAD: OPPOSITION QUANDARY

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000546 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, INR, DRL, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM CD SUBJECT: CHAD: OPPOSITION QUANDARY ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Opposition leader Lol Mahamat Choua cast the opposition's quandary in clear focus in conversation with the Ambassador April 14: The democratic opposition could call for massive obstruction to the May 3 election, but to do so would bring brutal repression. The democratic opposition abhorred violent overthrow of the regime, but the regime only respected strength of arms. The democratic opposition desperately needed cooperation from the French, but were scorned. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Lol Mahamat Choua, former president (for a brief period in 1979),a key leader of the Kanem (northeast of Lake Chad),and one of the principal figures in the opposition coalition CPDC, called on the Ambassador April 14, in the wake of the rebel incursion into Ndjamena the previous day. Lol, speaking on behalf of the CPDC, said that he and his colleagues stood for peaceful transition; they stood at the polar opposite of the violence that was shaking the country. Unfortunately, President Deby, France, and the rebels ("our armed brothers," he said) all viewed the democratic opposition as weak. In an environment in which only force of arms and violence were respected, and in which the regime had an absolute monopoly on the state's resources to do as it liked unconstrained by law, the democratic opposition could be considered weak, but it actually represented the will of the people and without giving them their due, there would be no alternative to violent overthrow. ¶3. (SBU) Lol said that the French role was vital. Its role in the fighting of the previous days had been essential to the regime's turning back the incursion. Without French intelligence on locations of the rebels, Deby would have been lost. Lol stated as absolute fact (note: untrue) that French Mirages had bombed not only rebel columns but also villages and suburbs through which the rebels were passing, killing many innocent Chadian civilians. He said that Chadians across the board were incensed at this perceived brutal French military intervention. The French gave the regime total and blind support. Lol said that he perfectly well understood that the French Ambassador was carrying out instructions from President Chirac to support Deby at all cost. But the French Ambassador was doing so in a vengeful way that cut ties to the democratic opposition and stifled any possibility of pressure on Deby to move toward a peaceful democratic transition. Without such pressure, Deby would not budge. Even if the French Ambassador had rigid instructions from President Chirac, he could have sought a harmonious relationship with the democratic opposition. But his attitude was one of open scorn. Lol said that the bitterness among the opposition toward the French was deep and growing and he often heard rumblings of a desire to attack the French, which he strongly opposed. ¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador read from the previous day's Department of State guidance (condemning acts of violence to achieve political objectives, appealing to Chadians to participate in dialogue to resolve the political blockage) and asked whether in the present context it were possible to have such a dialogue. Lol said that, if adequate pressure were put on Deby to accept a dialogue, it would be completely possible to organize it. The opposition parties and civil society were primed, and even the armed rebellion might be persuaded to join the dialogue. But the present electoral charade would have to be suspended and a proper election would have to be organized, pursuant to a properly structured national forum. Chirac would have to give instructions. ¶5. (SBU) The Ambassador asked whether the opposition would accept Deby as a candidate in a free and fair election. Lol said the opposition would have absolutely no problem with Deby as a candidate if the electoral system were cleansed and the opposition were assured of a level playing field. The Ambassador asked whether it would be possible for the opposition to settle on a single candidate. Lol said that the CPDC might be able to designate a single candidate, or two at the most, while it was likely that maverick oppositionist Yorongar would insist on running, even though he had lost much of his popularity. Lol disagreed with the Ambassador's observation that four candidates from a highly divided opposition would play directly into Deby's hands. Deby, he said, held office by force and fraud. Almost any Chadian off the street who put himself up as a candidate would beat Deby in a fair election, so fed up was the populace. If Deby were as popular as the French deluded themselves into believing, why was Deby so afraid of fair elections and a national dialogue? The issue of number of candidates was not important, but in any case, the CPDC was now a real, united force, and it could agree on one or a maximum of two candidates. ¶6. (SBU) The Ambassador noted that Lol and the CPDC were urging the populace to go beyond boycott of the election to obstruction -- what did that mean? Lol at first said that there would be a popular uprising, but he appeared troubled. He said that if he took the microphone before the assembled masses and told them to rise up and go to the street, they -- the great majority of the Chadian people, he claimed -- would do so. But Deby, surrounded by his privileged and ruthless Zaghawa relatives, would not hesitate to order his guns unleashed on any demonstrations, killing massively as need be. Comment: It appeared that Lol had not decided what to do, but was inclined not to give such an order. End Comment. WALL