DASH ACROSS CHAD: FRENCH VERSION

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000545 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, INR, DRL, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL SU FR CD SUBJECT: DASH ACROSS CHAD: FRENCH VERSION ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The French, according to Ambassador Bercot and his Defense Attache, only became aware two days before the fight in Ndjamena on April 13 that the rebel force was aiming at the relatively undefended city. The city and government were saved, they say, because the rebels stalled their advance just long enough for Chadian reinforcements to arrive in Ndjamena. A key element was the discovery that the Chadian army chief of staff was the mastermind. The rebels were, they claim, largely Sudanese of Tama and Arab extraction. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) French Ambassador Jean-Pierre Bercot gave a briefing April 14 to the American, Russian, Egyptian, and Algerian Ambassadors, and German Charge. He said that it was inconceivable that a group of rebels could penetrate Chad from Central African Republic in the remote southeastern corner of Chad, sprint across 800 kilometers of rough tracks in a few days, and threaten chaos in Ndjamena itself. He turned to his Defense Attache, Col. Jean-Mark Marril to give a day-by-day account. ¶3. (SBU) Col. Marril said that it had been known for some days that rebels associated with Mahamat Nour's RDL had infiltrated the Salamat region (far southeast Chad) around Haraze Mangueigne, in the wake of the fighting at Modohina (eastern border) at the end of March. The objective of this infiltration into Salamat seemed to be directed toward eastern Chad, where the Chadian armed forces were mainly located, and the real intention -- of striking Ndjamena itself -- was masked by the rebel attack on the refugee camp at Goz Amir, after which an attack on the chief town of the Dar Sila, Goz Beida, with its reinforced presence of Chadian armed forces, was expected next. It was only on April 11, when the rebel group arrived in Mongo in the center of Chad, that the size of the force and its intention of moving on Ndjamena were appreciated -- by both the Chadian government and the French. Sixty-five rebel vehicles were counted in Mongo, which had been nearly abandoned by the Chadian armed forces, as had been all the roads and villages between Mongo and Ndjamena. At that point, Ndjamena itself was very weakly defended, as the Chadian armed forces had moved almost entirely to the East and to a lesser extent to the Southeast, around Am Timan, where they were vainly hunting down a rebel force that had already moved on. On realizing the gravity of the situation April 11, President Deby ordered the troops in the Am Timan area and some of the troops in the East to proceed immediately to Ndjamena. ¶4. (SBU) According to Col. Marril, if the rebel force had maintained its momentum the story would have ended differently. From Mongo to Ngama, the rebels continued at high speed, but from Ngama westward on April 12 they slowed down and lost precious hours. Chad's sole helicopter was an important factor in this slow-down, as it began hitting the convoy at Bili. At Massenya, the rebels took time to decide what to do, dividing themselves into two groups, the smaller one proceeding on a more northerly path. The Chadian armed forces, reinforced by elements (25 vehicles) that rushed up from Am Timan, were able late on April 12 to engage the principal rebel column that arrived at Dourbali (100 kilometers from Ndjamena),in an action that was crucial and inflicted heavy losses. At that point the rebels became dispersed into small groups of two to three Toyotas, which nonetheless maintained their movement toward Ndjamena through the night of April 12-13. The Chadian armed forces attacked these groups in the northeastern and eastern approaches and suburbs of Ndjamena from daybreak on April 13, easily destroying them. Rebel fighters abandoned their vehicles and uniforms and tried to escape into the populace as civilians. Most of the prisoners and wounded were Tama and Arabs from Sudan who had been recruited and trained in Darfur. Of the original 65 vehicles, seventeen were recovered and displayed and approximately thirty were destroyed; the remainder were used by rebels to flee or were stolen by the local populace. The vehicles, Bercot added wryly, had no license plates. ¶5. (SBU) Bercot, taking the floor, said that an important factor was the discovery on April 12 that the chief of military staff, Ahmat Fadoule Makay, had been coordinating the movement of the rebels toward Ndjamena and preparing the scene for their welcome into the city. Bercot described Makay as a "brilliant Tama," i.e., the same ethnicity as Mahamat Nour, leader of the RDL. (Note: This conflicts with our previous information that Makay was a Chadian Arab, but we defer to the French. End Note.) Bercot said that it had been a source of extreme perplexity to him that these rebels could have come from so far, presumably come together from different routes, evaded any Chadian armed obstacles along the way, and suddenly manifested themselves as a significant fighting force in Mongo. The secret lay in the very heart of the Etat Major. ¶6. (SBU) From the moment of the discovery of Makay's role, Bercot said, the French henceforward dealt directly and only with President Deby himself. In the course of Bercot's meeting with Deby during the night April 12-13, Deby outlined the battle plan for engaging the remaining rebel elements on the morning of April 13 and by 5:00 a.m. the plan was fully in place. Deby assured Bercot that he would be able to confine the battle in the eastern portion of the city, thus sparing the better-off western parts of the city where the foreigners lived and worked, and the battle took place almost as Deby laid out. An hour and a half after the battle got under way, the RDL attempted a strong attack in the East, on Adre. ¶7. (SBU) Bercot said that "80 percent" (note: a favorite number, for him) of the rebels captured were Tama and Arabs from Darfur. They had been given very little training. Every vehicle had been crammed with 15-20 of these recruits. He had reasons to believe that Southern rebels were implicated, in helping them get across the country. Meanwhile, Bercot could not resist his customary dig at the political opposition, who he said were "all for" the rebels, even at the risk of the chaos they would have brought to Ndjamena. ¶8. (SBU) Bercot said that, despite the heavy criticism in Chad of the French role and, more significantly, the strong criticism in the French media, France had not been involved in any combat whatever. Its sole mission was to ensure the safety of the French and international communities in the country. France had provided logistical and transport assistance to ensure the defense of Ndjamena. On one occasion, a Mirage had fired a warning shot at the column advancing from Ngama. France had also provided logistical and transport support in the battle at Adre, including transporting wounded to Farchana, and it had provided logistical and transport help in reinforcing the garrison at Sarh. Bercot warned that the larger conflict was far from over. Major attacks were taking place in the East and more were expected, and there were outbreaks in the South. ¶9. (SBU) Bercot said that the battle in Ndjamena put Deby in the quandary of having to keep troops in the West that were direly needed for the East, at a time when it was clearer than ever that trouble could also come from the direction of the Central African Republic. (Bercot, for his part, never discounted the prospect of trouble from Libya, too.) It became all the more imperative for the international community to secure Darfur, otherwise it was going to become ever more difficult to guarantee the safety of the Darfur refugees. There was the prospect of massacres in the refugee camps, as the attack on the Goz Amir camp on April 10 could be a prelude of worse to come. Deby could not permanently assure the security of the camps. It was wrong to see the French forces in Abeche as being there to protect the camps. These forces had no mandate as a peace force but were there purely as part of a bilateral Chad-France agreement, under which France undertook to prevent any external attempt to take power by force in Chad. ¶10. (SBU) Comment: The story the French tell presents a gripping account of the events over the last week. The spin they put on it reveals their concern to counter perceptions here of their involvement in stopping the advance of the rebel force. They neither intervened directly in the fight nor had they any other mission than assuring the safety of the French and international community, they are at pains to stress. They have an uphill battle convincing many Chadians of this version of the events. WALL