CHAD: FRENCH AMBASSADOR LOOKS AT POST-ELECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000521 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, INR, DRL, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM CD FR SUBJECT: CHAD: FRENCH AMBASSADOR LOOKS AT POST-ELECTION STRATEGY REF: A. A. NDJAMENA 351 ¶B. B. NDJAMENA 431 Classified By: P/E HAYWOOD RANKIN REASON 1.4 (B, D). ¶1. (C) Summary: French Ambassador Bercot, in conversation with Ambassador Wall April 7, confirmed that the March 30 battle went badly for the Chadian armed forces, but said that Deby was using oil tax payments to buy helicopters and was building up for an imminent riposte against the rebels led by Mahamat Nour. Ambassador Wall emphasized the need for a coordinated U.S.-French strategy to ensure a near-term political transition, else the U.S. would consider making a frank (i.e., critical) public statement about the May 3 election. Backing off his previous idea of encouraging Deby now to undertake to leave office in one or two years, Bercot instead recommended urging Deby after the election to name an opposition figure as prime minister, who would name his own cabinet. Bercot did not indicate how Deby could be persuaded to follow this path, at a time when oil-tax receipts would be skyrocketing, except to say he believed that Deby would respond to respectful treatment, in particular an invitation to the U.S. before the end of this year. Bercot held to his dismissive view of the political opposition and his belief that maintaining Deby in power was the only hope for Chad's stability and eventual forward movement on democracy. End Summary. ¶2. (U) French Ambassador Jean-Pierre Bercot called on Ambassador Wall April 7. He was accompanied by French DCM Francois Barateau, Ambassador Wall by DCM and poloff. Fighting -------------- ¶3. (C) On the battle between the Chadian armed forces and Mahamat Nour's RDL March 30, Bercot said that, unlike the attack on Adre December 18 which he said had been "really carried out by Sudan," the fighting on March 30 engaged Mahamat Nour's forces. French satellite imagery had shown 140 Toyotas moving toward Modohyna (across the Wadi Kadja) from Sudanese territory, a considerable jump from the 15-20 vehicles that had been previously observed being employed by the RDL, and the French estimated on the RDL side there were at least 1000 men (400 Tama, 300 Arab, and the rest a mixture of SCUD remnants from the Hadjar Marfaine battle of March 22 and other Zaghawa elements under Abakar Tollimi). Meanwhile, the Chadian force that moved on Modohyna had had fewer than 400 men. Deby's nephew, Chief of Staff Abakar Youssouf Itno, was supposed to have teamed up with a force of gendarmerie but had set out without orders from Adre directly across Sudanese territory toward Modohyna and was massacred. Chad suffered 65 wounded and an equivalent number dead, including General Abakar. Some of the RDL had remained in Modohyna, while 100 RDL vehicles had departed to the border area in the "bulge" of Sudanese territory south of Daguessa/Mongororo (75 miles south of Modohyna). Radio silence had prevailed all along this border area, suggesting imminent hostilities. ¶4. (C) Bercot said that the Chadian armed forces were sending reinforcements to Goz Beida (the capital of Dar Sila and regional military headquarters). They had just got their C-130 back from Portugal (where it had been repaired and held for two years for nonpayment),and the Russian helicopter that had been shot down at Adre was now repaired. Two attack helicopters were to arrive within a few days, either bought directly from Ukraine or through Israeli middlemen. Deby paid the advance on these helicopters out of the oil-tax windfall he had just received from Esso. Deby had told Bercot that, in the face of France's reluctance to provide him with helicopters and transport, he had had no choice but to look elsewhere for arms supplies. With this added firepower, Bercot did not see the threat posed by Mahamat Nour as being grave, though the move of some of his forces southward suggested an attempt eventually to team up with Southern rebels under Gibril Dassert. Bercot's greater worry was Khartoum's intentions in regard to the Zaghawa rebels, bloodied at Hadjar Marfaine; if Sudan threw greater support in their direction, the threat would be much greater. Transition -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador Wall asked how long a reelected Deby would survive. Bercot said he did not expect Deby to finish his next mandate. France had tried to direct him toward thinking of leaving office but the coup attempt in 2004 had set back its efforts. Deby had indicated his desire to groom his son Brahim, but France had balked at the idea. Ambassador Wall asked whether Bercot still contemplated an approach to Deby about leaving office at some point after the election. Bercot said he had not cleared his latest thinking with Paris, but he now believed the best way to proceed was, first, to persuade Deby to name a prime minister from the opposition and allow him to form a new government that would last at least one year. This prime minister would chose his own ministers. The president would preside, the government would govern. The opposition would show its capacity for governing, at a time of previously undreamed-of revenues, possibly without World Bank controls (if present negotiations failed). Second, Deby would agree to real electoral reform, looking toward the legislative elections. UNDP would completely redo the voter registration, paid for by Chad's new-found wealth. ¶6. (C) With these two changes, Bercot continued, democracy would be under way and Deby would probably agree to leave office on his own, so long as the international community paid him the necessary homage, including an official visit to Washington before the end of 2006. Bercot said that he had been working on Deby to get him to understand how much he needed the United States. He had told Deby that France was losing influence everywhere in Africa, that the United States was an inescapable factor ("incontournable") which was increasingly turning its attention to the area and being sucked into Darfur. Deby had embraced Taiwan, thereby losing it relations with a key member of the Security Council, and Russia and Great Britain were not much interested in Chad. ¶7. (C) Ambassador Wall said that he had had a good meeting with Deby the previous week, during which Deby had mentioned his desire for a trip to Washington. The one point that the Ambassador had raised with Deby on which Deby had not given any response was the Ambassador's request for his thoughts on a plan for transition. As for a visit to Washington, the invitation would be even harder to contemplate after the May 3 election. Bercot bridled at the suggestion that May 3 would be seen as a sham; he doubted that more than 20 percent of the voter registration was fraudulent. The Ambassador said the election would be easier for Washington to accept if Deby agreed on a credible transition plan. Bercot complained about the word "transition," which he said was a red flag to Deby. As for May 3, if Washington thought the election was a total fraud, it would lose any capability of having positive influence on Deby. The Ambassador said that in the absence of a strategy for transition, or call it alternation of power, he would not be able to recommend mere silence in the face of this fraudulent election, as the credibility of the United States would be put in question. Bercot said that France too stood for democratic principle and sought to protect its credibility. In fact, he insisted, there was no basis on which to prove that the May 3 election was totally fraudulent by African standards. He defied the opposition to prove that the voter registration had been systematically manipulated. The election would be a mess, of course, but what else could be expected in a country of such size and poverty and illiteracy? The answer would be now for UNDP to conduct a precise voter census paid for by Chad. The Ambassador noted that he had received a letter from the Prime Minister requesting financial assistance to pay for the election, but he had sent a letter of refusal, as Chad had done nothing in the year since UNDP had submitted its recommendations on electoral reform. Bercot concluded that he and the Ambassador had different views on this subject. ¶8. (C) Bercot launched into his accustomed diatribe against the opposition parties. They bore much greater responsibility for the present political blockage than did Deby. They had made two grave errors, banking on the international community and on the armed rebellion. They had tried to sucker the international community by presenting proposals full of grand words that could only apply to a developed democracy but had no reality in the African context. They had hoped for chaos in the wake of desertions and rebellion. They could not agree among themselves on a single candidate, had no program, and only sought raw power. Worse, opposition leaders Yorongar and Choua had written to Paris condemning the French ambassador and predicting that French policy would provoke a massacre of French citizens in Chad. Meanwhile, Bercot had warned these gentlemen that if there were blood on the streets May 3, their relationship with France would be at an end. France would not be sending observers to the election (the opposition would immediately claim that France assisted Deby in fixing the election),and it appeared the European Union was reluctant, but the Francophonie and African Union would send observers. ¶9. (C) To the Ambassador's question when and how he proposed to motivate Deby to agree to the idea of an opposition prime minister and electoral reform after he was elected, Bercot responded that "all among us" (French, American, EU ambassadors) would need to approach Deby within the month after the election to tell him he had a stark choice, to take the proffered option of democracy or to go it alone. Meanwhile, Wolfowitz would hopefully negotiate reasonably. Deby was a "desert fox," intelligent by instinct rather than education, with whom it was necessary to be concrete and practical. It was necessary not to dwell negatively on the past or to shock Deby with an account of his failings but to emphasize one's concern for Chad's future and stability. For France, Deby was hardly the preferred leader, and with his necessary departure France would want to normalize relations with Chad, on the basis of thorough reforms. The trouble was, the country was so corrupt and rotten, removing the tip of the pyramid would do nothing to change the mess the country was in. Rather, it was necessary to reconstruct the base, and his proposal for cleaning up the legislative election and bringing the opposition into government would start that process. If someone else suddenly replaced Deby, the process of change would be set back by years. ¶10. (C) The Ambassador expressed interest in exploring Bercot's ideas for approaching Deby in the months after the May 3 election. He said that he would like to consult further on any public statements about the election and on Deby's possible future official visits in the context of a strategy to encourage positive change in Chad. He also cautioned against pursuing a strategy that risked saving Deby but losing Chad. ¶11. (C) Comment: French thinking about approaching Deby about his third-term agenda appears to be in flux. Stepping back from his earlier suggestion about encouraging Deby to step down within a year, Bercot flagged an idea for a more modest agenda. While Deby might find it more acceptable, we have doubts that his embittered opponents would ever sign on. Still, we would like to be able to probe the French on their thinking in the event such a plan might have traction. End Comment. WALL