CHAD: ANOTHER PLEA FROM CIVIL SOCIETY

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000520 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, INR, DRL, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM CD SUBJECT: CHAD: ANOTHER PLEA FROM CIVIL SOCIETY REF: NDJAMENA 467 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: A leading civil society activist, urging a national forum for reconciliation, painted a bleak picture for Chad and the region if the U.S. did not take a strong stand against the May 3 election. The Ambassador was sympathetic but doused expectation of U.S. support for her proposals, in their meeting April 5. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Delphine Kamneloum, an activist in one of the two principal human rights organizations and one of the principal leaders in the civil-society movement to convene a national forum on peace and reconciliation, called on the Ambassador April 5. She acknowledged that she had seen the Ambassador many times, but she needed to put her case more forcefully than ever. Security and socio-economic conditions were rapidly deteriorating in the country, while the President was insisting on an election that was a complete masquerade. The international community must stop the election. It was not too late; even the day before the election would not be too late. The President had boxed himself in a corner so that without external pressure he would not retreat, even from an election universally ridiculed, but she believed that he would surely listen to the United States. The many civil society leaders who had come together to urge this national forum agreed that Deby would have a central role in any transition process. He would remain president through the transition, and he and his clan would be assured immunity and the right to retain a proportion of ill-gotten wealth. Civil society did not want revenge, however much the populace was feeling vengeful; it wanted a peaceful transition. ¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador asked what Delphine specifically requested of the United States. First, she said, her movement wanted a public declaration from the United States, that the election did not meet minimum requirements. Second, it sought political and financial support for the forum for national dialogue. It wanted strong international involvement in every phase of transition. The national forum would address complete electoral reform, as well as reform of the security system and national army, and putting in place a mechanism for national reconciliation, adapting the experience of South Africa to Chad. ¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador said that he constantly pondered these issues. It was indeed essential for Chad, if it were to avoid a violent future, to engage in an inclusive political process that would put in place a peaceful transition. Unfortunately, the system was blocked. The conditions for putting in place such a process and transition did not exist. Conditions in the country were not even close to being ready for Delphine's proposals. President Deby was determined to hold an election that many critics believed was designed only to "amuse the gallery." There was no unified international community in Chad, contrary to what many in the opposition seemed to assume. As for what the United States might say publicly in regard to the election or Deby's inauguration, we were considering the matter, in light of the many interests the United States had in Chad and the region. Public declarations were one possibility, against a background in which the United States pursued many programs to strengthen democracy over the long-term. In any case, the Ambassador noted, the Prime Minister had requested assistance in conduct of the elections, and the Ambassador had just signed a letter in response saying that, while the United States would have liked to be able to provide assistance if Chad had pursued electoral reform in a timely fashion, the United States would not be able to help, in the absence of any reform. ¶5. (SBU) Delphine said that she was at least gratified to learn that the United States would not be financing an election which did not fulfill the minimum requirements for transparency. She said that, in her view, all American interests in Chad and the region ought to point the United States in the same direction. If these elections went forward and Deby remained in power, Chad's internal situation would become progressively more unstable and it would be ever more difficult to find a durable solution to Darfur, and the fight against terrorism would be undermined. If the United States took a clearer position, France would be pressured to reflect on its support of Deby. As it was, France did not budge, since it knew the United States was taking the lead from France. ¶6. (SBU) To conclude, the Ambassador asked about the extent of popular support for Delphine's movement. Even if a united international community existed, in the end only Chadians could save Chad. In other places in the world, in Ukraine for example, there had been massive popular movements that had brought about peaceful change. Such did not seem likely to happen in Chad. Why? Delphine said that the populace was traumatized by years of violence and repression. They were simply too afraid. On walking her out, poloff asked whether the Muslim-Christian divide were a factor. Delphine reluctantly acknowledged that it was. Muslims were as badly off, or worse, in Chad than Christians and her movement had attracted some young Muslims and even a few imams, but its success with Muslims was limited. She insisted, however, that the fundamental givens in Chad were profound poverty and brutal repression, which were not conducive to peaceful popular uprisings. WALL