CHAD: DEBY ON DARFUR, DEMOCRACY, AND OIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000482 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, INR, DRL, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM CD SU SUBJECT: CHAD: DEBY ON DARFUR, DEMOCRACY, AND OIL NDJAMENA 00000482 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: P/E OFFICER HAYWOOD RANKIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D). ¶1. (C) Summary: President Deby, in a meeting with Ambassador Wall March 30, said that Islamic fundamentalism and the deteriorating situation in Darfur threatened the stability of the entire Sahel region, and he asked for more forceful action from the international community. He reacted equably to the Ambassador's expression of regret that the upcoming election, in the absence of electoral reforms long recommended by UNDP, would not receive American assistance. He dodged the Ambassador's question of whether he contemplated a democratic transition in the future. Noting nostalgically the closer bilateral relations that had existed in the 1980's, Deby renewed his wish for a visit to Washington. He regretted that the World Bank had singled out Chad for strongarming, insisted he would not budge on issues of principle or sovereignty, but said he was willing to negotiate the management of oil revenues on the basis of partnership. He claimed that instability in the Central African Republic had the potential for spilling over into Chad and harming the oil facilities in Chad's deep South. End Summary. ¶2. (U) President Idriss Deby Itno received Ambassador Wall for the first time in several months March 30, for an hour's meeting at his residence adjacent to the presidential office complex by the Chari River. Deby was cordial and relaxed throughout the meeting, sometimes light-hearted, always focused and, to superficial appearance, in good health. He was accompanied by his acting cabinet director, Mahamat Saleh Adoum, and a notetaker. Ambassador Wall was accompanied by DCM and notetaker. -------------- Opening Remarks -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador opened by congratulating Deby on his recent marriage (note: his sixth) and on the success of the military actions March 20 against rebels in eastern Chad. He noted that the American people had gotten to know Deby a little better now, as he had appeared on American television in an NBC interview. He noted the importance of the recent exchange of letters between Deby and President Bush on Darfur. He handed Deby a six-page summary of American assistance to Chad, covering military, security, commercial, humanitarian, economic, legal, civic, political, and intellectual cooperation and exchange programs. -------------- Peace Corps in Chad -------------- ¶4. (U) The Ambassador said that one particularly important area of cooperation was the work of the Peace Corps in Chad. There were now 29 Peace Corps Volunteers across the breadth of Chad, most of them living in isolated villages, for whom satellite telephones were a vital need. A recent decree appeared to direct that all satellite telephones in Chad be surrendered. The impact on the Peace Corps would be severe. Deby responded that the decree was not meant to affect the operations of organizations such as the Peace Corps. The day before, he said, he had instructed the Prime Minister to clarify the misunderstanding and ensure that no humanitarian or nongovernmental organizations (including those working with refugees) be affected by this decree. Deby said that ninety percent of the satellite telephones being used in Chad had come from Sudan. There were many Sudanese agents, in the refugee camps and elsewhere, that were using these telephones as instruments of destabilization along the border. The decree was intended to deal with that problem, not affect the work of organizations such as the Peace Corps. -------------- An Exchange on Issues: -------------- NDJAMENA 00000482 002.2 OF 004 ¶5. (C) The Ambassador sought Deby's perspective on three important questions: 1) the management of oil revenues in connection with the World Bank; 2) the situation on Chad's border with Sudan, especially after the military action of March 20; and 3) the May 3 presidential election, his priorities for a third term, and his plan for eventual transition. -------------- ...Oil Revenue Management,... -------------- ¶6. (C) Deby said that, on management of oil revenues, he wanted complete transparency. He supported the work of the supervisory body ("College"). He claimed he had only sought to make one change in the operative law, necessitated by the mounting precariousness of Chad's economic and security situation, particularly the military threat in the East and deepening salary arrears. He had had no intention of reducing the transparency in the management of the oil revenues. All the supervisory mechanisms that had been put in place would continue, while the existing priority sectors would be increased, to include assisting the judiciary and civil security forces and the reorganization of the armed forces. The World Bank had not properly understood the limited scope of the modification of the law, which was a sovereign act by the National Assembly. Chad had had good relations with the World Bank for 40 years. The World Bank needed to adapt to African reality, see the needs of the people of Africa and not make decisions in the isolation of Washington. Deby said he was not against the World Bank, he wanted to continue discussions, but such discussion had to be on the basis of equal partners looking at Chad's real needs. Concerning the fund for future generations, Deby postulated that it might be reinstated after a number of years -- depending on the circumstances. -------------- ...Darfur,... -------------- ¶7. (C) On Darfur, Deby said that worsening instability there would soon destabilize the entire region. The international community would find that it would have to spend many more billions of dollars if Darfur were not soon brought under control. Chad, in particular, was under great stress because of Darfur. It now had to cope with 300,000 refugees, if southern Chad were included. Sudan was pouring in arms to Chadian rebel groups, and Sudanese-backed militias were violating Chad's border on a daily basis. The AU had failed in its mission to bring peace to Darfur. The international community, especially the United States, had to act now, forcefully, and impose peace on Darfur, or else there would be no solution. He beseeched the United States to hear his cri de coeur. He feared for Chad and for the whole region. -------------- ...Elections,... -------------- ¶8. (C) As for the coming presidential election in Chad, Deby regretted the lack of support from the international community. The situation in Chad was normal, or better than normal, compared to much of Africa. While he deplored the fact that Chad's political class refused to participate, boycotts of elections were common in Africa, as opposition parties often preferred boycotting to participation. This election would go forward, and nothing would disturb it. He would not accept a legal void. The opposition in Chad had its armed branch in the East, which was inadmissible. The opposition could choose to boycott, and such was its democratic right. What did he foresee for the future? He referred to the Millennium Development Goals in explaining his objectives for Chad, to include education, agriculture, infrastructure, communications, and transport. NDJAMENA 00000482 003 OF 004 -------------- ...and Threat of Islamic Fundamentalism -------------- ¶9. (C) But he said that the future was clouded, particularly by the specter of Islamic fundamentalism. Chad was caught between the Muslim world and Africa. Darfur was a festering base from which fundamentalism was being spawned. Chadians had turned up at Guantanamo Bay, some had died in Iraq, arrests of Chadian fundamentalists had been made in Chad. Young Chadians, some with Arab/Saudi lineage, were being proselytized and taken to Saudi Arabia for brainwashing. Saudi nongovernmental organizations, financed by Usama bin Ladin, were springing up across the Sahel. Northern Nigeria was a source of fundamentalist teams sent into the Sahel. Deby said he had just sent an emissary to the president of Cameroon to warn of the threat. It was essential that anti-terror cooperation with the United States be deepened. One unit had been formed already and provided with vehicles, another was being formed, and more needed to be done. -------------- An Official Visit? -------------- ¶10. (C) Deby said that he recalled the close relationship that had existed between the United States and Chad in the 1980's. In those days, the two countries had worked as one team to promote the greater security of the region. Now a new threat was emerging in the form of Islamic fundamentalism, which required coordinated combat, with the United States at the head. Chad was the central point around which many vital interests in the region revolved. It was essential to take hold of Darfur and to block Sudanese and rebel inroads in the East. Meanwhile, instability was mounting in the Central African Republic, which could soon be a direct threat to the oil installations. Deby said, in connection with this urgent need to consolidate bilateral cooperation, he had often expressed his wish to go to the United States. He had not yet made an official visit. He hoped one day that it would occur. -------------- Ambassador Responds -------------- ¶11. (C) The Ambassador thanked Deby for sharing his perspectives on these subjects. Chad was indeed at the center of several issues directly touching American interests, including coping with terrorism, oil production, management of oil revenues, economic development, promoting good governance, and developing democracy, in Chad and the entire region. In regard to relations with the World Bank, the Ambassador was happy to note the President's desire to pursue dialogue. ¶12. (C) Deby said that he was angered that he had been forced into an unequal combat with the World Bank, which had acted toward Chad in the manner of a hammer to hit a fly. The World Bank had other more important business to take care of, rather than to strongarm Chad. The World Bank's actions were regrettable and unjust. However, the World Bank was a long-time partner, and Chad hoped to negotiate an entente with the World Bank team present in Chad. The Ambassador said he hoped that the parties could come to an agreement that responded to Chad's needs and conformed to the engagements undertaken by the World Bank and Chad concerning transparency and management of revenues. Deby repeated that there would be "total transparency" in achievement of poverty alleviation, keeping in focus the Millennium Development Goals. But there could be no going back on questions of principle and no infringement of Chad's sovereignty. Chad should not be thrust forward as the World Bank's lesson to the world, but Deby said he sought a constructive dialogue between partners. NDJAMENA 00000482 004.2 OF 004 ¶13. (C) On Darfur, the Ambassador recalled that in a press conference two years ago Deby had expressed doubt about the AU's capacity and had predicted that the international community would have to impose a peace arrangement. He assured Deby that the United States was determined to work with all parties, Sudan, the rebels, and the international community, to achieve security in Darfur with a significantly reinforced international force and to bring about a negotiated settlement in the Abuja talks. Deby said that resolute action that had been taken by the international community in the Balkans showed the way forward on Darfur. He said he had, indeed, insisted from the beginning of the conflict that the only solution was direct intervention by the international community. ¶14. (C) On elections, the Ambassador said that the United States would always be ready in the future to work with Chad toward consolidating a base on which to build a democratic system. He would have liked to be able to recommend to Washington to assist the holding of the coming presidential election. Unfortunately, the letter from the Prime Minister requesting assistance for this election had come too late. Nearly one year had elapsed since UNDP had made its recommendations on the requirements for electoral reform, including a reconstituted electoral commission and a new voter registration, but no start had been made on implementing those recommendations and it was too late for the United States to be able to help. Deby laughed and said it was never too late. He said that Chad was always the "demandeur" seeking assistance on electoral reform. -------------- Expressions of Friendship, Hopes for Dialogue -------------- ¶15. (C) The Ambassador said that he looked forward to maintaining a dialogue. He hoped Deby would see him as a friend and partner of Chad. It was important that their dialogue be maintained even when -- indeed, especially when -- there were areas of disagreement, because there were many interests in common. Deby noted favorably reports on television of the Ambassador's frequent trips around the country and his visits to projects receiving U.S. assistance. Deby said that traditional good friends, such as Chad and the United States, could not always be in agreement. Chad would not waver on questions of principle, but Chad needed help from the United States, including help on reinforcing its democracy. Deby perused again the summary of bilateral cooperation that the Ambassador had given him. He noted that he had not always been adequately informed of all that the United States was doing. He recommended that the Ambassador provide him such a list on a recurrent basis. He said that he would be disposed to see the Ambassador whenever the Ambassador wished. No subject, he said, would be considered taboo. ¶16. (C) Comment: The atmospherics of this exchange were excellent. Notably, two of the most sensitive issues broached in the exchange were not answered, i.e., Deby's expression of interest in an official visit and the Ambassador's request for Deby's views on plans for an eventual transition. We look forward to opportunities to pursue those issues in the future. WALL