CHAD'S TROUBLES ON ELECTION'S EVE AND WHAT WE

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000463 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHER ADDIS ABABA PLEASE PASS TO DAS YAMAMOTO E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2008 TAGS: ASEC CD KDEM PGOV PHUM PREL SUBJECT: CHAD'S TROUBLES ON ELECTION'S EVE AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT THEM REF: A. NDJAMENA 459 ¶B. NDJAMENA 453 ¶C. PARIS 1843 ¶D. NDJAMENA 57 Classified By: Ambassador Marc Wall for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Troubles are ahead in the run-up to the presidential elections on May 3. The opposition parties are calling for obstructing them outright as well as for a boycott. Security is under strain, but President Deby is fighting back, with resolute support from the French. The beleaguered Chadian leader may be able to tough it out for years to come, but the backlash against his determination to stay in power at all costs is likely to lead to more unrest. While delaying this round of elections and working to make them credible are no longer options, we would like to explore with the French the idea of working together to persuade Deby to step down within a year and initiating a plan for handing over power. Our statements about the elections will be decisive in shaping public perceptions of their legitimacy and the seriousness of U.S. words about supporting democratic change. We may be able to use French concerns about what we say to encourage efforts toward launching a transition process. END SUMMARY ¶2. (SBU) President Idriss Deby Itno is driving forward on holding elections May 3 to provide window dressing for his third term in power. The deadline of March 24 passed with none of the leading opposition politicians declaring their candidacy. The last ditch effort earlier that day by the resident UNDP representative to bring Prime Minister Yoadimnadji together with Ngarlejy Yorongar, president of the only opposition party that agreed to attend, to discuss electoral reforms ended at an impasse. The CPDC, the umbrella group for most of the major opposition parties, remains united in calling for a boycott. In the keynote address at its gathering March 25, respected former Chad president (and former Deby ally) Lol Mahamat Choua called as well for using all means to obstruct the elections (ref B). The stage is set for a replay of the referendum of June 6 overturning constitutional term limits: hardly anyone will show up at the polls, many that do will vote no, and the government will declare a resounding victory. ¶3. (SBU) But this time the risk of civil protests, possibly turning violent, is greater. Strains on Deby's hold on power are becoming more apparent. Members of his security guard staged a bungled coup attempt March 14. Less than a week later, Deby launched an offensive against a rebel stronghold on the Sudanese border. Nerves were so on edge that reports of an attack on the presidential compound March 22 caused N'Djamena residents to take to the streets in a mass stampede to guard their homes or get out of town. The French have thrown their weight behind Deby, stepping in to secure the airport after the March 14 coup attempt and providing logistical support for Deby's campaigns in eastern Chad. -------------- Deby's Prospects -------------- ¶4. (C) According to the French, Deby will emerge stronger from the most recent battle in the East (ref C). We and many others here are not so sure. By attacking his relative Yaya Dillo and the Zaghawa forces making up the SCUD, he risks igniting the intra-tribal bloodbath he avoided last November when his senior commanders at the time refused orders to open fire on their fellow clansmen. His non-Zaghawa soldiers are said to be in the fight because they believe the more Zaghawa they can eliminate now, the better their chances will be in the battles to come in a post-Deby Chad. Meanwhile, the forces under Mahamat Nour are keeping their powder dry, but ready to move when the time is right, perhaps with Khartoum's connivance. ¶5. (C) It is not out of the question that Deby will make it through the elections in a position to hang on for as long as he wants, or at least as long as his health holds, his army stays loyal, and the French stay committed to backing him up. For this to happen, he will also have to count on keeping the lid on his Zaghawa rivals, the opposition remaining as ineffectual as it has been in the past, pressures from Darfur easing, and the woefully dispirited Chadian people refusing to take to the streets in mass protests. The infusion of cash from Esso's tax payments Deby can look forward to receiving soon will strengthen his hand, even without a quick deal with the World Bank unblocking the oil revenue accounts (ref A). Still, if the future is anything like the recent past, we are likely to see more defections, more coup attempts, and more clashes with rebel groups -- with the added new element of outbreaks of election-related unrest in the weeks leading up to the inauguration on August 8. In fact, the situation could drag on for years. Still, the estrangement between Deby's regime and the Chadian people runs too deep ever to allow him to establish a secure base of popular support. -------------- Our Strategy Now -------------- ¶6. (C) The question is not whether, but when and how, change will take place. Our interests in a Chad able and willing to cooperate with us on Darfur, refugees, oil, and anti-terrorism are best served by change that takes place as peacefully and democratically as possible. The French are right that Deby has no clear successor (and he had made sure that such is the case),but they are wrong in concluding that we therefore have no choice but to try to prop him up for years to come. We cannot avoid the painful consequences of change by seeking to postpone it. It is better to work to encourage a peaceful transition now, before we are forced by events to deal with abrupt and potentially more violent change (ref D). ¶7. (C) Our options at this stage are limited. Now that delaying the vote and repairing the electoral process are no longer possibilities, the next best course of action is to take the French up on the idea they have floated of convincing Deby to announce that he will step down within a year and prepare for real elections. Given Deby's fierce determination to hang on to power, we are skeptical that this approach has much chance, but it is still worth trying. Recognizing that our leverage for positive change in Chad depends on having the French on our side, we would like to explore with them whether or not they are serious about this idea. ¶8. (C) One point of influence remaining to us in the run-up to the elections will be what we say about them publicly. Our words will be decisive in shaping views of the legitimacy of the outcome. Endorsing a fraudulent election, or even saying nothing, would be seen as abandoning friends of a more open, democratic Chad. A statement of "non-endorsement (i.e., we are disappointed the Chadian people did not have an opportunity to vote in credible elections) would be taken very seriously. We should consult with the French on using our public remarks to encourage efforts toward launching a transition process. ¶9. (C) Other steps we should take in coming weeks include: -- dispatching a senior State official to assess the situation and inquire about transition prospects; -- supplementing the Embassy's efforts to monitor the May 3 elections with TDY help from Washington; -- moving forward on plans for TSCTI and ATA training, but keeping a low profile at least until after the inauguration of the new President in August; -- supporting the World Bank's mission now in Chad in working toward a deal with strong commitments and safeguards before considering unblocking the oil revenue account; -- responding to the letter by Chad's Prime Minister for last-minute help with the electoral reforms by informing him it is far too late to do anything useful; -- sounding out senior UN officials (possibly including Secretary General Kofi Annan) and sympathetic African leaders SIPDIS who have shown interest in encouraging democratic change; -- reviewing our security posture in light of the greater risk of election-related civil disturbances. WALL