CHAD: ROLE OF THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000305 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, D, DRL, INR, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM CD SUBJECT: CHAD: ROLE OF THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso ns 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: President Idriss Deby's opponents are trying to capitalize on his unpopularity and a heightened level of general discontent to push for a political transition. However, since coming to power, Deby has stacked the political arena against his opponents, cleverly buying off, exploiting weaknesses of, and undermining various enemies. Deby's ruling party controls the legislature and local government positions. In addition to the absence of a level playing field, Chad's political parties also are handicapped by their own numbers, divisions, and regional ethnic bases. Departures and desertions of family members and military officers continue, prompting the political opposition to reach out to the disaffected family members, particularly Timan Erdimi. A level of collaboration between Chad's political and armed opposition groups has developed. We are concerned that French analyses underestimate the ties between and capabilities of Deby's opponents that have developed over the past year. While we must be careful not to exaggerate the opposition's role and capabilities, their participation in the elections is critical to the legitimacy of the process. Without it, Deby's re-election will be tainted and the French will find it increasingly expensive and difficult to prop him up. To move forward, it will be important to determine if Deby is interested in a genuine political transition. If he indicates that he is, the international community must immediately take steps to engage the opposition, mobilize donor resources to solidify the electoral process, and be prepared to accept a delay in the elections. If not, then we need to be prepared to condemn a fraudulent election and deal with the insecurity created by an increasingly alienated political and military opposition. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - POLITICAL PLAYING FIELD - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) A key difficulty in identifying capable individuals or groups with sufficient nationwide appeal is that Chad's political arena remains limited. Deby has effectively weakened or coopted those individuals who might challenge him. He has reportedly not stopped at killing those individuals who might challenge him. Years of government heavy-handedness and ruling party domination of key institutions of democracy coupled with the disengagement of Chadians from the political process have stunted thedevelopment of political parties and provided limied opportunities for government experience. The situation in eastern Chad, continued desertions ad deections, and Deby's poor health are key facors shaping the calculations of Chad's political players. Many family members, former ruling party members, or close Deby associates prefer to leave the country and join opposition-in-exile because they have become convinced that Deby has no intention of leaving power. Given this conclusion, no one is willing to participate in an election expected to be fatally flawed. The press and opposition political parties function relatively free of harassment because the government does not judge them to be able to put up a credible threat to Deby. ¶3. (SBU) The Government states that it wants consultation with the opposition. However, the Government's track record is poor on this front, and its heavy-handed style of consultations discourages genuine dialogue. We have observed first-hand the Government's behavior at so-called consultative meetings. In general, the Minister convokes a meeting, presents the Government's position with a heavy press presence, sometimes allows others to state theirs, and then ends the meeting for "private" discussions which never take place. A communique is then issued that is written in advance or on which not all parties agree. Other types of "consultations" involve money or other inducements and -- on occasion -- harassment. For the oil revenue law change, the Prime Minister announced to the assembled diplomatic community that the Government had held consultations with political party leaders and human rights groups. In fact, party leaders and human rights groups did not participate in hastily arranged meetings on the issue because they feared the government would issue press communiques saying that they agreed with the law change. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - KEY SOURCES OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Opposition Parties. Given these conditions, the political opposition will continue to be weak, while at the same time remain an important group whose participation is needed to give legitimacy to any election. Recognizing their own shortcomings, some of the opposition parties are working together on election and political transition issues and contingency plans in case of an irregular change in power. The political opposition, with over 80 political parties, remains highly fractionalized, ineffective, and unable to mobilize the public to take action. The Coalition of Parties for the Defense of the Constitution (CPDC),formed in early 2004 to oppose the amending of the constitution, is a group of 20 opposition parties. There are a handful of core members within the CPDC: Ibni Saleh Oumar (former Minister), Lol Mahamat Choua (former President),Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue (former National Assembly Speaker),Salibu Ngarba (former Minister),and Jean Alingue (former Prime Minister). Although these leaders have national name recognition, their power bases are limited to their home areas. Within the group, there were differences over participation in the electoral registration process, but recently, there seems to be more solidarity on boycotting the election and options concerning a political transition. Among themselves, they have divided up responsibilities with certain members maintaining regular communication with the armed opposition. ¶5. (SBU) In September 2005, after months of trying to get an appointment to begin dialogue with the President on the elections, Deby granted an audience to the CPDC. The group proposed a dialogue committee consisting of three members of the Government, five members of the CPDC, five members of the ruling Pariotic Salvation Movement (MPS) and its allied parties, two members of other parties, and three members of civil society. The committee was to be headed by the Prime Minister. Technocrats, military, and representatives of the armed opposition would be welcome, according to the CPDC. The election committee's mission was to exchange views on the current situation and examine ways in which to improve the organization and conduct of elections in 2006, which would permit their participation and allow international donors to support a transparent electoral process. To date, Deby has not responded to their proposal or communicated directly with members of the CPDC. ¶6. (C) Disgruntled Zaghawa, family members, and military deserters. These are, from Deby's perspective, the greatest threat to his power and re-election. They have had the greatest access to Deby and since September have been expressing their disillusionment with his regime through military desertions and defections across the border and into political exile. The list grows, but includes former Ambassador to the United States Ahmat Soubiane, former presidential advisors and cousins Tom and Timan Erdimi, generals and cousins Seby Aguid and Issaka Diar, former Minister of Defense Djibrine Dassert, Yaya Dillo and his followers, and members of the Tolli and Haggar families. The Government has sought revenge against some of these former government allies by giving orders for the security forces to loot their homes and for local government authorities to destroy the dwellings as a sign of what happens when you cross the President. Of this group, the ambitious Timan Erdimi has been the most active in trying to construct an alliance among various ethnic groups within the deserting camps. This week's ruling party congress will be a good indicator if powerful Zaghawa families, such as the Haggars, are ready to participate in a sham electoral process or if they will become more vocal in their concerns with another term. ¶7. (C) Armed Opponents. To Deby, the armed Chadian rebel movements in Sudan present a threat, but with differing ethnic bases and political agendas, Deby may judge them as unable to affect the regime change that they are seeking through military means unless they coordinate their actions. The Government's response to these groups is to reinforce its borders. Deby also continues to acquire weapons and vehicles to beef up security along the border. The Chadian Government views these elements as Sudanese-government backed with actions controlled by the Government of Sudan. Chadian Foreign Minister Allam-mi, as well as other contacts, have told us that it appears that Khartoum has warned the Chadian rebels in Sudan to hold back for now. Chad's political opposition has contacts with some of the armed groups' leadership in exile, like Acheikh Oumar, in France. CPDC claims to have contact with groups such as Mahamat Nour's and have told poloffs that Nour's political platform strongly reflects the CPDC's thinking on transition. Some members of the Chadian political opposition do not discount the possibility of an irregular change of power just after elections -- and are keeping their lines of communication open with the various armed groups for just this eventuality. - - - - - - WHAT'S NEXT - - - - - - ¶8. (U) The Electoral Commission has announced that presidential elections will take place on May 3. The Government's attempt to repair the electoral lists consists of allowing anyone who did not register to do so with the next two weeks. The lists are to open to public scrutiny on March 16. The list of candidates for the election must be released 30 days prior to the election. Campaigns will begin on April 2. Given the problems associated with the previous electoral list, the next list could be even more unacceptable. Later this week, the ruling MPS will meet and gear up for the elections. This includes replacing the party's general secretary and presumably announcing Deby as its candidate. ¶9. (SBU) UNDP's Country Representative Kingsley Amaning is prepared to facilitate a dialogue between the Government and opposition, but first wants to speak with Deby to determine whether he genuinely wants dialogue or is still only paying lip service to the idea. If satisfied, Amaning is willing to host a meeting of the CPDC and Yorongar's Federalist alliance with several government ministers to see if there is a way out of the impasse. If UNDP takes on such a dialogue, it will need our support. ¶10. (SBU) If no dialogue is started, then Deby will likely follow through with the elections as planned. The opposition will not participate, will probably call for a stay-at-home strategy on election day, and Deby will be re-elected with an overwhelming majority of votes and a reported high turn-out (similar to that of the public referendum.) France will organize election observers from neighboring francophone countries and will accept the results and congratulate Deby's victory. We can anticipate that French Ambassador Bercot will (at least privately) criticize opposition parties for any upcoming election failure because they refuse to participate. We will be expected to make a public pronouncement on the elections. - - - - - - - - RECOMMENDATIONS - - - - - - - - ¶11. (C) If a credible dialogue begins, we need to be prepared to be flexible regarding the timing of the elections and would be expected to provide financial and technical support, probably through UNDP. A key issue is whether changing the August 8 date for a hand-over constitutes a technical change of the rules which can easily be done or whether it would require National Assembly approval. A key issue -- if this scenario evolves -- is whether or not Deby runs for re-election. The opposition would prefer that he does not run, but a UNDP-run election may instill enough confidence in the process to ensure their participation. In this case, the opposition tells us that they would back a single candidate, but for security reasons will not reveal the name until they are assured of a credible election process. ¶12. (C) We need to be careful not to fall for French prognostications that Chad will fall apart without Deby. The situation will continue to deteriorate with Deby in power. The French need to encouraged to articulate their own view of what a managed transition could look like, rather than solely focusing on individuals. We need to urge the French to speak with Deby concerning the election and options for a possible delay or agreement to step down. ¶13. (C) We must also be cognizant that Deby forging ahead with this electoral timetable can open him up for an assassination or coup attempt and that the game does not necessarily end if Deby successfully pushes through the elections. Reports of desertions continue on a daily basis. There may be triggers in the process that we do not yet know about, and it is not clear how much support Deby actually needs to stay in office. His health, as always, remains a wild card. His re-election in flawed elections will likely spur on the deserters and others. He may also undertake initiatives to woo some of the dissenters back. We need to be prepared in the event an irregular change happens after he is re-elected in a fraudulent process. WALL