CHADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON DARFUR, LIBYA, UN ARMS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000301 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU SUBJECT: CHADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON DARFUR, LIBYA, UN ARMS EMBARGO REPORT NDJAMENA 00000301 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: P/E Officer Haywood Rankin for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Chadian Foreign Minister Allam-mi expressed doubt that the ongoing Libyan mediation between Chad and Sudan or the Abuja peace talks would produce much, during a meeting with Ambassador Wall on February 27. He said that Sudanese President Bashir had called a halt to the Chadian rebels, offensive and had had conciliatory words for Chad,s president, but Bashir remained unfairly suspicious of Chad. Sudan was continuing to arm the janjaweed and Chadian rebels and thereby producing a volcanic situation that no one, including Sudan, the AU, or even a much-strengthened UN force could control. The Darfurian rebels were too demanding and greedy, seeing a stalling game as the way to achieve the overthrow of the Sudanese regime. In his view, Chad,s military forces were weak and discouraged, in the face of mounting instability in the East that could well be the beginning of the Somalization of Chad. End Summary ¶2. (C) In a meeting on February 27, the Ambassador asked Chadian Foreign Minister Ahmad Allam-mi for an update on the situation in eastern Chad and the Libyan mediation between Chad and Sudan. Allam-mi said that Sudan had &somewhat betrayed8 Chad in the wake of the Bashir-Deby meeting in Tripoli. Bashir had spoken of his fondness for Deby and had called a stop to the Chadian rebels, offensive, but it appeared that Sudan was continuing to support and arm them. The situation was confused ) most of the Chadian rebels and deserters, Allam-mi admitted, had taken up with the Darfurian rebel group Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Allam-mi said that Chadian deserters Sebi Aguid and Timan Erdimi were close to JEM,s leader Khalil, for whom he reserved special criticism, in contrast to the latter,s upbeat assessment to the Ambassador February 25 of his relations with Chad, per septel. ¶3. (C) Allam-mi said that Tripoli had not produced a peace agreement between Chad and Sudan but rather a mechanism for moderating the crisis. The Chadian and Sudanese heads of external security were to meet (perhaps February 28) to address more precisely each side,s accusations. Each accused the other of supporting its rebels and each denied it. Chad was, in fact, not supporting the Darfurian rebels, Allam-mi protested. At the request of the international community Chad allowed the rebel leaders to pass through Chad to attend negotiations. Sudan had hinted to Chad to turn over Darfurian rebel leaders Minni Minawi and Dr. Khalil Ibrahim. Meanwhile, Sudan,s denial of its support for the Chadian rebels was not credible in the face of evidence from the AU itself, Allam-mi claimed. ¶4. (C) A further focus in Tripoli, according to Allam-mi, was how to establish security along the border of Chad and Sudan. The idea was being discussed of stationing AU forces along the border, possibly reinforced by Libyan, Chadian, and Sudanese forces. But who was going to pay for al this? Libya made financial promises, but Libya often made such promises and often did not do all that it had promised. ¶5. (C) What was clear, according to Allam-mi, was that the Chadian armed forces were overwhelmed and could not do the job in the East, and increasingly, indeed, could not ensure the &quietude of the Chadian populace8 in general. They were weakened and discouraged, unclear &who is who,8 and suffering desertions. Meanwhile, Sudan had oil money with which to arm its forces properly and a major backer, China. But Sudan was playing a dangerous game that had the potential to get away from it. Having armed and continuing to arm the janjaweed and now the Chadian rebels, it was creating a monster that could result in the Somalization not only of Chad but of the whole region. Chad and Libya disagreed about the UN force, but the fact was that increasing disorder in and around Darfur would soon be beyond anyone,s control, even a UN force. Nevertheless, Chad was heartened by the idea of a much larger force with a stronger mandate. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador emphasized the urgent importance of the peace negotiations in Abuja, but Allam-mi was NDJAMENA 00000301 002.2 OF 002 pessimistic. He saw Darfurian rebel leaders Mini Minawi and Khalil as unwilling to compromise at Abuja. They would probably &say no8 in the end, as they had at all previous rounds in Abuja. The rebels were too pampered, too demanding, too greedy; their apparent strategy was to spin out the negotiations indefinitely until pressure on Khartoum brought the Sudanese regime down. Meanwhile, the Sudanese government feared that giving in on Darfur would destroy the country. ¶7. (C) Allam-mi strongly objected to a recent UN report suggesting that Chad was violating the arms embargo and putting presidents Bashir and Deby on the same list of supporters of rebels that should be considered for sanctions. He said that the UN investigators apparently understood nothing about the region and took at face value baseless accusations leveled by the Movement for National Reform and Development's leader Gibril against the Chadian Government. Allam-mi said that SLM/A's vice-chairman Khamis Abdullah was trying to raise a proper force but was not succeeding. He also said that SLM/A faction leader Abdelwahid might be negotiating with Sudan and expressed his frustration that all the parties are playing games. ¶8. (C) Comment: Allam-mi never shirks from expressing his views on Darfur. It is clear that the Chadian Government does not believe the Abuja peace process will yield a workable peace agreement in Darfur. In fact, Allam-mi wondered outloud whether the most lasting outcome would be a military solution on one side or the other. Allam-mi's views of Khalil constrast to what Khalil has to say about how helpful he is being to Idriss Deby. This underscores the deep distrust that remains between the GOC and JEM. In addition, Allam-mi's pessimism on the outcome of the Tripoli summit fits with Libya's track record of holding meetings but not delivering on the agreements. ¶9. (C) Tripoli Minimize Considered. WALL