CHAD SCENESETTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 001411 SIPDIS SIPDIS KHARTOUM PLEASE PASS TO S/E NATSIOS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016 TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM PGOV CD SU SUBJECT: CHAD SCENESETTER Classified By: DCM LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: N'djamena today is a tank-ringed garrison town as President Idriss Deby Itno defends his 16-year regime against increasingly emboldened rebels -- many of them from his own clan. Civil society and the opposition political parties have called for an inclusive dialogue and an end to violence. But most Chadians are fearful that peaceful regime change is impossible given Chad's weak institutions and history of instability. New-found oil, exploited by a U.S.-run oil consortium, provided a glimmer of hope to Chad's 9 million inhabitants -- among the world's poorest. However, the risk of an impending political implosion threatens to set back economic progress for them as well as jeopardize the safety of the over 200,000 Sudanese refugees in eastern Chad. It also portends a chain reaction in the chronically unstable CAR. Chad has been a good partner with the United States in counter-terrorism efforts, and its leaders support a moderate and tolerant Islam. President Deby has expressed support for an international force in eastern Chad under UN auspices. Encouraging a peaceful political transition in Chad and supporting democratic institutions are significant challenges for our diplomatic efforts; they are also critical for peace and security in the central African region. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - SIC TRANSIT GLORIA MUNDI - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Fireworks and lavish banquets attended the inauguration of President Deby for a third five-year term on August 8, 2006. The unprecedented price of oil had sent his tax receipts skyrocketing. He successfully trounced a rebel attack on the capitol on April 13 with help from the French forces stationed in N'djamena. And a much-publicized feud with the World Bank over use of oil resources for poverty reduction was resolved to the government's benefit. But the euphoria would be shortlived. Although President Deby has presided over Chad's most peaceful era since independence, his legacy is undermined by his unwillingness to move seriously toward opening the political arena, and, more importantly, demonstrating that a peaceful transition of political power is possible in Chad. Not surprisingly, three months later, N'djamena is a tank-ringed garrison town as Deby - a master warrior - fights for his political life and that of his regime. The population is hunkering down for an indefinite period of uncertainty and anxiety as rebel groups splayed along the eastern border make increasing inroads in eastern Chad. French support for Deby is theoretically limited to logistics and reconnaissance, but the French press is wondering how deep the French government would -- or should -- go to support the regime. ¶3. (C) Dangers abound within the President's palace as well. The public enrichment of his Zaghawa clan is a source of division, both from outsiders jousting for a share of the spoils, and insiders scheming to maintain the family's place at the public trough. The state of the President's health - a constant source of speculation - has led some observers to predict that he will not live through his current term, adding to the uncertainty which veils Chad's political future. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - THE CROSS-BORDER DARFUR CONFLICT - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) The Darfur conflict is frequently labeled a cross border conflict. But the nature and roots of the conflict differ between Chad and Sudan. In Chad, the Zaghawa (the President's ethnic group) are the masters; in Sudan, the Zaghawa are the victims. In Chad the government has ceased to provide basic protection to its citizens as it devotes its resources to stemming rebel attacks. In the ensuing vacuum of authority, opportunist attacks by janjaweed (who may be Chadian or Sudanese arabs) as well as traditional disputes between pastoralists and nomads have spiraled out of control and created 90,000 Chadian Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). In Sudan, changing land-use patterns which bring more settled agriculturalists into conflict with pastoralist groups and the asymmetrical impact of Khartoum's involvement in inter-ethnic clashes has forged a deadly conflict that can no longer be resolved by traditional dispute settlement procedures. - - - - - - - - THE SUDAN FACTOR NDJAMENA 00001411 002 OF 004 - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Chad's make-up-to-break-up relationship with Sudan has come full circle - and then some - over the last year. In the summer of 2005, Chad was still a mediator in the Darfur conflict. But Sudan's support for Chadian rebels in late 2005 forced Chad's hand, and Chad withdrew from the scene as a mediator and eventually broke diplomatic relations with Sudan. Following the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),although it would appear that President Deby had everything to gain from peace returning to Darfur, DPA signatory Minni Minawi accused the regime of supporting DPA non-signatories. ¶6. (C) A very public hug between President Deby and President Bashir at Deby's inauguration ushered in the latest reconciliation between the two countries. Chad and Sudan agreed July 26 to reinstate diplomatic relations, and desist from supporting Darfur rebel movements (Chad) and Chadian rebels (Sudan). But peace was not long lasting. Chad has now declared that it is "in a state of war with Sudan" due to Sudan's continued support for Chadian rebels and written to Secretary of State Rice asking for U.S. support to defend SIPDIS against Khartoum's efforts to put in place an Arab regime in N'djamena. President Deby is adamant that his Government is not supporting DPA non-signatories, but most believe that he has lost control of other forces within his country (including possibly his half-brother Daoussa Deby) which are providing refuge and possibly arms, uniforms and vehicles to Sudanese rebels. It is common knowledge that JEM soldiers defend the Deby regime -- some, reportedly, standing guard in front of the Presidential Palace. In sum, while Chad and Sudan continue to see it in their interests to seek to maintain a destabilizing wedge in the other's political affairs, peace in Darfur is unlikely. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - REFUGEES IN CHAD - HOME ALONE AS THE UN DRAWS DOWN - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (SBU) Chad's eastern border hosts 12 refugee camps containing over 200,000 Sudanese refugees and about 90,000 Chadian IDPs. As Chadian rebels make bolder inroads into Chad, and violent clashes with the Chadian army become more frequent, eastern Chad has become a zone of peril for the UN and its partner NGOs. The UN is now in Phase IV security (similar to Darfur) and has evacuated non-essential staff. Development projects are at a standstill. Only essential humanitarian aid -- to refugees as well as IDPs -- continues. President Deby has asked that the refugee camps be moved further into the interior. UNHCR supports such a move, as the civilian and humanitarian nature of the camps has been severely compromised by their proximity to the border. However, a move would require a modicum of stability, and a great deal of additional funding. Chad's environmentally fragile region has been negatively impacted by the presence of refugees competing for water and firewood with the local inhabitants. In recognition of the needs of the local population, both the UN and donors (in particular, the United States) have earmarked funding specifically to improve livelihoods and living conditions for local populations. The United States has also committed over USD 183 million over the past three years to UNHCR, the World Food Program and other relief agencies in Chad, making it by far the largest donor to the humanitarian relief effort. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CHAD AND UNSCR 1706 -- WHAT KIND OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL FORCE? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) Following the visit of a UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) team to Chad and the Central African Republic, deliberations are ongoing as to the size and nature the "multidimensional presence" in Chad called for in UN Security Council Resolution 1706. During French Prime Minister de Villepin's recent visit to Chad, President Deby agreed to accept an international force under UN auspices. He is nevertheless concerned that a UN force would further provoke the wrath of neighbors Sudan and Libya. Without a very clearly defined mandate, such a force also runs the risk of finding itself in the crossfire between the Chadian army, Chadian rebels, and Sudanese rebels. - - - - - - - - - - - DEBY, OIL, AND DONORS - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (U) Chad's first oil began pumping in 2003 and flowing down the 1070-kilometer pipeline to the Cameroonian coast. NDJAMENA 00001411 003 OF 004 The largest single U.S. private investment in Africa, the over $4 billion project is managed by a consortium led by ExxonMobil. Chad earned USD 260 million from oil revenues in ¶2005. Projected revenues for 2006 (from all sources) are approximately USD 450 million and could balloon to over a billion USD in 2007 if oil prices stay high. The pipeline is now handling up to 170,000 barrels of oil per day and new oil fields are being brought on line. ¶10. (SBU) As part of the financing package arranged by the World Bank and other lenders, Chad agreed to an innovative arrangement for managing its oil revenues whereby the bulk of the royalties would be earmarked for social sectors such as health and education. An oil revenue management body, with members drawn from the government, civil society, religious groups, and labor unions was to oversee expenditure. Not surprisingly, this pathbreaking experiment in transparency foundered in December 2005 when the President, strapped for cash, unilaterally changed the Chadian law governing use of oil revenues. This provoked a rupture with the World Bank which has took over five months to resolve. The new agreement recommits the Government of Chad (GOC) to funding priority poverty reduction sectors, but allows wiggle room for spending on security. ¶11. (SBU) In the meantime, the price of oil has eclipsed all predictions, and Chad's indirect revenues (coming from taxes paid by the oil consortium) have skyrocketed. Chad's oil boom -- expected to last less than a decade -- will severely test its absorptive capacity and ability to manage and spend the resources so as to promote sustainable economic growth and improve the Chadian standard of living (currently ranked among the lowest in the world.) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - DEBY'S DEDICATION TO FIGHTING TERRORISM - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶12. (SBU) In March 2004, the Chadian army engaged in an intense battle with members of the terrorist group GSPC. The terrorist leader Al-Para was finally handed over to Algerian authorities in October of that year. The cooperation of Chad,s security services and army on counter-terrorism issues has been excellent, and President Deby welcomes additional U.S. counter-terrorism assistance provided under the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). In July 2004, U.S. Marines finished training and equipping 179 Chadian soldiers as part of the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), the TSCTP precursor. These troops learned to respond to internal threats from terrorism and banditry. In 2005 and 2006, Chad participated in several U.S. military training programs, including the Flintlock exercise. U.S. assistance continues with retraining of the PSI unit, and training of additional recruits. For the most part, Chadian Muslims are moderate and Muslim leadership in Chad is supportive of U.S. programs throughout the country. Muslim leaders also work closely with the government to rein in radical Islamic elements. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - DEBY, DEMOCRACY, AND DEVELOPMENT - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (SBU) Chad's human rights record remains poor and government institutions lack the capacity and the will to bring justice to average Chadians. In addition to Deby's heavy-handed attempt to revise the Constitution to allow him to run for another term, government harassment of the media has surfaced periodically. Under the State of Emergency declared in November (and recently extended for another 6 months),the press is outright censored. The international corruption watchdog organization, "Transparency International" named Chad (along with Bangladesh) as the world's most corrupt country in 2005. Corruption permeates most aspects of government operations. Civil society remains fragmented and too weak to pose a counterbalance to government power. Aside from oil, most Chadians earn a living through agriculture or livestock. Once a significant source of revenue, Chad's cotton producing sector has been unable to successfully pursue opportunities offered by privatization. U.S. cotton subsidies are frequently blamed as the source of the collapse of Chad's cotton sector, but inefficient management by parastatals has as much to do with the sector's failures. Chad is eligible to export products under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, but, aside from oil, has only managed to export small amounts of gum arabic (used in food processing) and shea butter. Poor to non-existent infrastructure, corruption and absence of a NDJAMENA 00001411 004 OF 004 skilled work force hinder foreign and domestic investment. -------------- THE U.S. PRESENCE IN CHAD -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The United States closed its USAID Mission in Chad over ten years ago. A modest amount of U.S. assistance is managed for the most part directly by the Embassy and supports grass-roots efforts to improve education, access to water, and promotion of human rights. The Mission also maintains a strong outreach to Muslim communities. ¶15. (SBU) The United States Embassy in Chad has 34 direct hire-Americans. The American community in Chad has been reduced significantly following the drawdown of personnel from the UN, international NGO's and the oil consortium. It now numbers under 200. The Embassy was on evacuation status for two months following April 2005 rebel attacks on the city. Americans are not targets in the struggle between President Deby and rebel contenders, but the danger of widespread civil disorder is very real. - - - - - - OUR MESSAGE - - - - - - ¶16. (SBU) Key points in our message to President Deby include: -- Chad-Sudan border: We are concerned by insecurity on the border and threats to Chadian civilians, Sudanese refugees, and humanitarian workers. We support deployment of an international force to counter these threats. We want to work with Chad on a plan for such a force. -- Chadian instability: We condemn the use of violence to overthrow recognized governments. We urge all Chadians to engage in dialogue to address political grievances. -- Darfur: We seek an end to violence in Darfur. All parties must honor the cease-fire, support the Darfur Peace Agreement, and implement the consensus framework achieved in Addis Ababa last month. -- Refugees: We appreciate the welcome that Chadians have given refugees from Sudan. The United States has provided over USD 183 million over the last three years for humanitarian relief in eastern Chad and will continue to provide support, including for programs to assist Chadian IDPs and local populations. -- Democracy: We believe political stability in Chad requires steps to develop democratic institutions, promote respect for human rights and rule of law, and create an inclusive political environment which allows for credible elections and a peaceful political transition. -- Development: We stress the importance of Chad's oil resources being used for poverty reduction. -- Counter-terrorism: We value our partnership with Chad in the war against terror. We look forward to working with Chad on TSCTP and other programs of bilateral cooperation. ¶17. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. WALL