JEM'S KHALIL IBRAHIM VISITS CHAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001402 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU SUBJECT: JEM'S KHALIL IBRAHIM VISITS CHAD REF: EMAIL EXCHANGE BETWEEN AMBASSADOR WALL AND AF/SPG DIRECTOR LANDIS OF DECEMBER 4 AND 5 NDJAMENA 00001402 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: ECONOMIC/CONSULAR OFFICER JITU SARDAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B ) and (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Instability in Chad is a result of the Government of Sudan's plans to destabilize the Deby regime, destroy indigenous populations, and permit the migration of Arab communities to these areas, according to Justice and Equality Movement's Khalil Ibrahim. Khalil would not openly admit that the JEM had military assets in Chad, but stressed that it opposed the overthrow of the Deby regime by force. The JEM and other Sudanese rebel commanders of the National Redemption Front, he noted, had demonstrated that they can soundly defeat the Sudanese Armed Forces. The NRF, according to Khalil, was ready to negotiate with the GOS and regional actors, but the international community must step up efforts to provide an alternative to the Darfur Peace Agreement. While he did not oppose an international peacekeeping presence in Darfur, Khalil expressed concern that the lack of a comprehensive peace plan would make any peacekeeping operation extremely difficult. END SUMMARY. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SUDANESE REBELS NOT IN CHAD, BUT OPPOSE THE OVERTHROW OF DEBY - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) On December 5, Justice and Equality Movement's Chairman Dr. Khalil Ibrahim met with the Ambassador to discuss perspectives on current relations with Chad and Sudan as well as prospects for peace in the region. Khalil said that his visit to Chad was part of a wider trip to meet with JEM representatives in Europe and other African countries, as well as government officials from countries that directly bordered Sudan, such as Chad, Libya and Sudan. Khalil noted that his meetings in Tripoli with President Qadhafi, Sudanese authorities, and non-signatories were productive, even though little concrete progress was made. Qadhafi, according to Ibrahim, understood the need for dialogue and unity among African and non-African leaders in the region. This made Qadhafi the counterweight to President Bechir's plans to create a gap between African Arabs and non-Arabs, with an eventual intent to destroy indigenous African communities and pave the way for the spread of Arabic influence from Sudan. ¶3. (C) The current threat against the Chadian regime was part of Bechir's master-plan, according to Khalil. By overthrowing the Chadian regime, and destroying ethnic Chadian communities in the process, Sudanese Arabs would be able to expand into Chadian territory, establish communities and prosper off the lands that originally belonged to the indigenous peoples. Khalil said that his organization could not allow this injustice (which he equated to the suffering against Darfurians at the hands of the Sudanese military and Janjaweed militias) to take place, and was opposed to any forceful overthrow of the government of President Deby. When asked whether that meant military support, Khalil quickly said that JEM forces were not in Chad helping the Deby regime, and were focused only on fighting the Sudanese armed forces in Darfur. Nevertheless, JEM did benefit from the movement's normalized relations with Chad by having a diplomatic ally that permitted travel and transit for representatives of the rebel movement. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NRF COUNTERING SUDANESE MILITARY - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Khalil stated that the JEM and their allies in the National Redemption Front were firmly in control of a large amount of territory extending from El Geneina to the Sudan-Libya border. He claimed that NRF forces outnumbered any military elements loyal to Sudanese presidential advisor Minni Minawi, and noted that the NRF had soundly defeated the SAF in Kulkul, Um Sidr, and Kariyari in the past several months. According to Khalil, the ability of the NRF to militarily counter the Sudanese army should be an indication that the GOS cannot bring peace through military means, which was Bechir's original plan. He added that the NRF's military victories should be an indication to the international community that the NRF must be included in any plans to reach a comprehensive peace in Darfur. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NEW NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENT NECESSARY - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Khalil contended that the DPA was a failure, and that new negotiations must take place to provide a lasting peace for Darfur. He argued that rather than solving the external complexities of the Darfur crisis (which appeared to be the NDJAMENA 00001402 002.2 OF 002 original intent of the DPA),a lasting peace would have to clearly address the root causes of the crisis. Specifically, a new peace agreement would have to include clearer indications of proportional representation for the Darfurian people, individual compensation, and enhanced security measures, such as clear timelines for the disarming of Janjaweed militias. The JEM and NRF would accept being a part of Sudan, and even accept the legitimacy of President Bechir's regime, but would accept the current inequities that existed on the ground. Khalil said that he would reconsider a second stab at a peace agreement, so long as the JEM could actively participate in the negotiations. ¶6. (C) The JEM chairman continued to say that the rejection of the DPA by the Sudanese refugee and IDP populations was another sign that a new agreement must be negotiated. Khalil stated that the formulation of a new agreement should be comprehensive, bringing in all non-signatories and splinter groups of the Sudanese Liberation Movement. Excluding some rebel groups and accepting others would only create further discord and prevent the achievement of a lasting accord. In addition, the mediation efforts should be dictated by countries directly implicated by the conflict, which would include Chad, Eritrea, Libya, Central African Republic and Egypt, and be supported by the international community. However, according to Khalil, the African Union should have a limited role in the negotiations, as their role in the past had been to manipulate agreements without allowing any input from the negotiating parties. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - INTERNATIONAL FORCE ONLY WORKS WITH PEACE ON THE GROUND - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) Khalil said that the NRF would not oppose the presence of an international force along the Chad-Sudan border. However, he expressed concern that the lack of a durable peace would impede the work of a peacekeeping force, and threaten the lives of the peacekeepers themselves. For a mission to be successful, a new agreement accepted all parties would have to be in place. Khalil reiterated that the JEM was willing to work with the rest of the rebel movements, the United States, and the international community to develop a new framework for a comprehensive agreement. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ATTEMPTS AT INTRA-ZAGHAWA FENCE-MENDING - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) Khalil told the Ambassador on his way out that he was working to encourage a rapprochement between President Deby and Timan Erdimi, the leader of the main Zaghawa-based rebel faction. He said that he was advising Deby to accept Timan Erdimi's demands with the exception of Erdimi's insistence that Deby steps down as president. Khalil was confident that the feuding Zaghawa leaders could patch things up soon. - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶9. (C) Khalil's obstructionist tactics in the Abuja peace talks and since then have endeared him to virtually no one. But like it or not, he remains the leading voice in one of the key Darfur rebel movements. In this meeting, he stressed his interest in constructive contacts with us and sought to downplay any continuing associations with his Turabist past. Special Envoy Natsios's visit to Chad next week may provide an opportunity to pursue discussions with him, if we consider them desirable. If so, we should keep that in mind before moving forward now on travel bans or asset freezes against Khalil. ¶10. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered. WALL