INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN CHAD: SIDE WITH THE GOOD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 001389

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2016
TAGS: CD KPKO PGOV PREF PREL SU UNSC
SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN CHAD: SIDE WITH THE GOOD
GUYS

REF: A. N'DJAMENA 1272


B. N'DJAMENA 1334

C. N'DJAMENA 1350

D. PARIS 7548

E. N'DJAMENA 1378

NDJAMENA 00001389 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARC M. WALL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. This cable outlines some of the
important factors we recommend for consideration in preparing
for a possible peacekeeping presence in Chad. Above all, the
mandate of this force should be focused on the area which
could make the most immediate impact on the ground:
protection of humanitarian operations, personnel and
corridors. Broadening the mandate to include protection of
civilian populations caught in inter-ethnic violence as well
as preventing the camps from becoming support bases for the
Sudanese rebels may also have to be considered. But at this
stage, involvement in more ambitious security questions
(e.g., attempts to impose a cordon sanitaire on the
Chad-Sudan border) should be avoided. We should focus on
what is achievable and necessary now. Even this will require
a robust international force that will be difficult to
organize, recruit and finance. But while safeguarding
humanitarian services in eastern Chad now, such a force would
also send a powerful message to Khartoum and set the stage
for an expanded mission if conditions deteriorate even
further on the border. Now that President Deby has signaled
a willingness to accept an nternational force, we should move
quickly to consult with Chad and our partners on its
implementation.
END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.


TAM IN CHAD
--------------


2. (SBU) The UN Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) was in
Chad to explore the options for UN peacekeeping in eastern
Chad which it will eventually present to the Security Council
pursuant to operative paragraph 9 (d) of UNSCR 1706 (2006).
Its itinerary was abbreviated after the outbreak of violence
between Chadian rebels and national forces (ANT) beginning
November 26; the TAM did not travel to eastern Chad but
rather conducted its assessment for Chad through meetings
with government officials and international partners in
N'Djamena.


3. (SBU) Based on the Terms of Reference for the TAM's visit,
as provided to Embassy at a November 21 meeting hosted by
UNDP N'Djamena, the team operated under the authority of
UNSCR 1706. There is not yet clarity on how, if at all, the
November 16 agreement reached in Addis Ababa will affect
paragraph 9(d) of 1706 concerning the need to have a
"multidimensional presence" in Chad.

UN OUTLINES OPTIONS FOR CHAD FOOTPRINT
--------------


4. (SBU) According to a September 2006 draft UN proposal
(passed to Poloff by UNHCR - please protect) for implementing
operative paragraph 9 (d) of UNSCR 1706, the UN sees as
strategic objectives:

-- improving the security and protection of refugees and
internally displaced
persons (IDPs) along the border areas in Chad and in CAR if
need be;
-- augmenting stability in eastern Chad and the region;
-- providing for humanitarian workers' safety;
-- contributing to Darfur peace; and
-- assisting in the implementation of the July 26 Sudan-Chad
Agreement.


5. (SBU) UNDP Chief Kingsley Amaning told Ambassador in a
November 21 meeting ahead of the TAM visit to Chad that the
focus of the force's mandate would be to protect humanitarian
corridors but not to address the internal conflicts ongoing
in both the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad in and of
themselves (ref C). "We can tell the Chadian rebels not to
touch the refugees in the camps," Amaning explained, "but if
they want to march through Am Timan (site of a rebel advance
in October),then that is their problem."


6. (SBU) According to the draft proposal, the UN favors a
multidimensional peacekeeping mission in eastern Chad - and,
if necessary, in CAR. The UN considers that such a

NDJAMENA 00001389 002.2 OF 003


configuration could prevent further deterioration of the
already worsening refugee and IDP situation and contribute to
overall regional stability. Such a force, called Option B of
Scenario 3 in the UN's proposal, would consist of several
thousand military and civilian police and would require an
additional UNSC resolution for its establishment.


7. (C) UNHCR Senior Refugee Security Liaison Officer
explained to Poloff that UN agencies also favored a heavy UN
footprint in eastern Chad and would accordingly advocate for
the TAM's acceptance of Option B. They are fully aware that
such a scenario would be a stretch for the UNSC to accept
within the context of UNSCR 1706 and that a new UNSCR would
be needed. According to an October 12 UNHCR document passed
to Poloff, the humanitarian community in Chad would advise
the TAM that at least one civilian police officer per 850
refugees on a 24/7 basis would be a prerequisite.

GOC STANCE
--------------


8. (C) For the GOC, regime survival is the overriding issue.
A crucial element in these calculations for President Deby is
the support of Libya, which has demonstrated its ability to
provide military assets in a rapid fashion. The price tag of
this support undoubtedly includes resistance to a UN military
force on the Chadian side of the border with Sudan, a point
Qadhafi likely stressed in his hastily-convened November 21
meeting in Tripoli. President Deby is also worried that an
international force not be perceived by Sudan as an attempt
to enter Sudan by the back door. Recent statements by Deby
to the Ambassador (ref E),however, have indicated an
openness on the President's part to a UN presence on Chadian
soil, despite reservations about force size, composition and
command. In a press statement after his meeting with French
Prime Minister Villepin November 30, Deby said he agreed in
principle to the UN's proposal for a force on the border.


9. (C) In spite of this "acceptance," the GOC is not willing
to commit its military resources to safeguarding humanitarian
personnel and assets at the expense of combating the Chadian
rebellion. This position will only become more entrenched
in the wake of the rebellion's latest offensive in eastern
Chad over the past week, including its attempted take-over of
Abeche. President Deby himself has repeatedly asserted that
the ANT does not have the capacity to ensure the safety of
humanitarian workers in the east, and speculation abounds
concerning complicity of local authorities in sabotaging
humanitarian operations in order to bolster GOC efforts to
break the back of the rebellion.

WHAT WE RECOMMEND
--------------


10. (C) Given the lack of sustainable GOC support for the
plight of refugees and IDPs in eastern Chad, as well as the
myriad internal crises raging within the country, it is
impossible to distinguish among the "bad guys" - whether
they be government forces, Chadian rebels, Sudanese rebels,
Chadian militias, Sudanese Janjaweed, Arab alliances - who
are perpetuating the humanitarian crisis in the east. An
international presence should not be mandated to bite off
more than it can chew, specifically to protect the GOC from
Chadian rebels operating in Sudan or to try to fend off
different invaders whom not even the locals can tell apart
(ref C).


11. (C) Instead of becoming mired in differentiating among
bad guys, the force should be focused on the "good guys,"
whose identity is unquestioned in eastern Chad. It is the
NGO and UN organizations that make up the humanitarian
community who are the "good guys." They are the ones
responsible for feeding, housing and tending to the thousands
of Sudanese refugees and now thousands of Chadian IDPs.
However, it is these same humanitarian workers who bear the
brunt of the protracted political crises: in the past months
over 50 humanitarian vehicles have been stolen; NGO workers
have been victims of arbitrary violence, recently seen in the
shooting of an IRC driver in Bahai; NGO compounds are
infiltrated and looted, including those of GTZ, WFP and UNHCR
during November 26 Abeche violence; and vital humanitarian
operations, such as the delivery of non-food items to newly
displaced populations in Goz Beida have been interrupted
because of turmoil in eastern Chad.


12. (C) These threats are exactly what an international
presence in Chad could be designed to counter. The force

NDJAMENA 00001389 003.2 OF 003


should be mandated to support the safety of humanitarian
operations and to protect the corridors used by humanitarian
organizations to travel between their bases and refugee and
IDP locations. The force should escort humanitarian convoys
on a regular basis where gendarmes already stationed at the
camps fail to do so. It should conduct an increased number
of daily patrols (as opposed to the three currently expected
of but not always executed by gendarmes). It should
maintain a presence at humanitarian bases to deter break-ins
and vehicle theft.


13. (C) To accomplish this, we would envision a political and
humanitarian liaison/monitoring mission in key locations in
eastern Chad, including in and around refugee and IDP camps,
as well as around humanitarian bases. It would also include
a group of armed military observers and UN police, in
addition to the existing UNHCR arrangements with the Chadian
gendarmes. While the force's ability to entirely prevent
such activities would be restricted until a comparable force
is installed on the other side of the border, a peacekeeping
presence in Chad would nevertheless send a message to
Khartoum that the international community is serious about
the Darfur situation and its consequences.


14. (C) We have heard repeated pleas from the humanitarian
community that the eventual force in eastern Chad have a
clearly defined command and control structure from the
outset. They argue against UN forces conducting gendarme
police work in the camps (ref A). The GOC should not be let
off the hook for providing safety and security to refugees
and law and order for its own citizens. Another major UNHCR
concern is that an incoming force not "poach" already
stretched resources and equipment from the humanitarian
communities already operating here. The new force will thus
need to have adequate logistics and equipment when they
arrive.


15. (C) The mandate of the force will also need to take into
account other aspects of the humanitarian emergency in Chad.
For one, rather than wait for the situation on Chad's
southern border with CAR to deteriorate to the same extent as
it has in eastern Chad (ref B),we believe that an incoming
force should be prepared to take action in that region as
well. In addition, it may also be called upon to address
issues beyond strictly protecting humanitarian operations, to
include such missions as deterring attacks on local
populations bearing the brunt of inter-ethnic violence or
acting to prevent the camps from being further militarized or
becoming safehavens for rebels. To the extent it is
determined that a force should take on such additional
responsibilities, it must be assured the capabilities of
carrying them out.

HOW TO SELL THIS FORCE
--------------


16. (C) The force described above would most likely require a
new UN Security Council Resolution, always an obstacle to
expediting policy in this region. To ensure GOC approval, we
should continue to consult with the GOC on plans for an
international force and work to obtain its acceptance of a
presence which it itself had originally requested. A letter
from Secretary Rice and visits by senior USG officials could
be effective in this regard.


17. (C) We leave it to DPKO's experts and others to recommend
the size of such a force, but we expect a force of at least
1000 armed monitors would be necessary. If the November 16
Addis Ababa agreement bears fruit and even a partially
"blue-hatted" force is deployed on a larger
scale in Darfur, the need for a proportionally large number
of troops on the Chadian side of the border might be
accordingly reduced. Keeping the force as lean as possible
will be an important consideration in light of an annual
price tag in the billions if an eventual a force of 17,000 in
Darfur finally materializes.


18. (C) We should seek to enlist the support of the French in
advocating for the force envisioned above. Ref D outlines a
willingness on the part of Paris to commit French assistance
in this regard provided there is adequate international
"cover" for a force in Chad. We could consider co-sponsoring
a resolution with France to this effect once DPKO presents
the TAM's recommendations to the Security Council in the
coming weeks.
WALL