INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN CHAD: SIDE WITH THE GOOD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 001389 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2016 TAGS: CD KPKO PGOV PREF PREL SU UNSC SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN CHAD: SIDE WITH THE GOOD GUYS REF: A. N'DJAMENA 1272 ¶B. N'DJAMENA 1334 ¶C. N'DJAMENA 1350 ¶D. PARIS 7548 ¶E. N'DJAMENA 1378 NDJAMENA 00001389 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARC M. WALL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. This cable outlines some of the important factors we recommend for consideration in preparing for a possible peacekeeping presence in Chad. Above all, the mandate of this force should be focused on the area which could make the most immediate impact on the ground: protection of humanitarian operations, personnel and corridors. Broadening the mandate to include protection of civilian populations caught in inter-ethnic violence as well as preventing the camps from becoming support bases for the Sudanese rebels may also have to be considered. But at this stage, involvement in more ambitious security questions (e.g., attempts to impose a cordon sanitaire on the Chad-Sudan border) should be avoided. We should focus on what is achievable and necessary now. Even this will require a robust international force that will be difficult to organize, recruit and finance. But while safeguarding humanitarian services in eastern Chad now, such a force would also send a powerful message to Khartoum and set the stage for an expanded mission if conditions deteriorate even further on the border. Now that President Deby has signaled a willingness to accept an nternational force, we should move quickly to consult with Chad and our partners on its implementation. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. TAM IN CHAD -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The UN Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) was in Chad to explore the options for UN peacekeeping in eastern Chad which it will eventually present to the Security Council pursuant to operative paragraph 9 (d) of UNSCR 1706 (2006). Its itinerary was abbreviated after the outbreak of violence between Chadian rebels and national forces (ANT) beginning November 26; the TAM did not travel to eastern Chad but rather conducted its assessment for Chad through meetings with government officials and international partners in N'Djamena. ¶3. (SBU) Based on the Terms of Reference for the TAM's visit, as provided to Embassy at a November 21 meeting hosted by UNDP N'Djamena, the team operated under the authority of UNSCR 1706. There is not yet clarity on how, if at all, the November 16 agreement reached in Addis Ababa will affect paragraph 9(d) of 1706 concerning the need to have a "multidimensional presence" in Chad. UN OUTLINES OPTIONS FOR CHAD FOOTPRINT -------------- ¶4. (SBU) According to a September 2006 draft UN proposal (passed to Poloff by UNHCR - please protect) for implementing operative paragraph 9 (d) of UNSCR 1706, the UN sees as strategic objectives: -- improving the security and protection of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) along the border areas in Chad and in CAR if need be; -- augmenting stability in eastern Chad and the region; -- providing for humanitarian workers' safety; -- contributing to Darfur peace; and -- assisting in the implementation of the July 26 Sudan-Chad Agreement. ¶5. (SBU) UNDP Chief Kingsley Amaning told Ambassador in a November 21 meeting ahead of the TAM visit to Chad that the focus of the force's mandate would be to protect humanitarian corridors but not to address the internal conflicts ongoing in both the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad in and of themselves (ref C). "We can tell the Chadian rebels not to touch the refugees in the camps," Amaning explained, "but if they want to march through Am Timan (site of a rebel advance in October),then that is their problem." ¶6. (SBU) According to the draft proposal, the UN favors a multidimensional peacekeeping mission in eastern Chad - and, if necessary, in CAR. The UN considers that such a NDJAMENA 00001389 002.2 OF 003 configuration could prevent further deterioration of the already worsening refugee and IDP situation and contribute to overall regional stability. Such a force, called Option B of Scenario 3 in the UN's proposal, would consist of several thousand military and civilian police and would require an additional UNSC resolution for its establishment. ¶7. (C) UNHCR Senior Refugee Security Liaison Officer explained to Poloff that UN agencies also favored a heavy UN footprint in eastern Chad and would accordingly advocate for the TAM's acceptance of Option B. They are fully aware that such a scenario would be a stretch for the UNSC to accept within the context of UNSCR 1706 and that a new UNSCR would be needed. According to an October 12 UNHCR document passed to Poloff, the humanitarian community in Chad would advise the TAM that at least one civilian police officer per 850 refugees on a 24/7 basis would be a prerequisite. GOC STANCE -------------- ¶8. (C) For the GOC, regime survival is the overriding issue. A crucial element in these calculations for President Deby is the support of Libya, which has demonstrated its ability to provide military assets in a rapid fashion. The price tag of this support undoubtedly includes resistance to a UN military force on the Chadian side of the border with Sudan, a point Qadhafi likely stressed in his hastily-convened November 21 meeting in Tripoli. President Deby is also worried that an international force not be perceived by Sudan as an attempt to enter Sudan by the back door. Recent statements by Deby to the Ambassador (ref E),however, have indicated an openness on the President's part to a UN presence on Chadian soil, despite reservations about force size, composition and command. In a press statement after his meeting with French Prime Minister Villepin November 30, Deby said he agreed in principle to the UN's proposal for a force on the border. ¶9. (C) In spite of this "acceptance," the GOC is not willing to commit its military resources to safeguarding humanitarian personnel and assets at the expense of combating the Chadian rebellion. This position will only become more entrenched in the wake of the rebellion's latest offensive in eastern Chad over the past week, including its attempted take-over of Abeche. President Deby himself has repeatedly asserted that the ANT does not have the capacity to ensure the safety of humanitarian workers in the east, and speculation abounds concerning complicity of local authorities in sabotaging humanitarian operations in order to bolster GOC efforts to break the back of the rebellion. WHAT WE RECOMMEND -------------- ¶10. (C) Given the lack of sustainable GOC support for the plight of refugees and IDPs in eastern Chad, as well as the myriad internal crises raging within the country, it is impossible to distinguish among the "bad guys" - whether they be government forces, Chadian rebels, Sudanese rebels, Chadian militias, Sudanese Janjaweed, Arab alliances - who are perpetuating the humanitarian crisis in the east. An international presence should not be mandated to bite off more than it can chew, specifically to protect the GOC from Chadian rebels operating in Sudan or to try to fend off different invaders whom not even the locals can tell apart (ref C). ¶11. (C) Instead of becoming mired in differentiating among bad guys, the force should be focused on the "good guys," whose identity is unquestioned in eastern Chad. It is the NGO and UN organizations that make up the humanitarian community who are the "good guys." They are the ones responsible for feeding, housing and tending to the thousands of Sudanese refugees and now thousands of Chadian IDPs. However, it is these same humanitarian workers who bear the brunt of the protracted political crises: in the past months over 50 humanitarian vehicles have been stolen; NGO workers have been victims of arbitrary violence, recently seen in the shooting of an IRC driver in Bahai; NGO compounds are infiltrated and looted, including those of GTZ, WFP and UNHCR during November 26 Abeche violence; and vital humanitarian operations, such as the delivery of non-food items to newly displaced populations in Goz Beida have been interrupted because of turmoil in eastern Chad. ¶12. (C) These threats are exactly what an international presence in Chad could be designed to counter. The force NDJAMENA 00001389 003.2 OF 003 should be mandated to support the safety of humanitarian operations and to protect the corridors used by humanitarian organizations to travel between their bases and refugee and IDP locations. The force should escort humanitarian convoys on a regular basis where gendarmes already stationed at the camps fail to do so. It should conduct an increased number of daily patrols (as opposed to the three currently expected of but not always executed by gendarmes). It should maintain a presence at humanitarian bases to deter break-ins and vehicle theft. ¶13. (C) To accomplish this, we would envision a political and humanitarian liaison/monitoring mission in key locations in eastern Chad, including in and around refugee and IDP camps, as well as around humanitarian bases. It would also include a group of armed military observers and UN police, in addition to the existing UNHCR arrangements with the Chadian gendarmes. While the force's ability to entirely prevent such activities would be restricted until a comparable force is installed on the other side of the border, a peacekeeping presence in Chad would nevertheless send a message to Khartoum that the international community is serious about the Darfur situation and its consequences. ¶14. (C) We have heard repeated pleas from the humanitarian community that the eventual force in eastern Chad have a clearly defined command and control structure from the outset. They argue against UN forces conducting gendarme police work in the camps (ref A). The GOC should not be let off the hook for providing safety and security to refugees and law and order for its own citizens. Another major UNHCR concern is that an incoming force not "poach" already stretched resources and equipment from the humanitarian communities already operating here. The new force will thus need to have adequate logistics and equipment when they arrive. ¶15. (C) The mandate of the force will also need to take into account other aspects of the humanitarian emergency in Chad. For one, rather than wait for the situation on Chad's southern border with CAR to deteriorate to the same extent as it has in eastern Chad (ref B),we believe that an incoming force should be prepared to take action in that region as well. In addition, it may also be called upon to address issues beyond strictly protecting humanitarian operations, to include such missions as deterring attacks on local populations bearing the brunt of inter-ethnic violence or acting to prevent the camps from being further militarized or becoming safehavens for rebels. To the extent it is determined that a force should take on such additional responsibilities, it must be assured the capabilities of carrying them out. HOW TO SELL THIS FORCE -------------- ¶16. (C) The force described above would most likely require a new UN Security Council Resolution, always an obstacle to expediting policy in this region. To ensure GOC approval, we should continue to consult with the GOC on plans for an international force and work to obtain its acceptance of a presence which it itself had originally requested. A letter from Secretary Rice and visits by senior USG officials could be effective in this regard. ¶17. (C) We leave it to DPKO's experts and others to recommend the size of such a force, but we expect a force of at least 1000 armed monitors would be necessary. If the November 16 Addis Ababa agreement bears fruit and even a partially "blue-hatted" force is deployed on a larger scale in Darfur, the need for a proportionally large number of troops on the Chadian side of the border might be accordingly reduced. Keeping the force as lean as possible will be an important consideration in light of an annual price tag in the billions if an eventual a force of 17,000 in Darfur finally materializes. ¶18. (C) We should seek to enlist the support of the French in advocating for the force envisioned above. Ref D outlines a willingness on the part of Paris to commit French assistance in this regard provided there is adequate international "cover" for a force in Chad. We could consider co-sponsoring a resolution with France to this effect once DPKO presents the TAM's recommendations to the Security Council in the coming weeks. WALL