DPA DISENCHANTMENT AMONG CHADIAN OFFICIALS AND

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001306 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CD PGOV PREF PREL SU KPKO SUBJECT: DPA DISENCHANTMENT AMONG CHADIAN OFFICIALS AND SUDANESE REBELS REF: NDJAMENA 01272 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Representatives of both the Chadian Government refugee agency (speaking unofficially) and a Chad-based Darfur rebel group had common interpretations of the ineffectiveness of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and of the responsibilities of the international community, namely the United Nations (UN),in protecting Sudanese refugees in Chad. Their November 2 and 3 comments were indicative of a growing restlessness and frustration on this side of the border with Sudan with the continued consequences of protracted Darfur fighting. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) On November 2 Poloff spoke with Nour Abdoulaye, First Secretary of the N'Djamena Office of the Chadian National Commission for Refugee Assistance (CNAR),which oversees the 235 Chadian gendarmes divided among each of the 12 refugee camps in the eastern part of the country. On November 3 Poloff met with Adam Shogar, spokesman for the G19 faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). DPA Disenchantment -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Neither Abdoulaye nor Shogar had kind words for the DPA's prospects for success, with Abdoulaye noting that the Darfur crisis had persisted and in fact worsened in spite of the Abuja Accords, making them a "bad solution" to the problems of western Sudan. A "good solution," Abdoulaye contended, would come from continued dialogue among non-signatories to the DPA, a dialogue to be brokered by either the African Union or the UN. ¶4. (SBU) Shogar vowed that his group would never commit to the DPA without assurances from the Sudanese Government of National Unity (GNU) on the issues of power-sharing, wealth-sharing, compensation for conflict-affected populations (the biggest bone of contention for non-signatories, according to Shogar) and integration of rebel fighters into the Sudanese national forces. ¶5. (SBU) Shogar acknowledged "rumors" that the GNU had indicated it would re-open discussions of the DPA with non-signatory groups, but he dismissed such claims as disingenuous. Shogar argued that the GNU was not ready to accept a democratic system in the Sudan, one that would ultimately grant every citizen a vote, which would mean the end of the ruling minority National Congress Party (NCP). Shogar asserted, however, that the NCP must be removed from power for progress to be made in Sudan. ¶6. (SBU) Shogar remarked that the DPA's only real tangible result was "to give a job to Minni" (Minni Minawi, leader of the SLM/A faction that signed the DPA) and to grant unwarranted power to both Minawi and Sudanese President Bashir, contrary to the will of Darfurians. For these reasons, Shogar insisted that DPA implementation NOT form the basis of the mandate of any eventual UN force in Darfur. UN Role in Darfur Crisis = Pick Up the Slack -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Both Abdoulaye and Shogar agreed that a UN presence in Chad was necessary to protect the refugees in the camps along the border, something which Abdoulaye admitted the 235 gendarmes at a ratio of one per thousand refugees lacked the capacity to do. Nor could the gendarmes ensure border security: Abdoulaye argued the UN should assume this responsibility so that the GOC could concentrate on ensuring its own territorial integrity in the face of cross-border incursions by Sudanese groups in violation of the Tripoli Accords. ¶8. (SBU) Shogar agreed that a UN presence in Chad would be helpful in protecting refugees from attacks by the Janjaweed and Chadian rebels. He was explicit in identifying what he considered key aspects of the mandate of a UN Darfur force, reiterating that it not be based on DPA implementation. Instead, Shogar contended the UN focus on protection of civilians, disarmament of the Janjaweed where Khartoum had failed to do so, and accountability for human rights violators through collaboration with the International Criminal Court. Such discussion, however, was useless, according to Shogar, given Bashir's resounding no to UN Security Council Resolution 1706. "Let us fight the Sudanese Government ourselves," Shogar offered, given what he saw as the UN's "failure" in this regard. Comment NDJAMENA 00001306 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶9. (SBU) There is clearly a disconnect between the upper and lower echelons of the GOC regarding both the DPA and a possible UN presence on this side of the border. Despite the fact that senior GOC officials are currently leery of UN personnel in Chad, some lower-level GOC officials, including CNAR representatives and several prefets and sous-prefets, nevertheless retain the view that a UN deployment would be in Chad's best interest. The same discrepancy exists with regard to the DPA, which the high levels of the GOC formally support. However, the DPA disillusionment recently expressed by CNAR and G19 representatives illustrates the pervasiveness of such sentiment, not only among refugees (reftel) but among lower-ranking government officials and rebels alike. This attitude does not bode well for the success of an eventual UN Darfur deployment, which would be charged with DPA implementation. While imperfect, the DPA still represents the best way forward on Darfur peace and must accordingly not be cast aside while a more "attractive" alternative is sought. END COMMENT. WALL