CHAD DIMENSIONS OF UNSC 1706

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 001272 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: UNSC PREL PHUM PREF CD SU SUBJECT: CHAD DIMENSIONS OF UNSC 1706 ¶1. (SBU) Summary. There is an acute need for an international presence on the Chadian side of the border, according to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) N'Djamena. UNHCR reports a fledgling collaboration with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in implementing operative paragraph 9(d) of Security Council resolution 1706 (2006),calling for the establishment of an UN "multidimensional presence" in refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps of eastern Chad and, if necessary, in northern Central African Republic (CAR). According to UNHCR, DPKO will seek Council endorsement during October 27 consultations for an assessment team to be dispatched to eastern Chad, envisioned for the end of October but likely to be delayed, given the recent political unrest in Chad. Meanwhile, public opinion among Sudanese refugees, AMIS and local Chadian officials favor UN Darfur deployment as the only way to stem the misery that the crisis there perpetuates in Chad. END SUMMARY. OP9 (d) of UNSCR 1706 -------------- ¶2. (SBU) UNHCR N'Djamena Senior External Relations Officer told Poloff October 25 that UNHCR and DPKO had begun a partnership earlier this month to address implementation of operative paragraph 9(d) of UNSCR 1706 (2006),which envisioned the eventual dispatching of a "multidimensional presence" charged with monitoring the security situation around the refugee and IDP camps in eastern Chad and possibly CAR. The UNHCR representative argued such a presence was needed to protect refugees, IDPs, local populations and the humanitarian community from spillover effects of the Darfur crisis, since the Government of Chad (GOC) was patently unable to provide this level of protection. She dismissed arguments that such a presence would enable President Deby to focus on combating the Chadian rebellion rather than securing the Darfur-affected populations. She also objected to claims that a UN focus on the Chadian consequences of the Darfur crisis would draw international attention and energy away from the root of the problem on the other side of the border and provide a "back-door" for UN troops to Darfur. The Darfur trend of Arab against black African persecution was playing out now in Chad, the UNHCR rep insisted, and it had to be addressed while there was still political room to do so. �0A; ¶3. (U) Two weeks earlier, on October 14, UNHCR Abeche Field Office convened a partners meeting to discuss the impending arrival (then envisioned for late October but now expected for late November) of a DPKO assessment team to conduct logistical analyses for the eventual deployment of UN forces to eastern Chad. UNHCR Chad Representative Serge Male alluded to an October 6 letter [NOTE: No text of such a letter was made available. END NOTE] from the GOC to the UNSC requesting an "initiative" for securing eastern Chad, specifying that any measure taken be civilian only (although, he corrected, this could include Chadian gendarmes, who already guard the refugee camps in limited numbers). ¶4. (SBU) Partners' greatest concern at that meeting related to the authority for any envisioned UN force and how such a presence would fit into existing security mechanisms at the camps. UNHCR was emphatic that any force be completely equipped logistically when it arrives, something that another UNHCR representative privately feared would serve only to make the UN forces a target of the vandalism now suffered by the NGO community. UNHCR and its partners were also deeply concerned that the UN presence would not address immediate protection concerns of the next six to eight months. UNHCR Protection Officer advised against UN forces conducting gendarme police work in the camps, recommending instead that two or three police teams oversee the training and supervision of gendarmes while maintaining their own chain of command. Refugee Leaders Express Broad Support for UN Presence -------------- -------------- ¶5. (U) Refugees in the camps along Chad's eastern border widely favor a UN presence, although most specify that it should be on the Darfur side of the border. The chief sultan at an October 4 meeting in Kounoungo refugee camp was explicit in proclaiming that there would never be peace in Darfur until UN troops NDJAMENA 00001272 002 OF 003 arrived. Sheikhs in the Oure Cassoni refugee camp, however, were not optimistic that Sudanese President al- Bashir would change his mind about consenting to a UN deployment in Darfur and asserted that force was the only way to provoke an affirmative response from him. Refugee leaders in Iridimi refugee camp noted that camp inhabitants were increasingly unsettled by frequent violations by the Government of National Unity (GNU) of the Tripoli Accords, which Iridimi residents emphatically supported. ¶6. (U) The President of the Bredjing Camp Refugee Committee warned Poloff on October 12 that even with the presence of UN troops to disarm rebels, peace would elude Darfur until all groups in Sudan were represented in the GNU. He said that AMIS, even if expanded in number, lacked the resources and experience to handle Darfur's long-term problems. The Refugee Committee President noted that the janjaweed were better armed now than in the past year on account of GNU reinforcements. He regarded the GNU's disregard for the provisions of the Tripoli Accords as that agreement's undoing, despite GOC efforts to expel Sudanese rebels from its territory. ¶7. (U) The leader of the Djabal camp Refugee Committee expressed similar disillusionment with the prospects for success of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),which he contended only about ten percent of the camp's inhabitants supported. Refugees turned instead to the Sudan Liberation Army for "protection" and were only too willing to join rebel ranks against the GNU to fight for Darfur independence, which he saw as the only solution to the ongoing crisis in western Sudan. He assured Poloff that refugees needed only to be given arms, that they were ready and willing to "fight alongside the UN" against the GNU in Darfur. Local Chadian Authorities Blame the Sudanese -------------- -- ¶8. (U) Local Chadian authorities have harsh words for the Sudanese, whom they blame entirely for the instability in the refugee camps. In an October 5 meeting, the Bahai Prefet accused Khartoum of launching a plan to destabilize the "black" countries across sub- Saharan Africa, beginning with eastern Chad before spreading to the Central African Republic and Cameroon. The Prefet added that Sudan's recent offensives in Darfur violated the provisions of good neighborliness of the Tripoli Accords. Iriba's Sous-Prefet did not mince words in declaring that Sudanese authorities were behind all acts of vandalism, theft and destabilization in eastern Chad. Gendarmes at Iridimi refugee camp claimed that all hijacked humanitarian vehicles (almost 50 to date) were headed for Sudan (despite an explanation from UNHCR that as of June, most were going to Libya, and an explanation from ICRC that many stolen vehicles were held by the Chadian military in Tine). ¶9. (U) The Prefet of Adre attributed all instability existing on Chadian soil to the actions of Sudan, adding that incursions by the janjaweed were constant and that Chadian stability would ultimately come only as a result of Darfur stability. He dismissed the DPA as ineffective, despite the GOC's mediating role in the peace process. He argued for a U.S. presence in Darfur in order to stem janjaweed activity and impose some semblance of order. AMIS views -------------- ¶10. (U) A Senegalese military observer (MO) with the ten-person AMIS office in Abeche identified the permeability of the Chad-Sudan border as the most pressing issue in eastern Chad, especially now that the rainy season had ended and the wadis along the border were low. The MO confirmed GOC assertions that it lacked the capacity to control border incursions due to the presence of Chadian rebels with whom it was fighting. He alluded to the Libyan suggestion under the Tripoli Accords that the border be closed completely to prevent incursions by rebels from both sides using the other's territory to stabilize their respective governments, such as the crossing of approximately 1,500 Chadian rebels north of Guereda since the beginning of October. He was anxious for the UN, with a robust Chapter VII mandate, to take over for AMIS, despite what he called "Chinese interference" in implementing UNSCR 1706. NDJAMENA 00001272 003 OF 003 COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (SBU) While there is no contesting that almost 250,000 refugees constitutes a major humanitarian crisis in eastern Chad, it is important to bear in mind that the cause of this crisis was not Chad-made. As such, the need to get UN troops into Darfur should not be eclipsed by a potential shift in DPKO focus to eastern Chad or northern CAR, where the ruling authorities might be more amenable to an international presence. Similarly, although public opinion among refugees here opposes the DPA and even the presence of AMIS, the hard fact remains that both entities are the only foundations on which the eventual UN Darfur force will be built. Wall