NMRD REPRESENTATIVE ON SITUATION IN DARFUR,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001173 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, D, DRL, PRM; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU SUBJECT: NMRD REPRESENTATIVE ON SITUATION IN DARFUR, EASTERN CHAD NDJAMENA 00001173 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: ECONOMIC/CONSULAR OFFICER JITU SARDAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B ) and (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Representatives of the NMRD, a non-signatory to the Darfur Peace Agreement, still wish to be involved in the Darfur Peace Agreement's implementation, but point to the need for dialogue among the non-signatories of the DPA and their inclusion into the implementation of the agreement. They continue to resist efforts by President Deby's half-brother Daoussa to incorporate them into the Justice and Equality Movement and the National Redemption Front. NMRD representatives strongly suspected continued Sudanese support of Chadian rebel groups operating in Hadjer Marfaine. END SUMMARY. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SITUATION DETERIORATING IN DARFUR, NEED FOR DIALOGUE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) During a meeting with Ambassador Wall, Khalil Abdullah, General Secretary for the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD),said that the movement is prepared to take part in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, but urged the U.S. and international partners to re-examine the compensation aspects of the DPA, and include the non-signatories of the DPA in the discussions. Abdullah, who had returned from Darfur to N'Djamena for only a few days, said that the impact of the recent GOS offensive on the civilian population in Darfur was tremendous, and would be disastrous in the coming weeks if the international community could not implement the DPA. However, lack of individual compensation for victims of the Darfur conflict made the agreement a tough sell to the people of the region. If the U.S. wanted to move forward with the implementation of the DPA, it would have to re-think how to compensate those affected by the crisis. ¶3. (C) Abdullah also told the Ambassador that non-signatories needed to be included in this process. This involved the non-signatories talking to each other, and then talking to the international partners. Abdullah claimed that NMRD field commanders had been in touch with representatives from the National Redemption Front and other non-signatories, as well as supporters of Sudanese Presidential Advisor Minni Minawi, in an attempt to assist bringing disputing rebel movements together and hammer out differences. He admitted that dialogue was extremely difficult to enforce, but was essential for the long term prospects of the DPA. - - - - - - - - - - - NOTHING TO DO WITH JEM - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Abdullah was adamant in noting that this dialogue could not include members of the Justice and Equality Movement. He noted that the NMRD had fundamental differences with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, and could not fully support any coalition that consisted of the JEM. Abdullah also claimed that Daoussa Deby, half-brother to President Deby, was continuing attempts to convince the NMRD to join the JEM and NRF. According to Abdullah, while they were currently in N'Djamena on an unofficial basis (as the Chad-Sudan agreement prevented the GOC from formally permitting the transit of Sudanese rebel movement leaders),Daoussa Deby was still contacting them, and calling on them to join the NRF's battle against the GOS. Abdullah also said that Daoussa Deby promised to support their military efforts if they did join the NRF. He told the Ambassador that the NMRD would continue to reject any overtures by Daoussa Deby and the Chadians, and still respected the N'Djamena Humanitarian cease-fire agreement of 2004. However, if attacked by the Sudanese Armed Forces, the NMRD would have to defend itself. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CHADIAN REBELS AND POSSIBLE SUDANESE SUPPORT NDJAMENA 00001173 002.2 OF 002 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Abdullah noted that while the NMRD had no recent interaction with Chadian rebel groups, they were aware of the fighting that was taking place in the area of Hadjer Marfaine between Chadian rebels and the Chadian national army. Abdullah said that the NMRD strongly suspects continued Sudanese support for Chadian rebel groups. According to him, Chadian rebels who were repelled after the battle in Aram Kolle on September 11 fled to the Jebel Moon area, and were being permitted by the GOS to remain in the area. Abdullah also claimed that Sudanese intelligence officers were seen in the area of Hadjer Marfaine two days before the attack in the area, indicating that they were alerting the Chadian rebels of a possible military attack by Chadian forces. ¶6. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered. WALL