THE CHAD-SUDAN AGREEMENT: CAN IT HOLD?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001094 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, DRL, PRM; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU SUBJECT: THE CHAD-SUDAN AGREEMENT: CAN IT HOLD? NDJAMENA 00001094 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: POL/ECON/CONSULAR OFFICER JITU SARDAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B ) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Chadian officials claim that the recent Chad-Sudan agreement has the potential to improve relations between the two countries and enhance regional stability, but admit that it will be very difficult to implement. Some half-hearted measures are reported to have been taken by the two countries to put Chadian and Sudanese rebels on notice concerning their presence in (respectively) Sudan and Chad. Joint border patrols as provided for in the agreement are viewed as highly unlikely. If the profound cynicism of Chadian signer Mahamat Ali (former Minister of Territorial Administration) is any indicator, this agreement is little more than window-dressing. End summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - THE CHAD-SUDAN AGREEMENT: GOOD THING ON PAPER - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) President Deby embraced President Bashir during his August 8 inauguration ceremony in a very public demonstration of the GOC's intentions to renew diplomatic ties with Sudan. Chadian authorities are touting the importance of the July 26 Chad-Sudan agreement for regional stability and the country's domestic security. Foreign Minister Ahmad Allam-mi noted pragmatically in a meeting with Ambassador Wall that Chad's decision to improve ties with Sudan was based on the GOC's estimation that strained relations only created further insecurity. The agreement encompasses reestablishing diplomatic relations, creation of joint economic and political commissions, and joint border patrols. A Chadian delegation, led by the Foreign Minister and the Governor of the Eastern Chadian province of Ouaddai, was recently in Khartoum to begin dialogue on the enhancement of political ties between the two countries. ¶3. (SBU) At the same time, governmental and non-government interlocutors have warned that concrete steps are needed to demonstrate sincerity. Sudanese support for rebels who attacked the Chadian border town of Adre on December 18, and who were able to penetrate directly into N'Djamena on April 13 still deeply rankles Chadians. Concrete Sudanese actions to cease material and logistical support and expel Chadian rebel groups will, according to these interlocutors, be the major indication that the Sudanese are genuine in their commitment to the July 26 agreement. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SUDAN DELIVERS MESSAGE TO CHAD REBELS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Representatives of the National Redemption Front believe that the Sudanese, while signing the agreement with Chad, will be unable to expel the five major Chadian rebel groups through forceful means, and will encourage the movements to unite for a final push against the regime in N'Djamena. According to NRF representative Tadjadiene Niam, NRF sources within the Sudanese government learned of a recent meeting in Khartoum involving Sudanese officials (which included Sudanese intel chief Salah Gosh) and representatives from the Chadian rebel movement. During this meeting, Sudanese officials told the Chadian rebel groups that the accord between the Government of Chad and the Government of Sudan meant that Chadian rebels could no longer remain in Sudan. They also said that the Chadian rebels were currently weaker then their adversaries on the Chadian side, primarily due to a lack of coordination. The officials asserted the Chadian rebels must either unite, or face the threat of expulsion (Niam noted that this threat was made simply to force the movements to consider closer coordination). ¶5. (C) NRF representatives have also said that training camps continue to operate in Sudan. The representatives have noted that the expulsion of Sudanese rebels by the Chadian government is one thing (as the Sudanese rebels do not have NDJAMENA 00001094 002.2 OF 002 large-scale established bases of operations). The removal of Chadian rebels, who already have well-entrenched operations within Sudan, is another. GOC officials have told the Embassy that their intelligence shows continued arms transfers from the Sudanese government to Chadian rebel groups. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CHAD MOVES TO EXPEL SUDAN REBELS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) Meanwhile, in N'Djamena, the GOC is taking visible measures to remove the Sudanese rebel movements in the country. On August 23, Foreign Minister Ahmad Allam-mi stated publicly that members of the Justice and Equality movement were being rounded up and handed over to the African Union. NRF Representative Niam told the Embassy the day after the GOC action that while the Government had detained several JEM leaders, the rebel movement, GOC, and the African Union had mutually agreed on a specific timeframe for the JEM leaders to leave the country. The GOC has also informed the French Embassy of their intention to expel G-19 leader Adam Shogar Supporters of the Sudanese Liberation Movement faction loyal to Minni Minawi have also been asked by Chadian authorities to leave, and have told the Embassy that they plan to depart in the coming weeks. The African Union has noted that while the Chadian authorities are claiming to expel all rebels groups, they particularly want to see the departure of those representatives loyal to Minni, as these have been openly critical of GOC support of Darfur Peace Agreement non-signatories. ¶7. (C) Aside from these measures, concrete steps towards establishment of the Agreement's commissions and joint border patrols are nowhere to be seen. Former Minister of Territorial Administration, Mahamat Ali (who in fact signed the agreement on behalf of the GOC) privately dismissed the agreement in a meeting with EmbOffs as fine "theoretically" but conveyed his deep cynicism that any of the specific measures would ever be implemented, recalling the failure to implement the February Tripoli accords between Sudan and Chad. He particularly questioned whether joint border patrols could ever be set up, given the situation on the Chad/Sudan border. He asserted that without a "guarantor", the agreement was worthless. Asked whether President Quaddafi might be considered a patron of sorts for the agreement, Mahamat Ali laughed that Quaddafi had offered 1,000 planes, cars and soldiers for the border which had never materialized. - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶8. (C) While the agreement appears to have made more progress than the earlier Tripoli agreement as regards normalizing diplomatic relations (and presumably opening up lines of communication),we share the view that actions such as joint border patrols are highly unlikely. Untangling the Chad/Sudan relationship is no easier in the light of the July Agreement, but one possible rationale for so much window dressing may be that China asked Chad and Sudan to reconcile in some form before agreeing to resume diplomatic relations with Chad. ¶9. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered. TAMLYN