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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NDJAMENA1037
2006-08-14 10:36:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

CHAD: FOREIGN MINISTER ON SUDAN, DARFUR, AND

Tags:   PGOV  PHUM  PREF  ASEC  CD  SU 
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VZCZCXRO9549
RR RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #1037/01 2261036
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141036Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4202
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1246
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0175
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0729
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1225
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0305
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1517
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2785
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1926
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0290
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1316
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0867
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0806
						UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001037 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, D, DRL, PRM; LONDON AND PARIS FOR
AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: FOREIGN MINISTER ON SUDAN, DARFUR, AND
POLITICS

REF: STATE 1244

NDJAMENA 00001037 001.2 OF 002




1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The long-term success of the recent
rapprochement between Khartoum and N'Djamena will hinge on
the good will of the countries' respective leaders, according
to Chad's Foreign Minister. He not only denied accusations
of Chad's support for Sudanese rebel movements, but accused
the international community of ignoring the positive role
that Chad had played in past mediation efforts between the
Sudanese government and the Darfur rebels. END SUMMARY.



2. (SBU) On August 12, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmad
Allam-mi met with Ambassador Wall to discuss Chad's recent
diplomatic maneuverings. Allam-mi's comments on Chad's
opening of diplomatic relations with Chad are reported in
septel.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CHAD-SUDAN RELATIONS POSITIVE, FOR THE MOMENT
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -



3. (SBU) Allam-mi told the Ambassador that the recent
rapprochement with Sudan was based on the premise that
strained relations with Khartoum would only further
destabilize Chad. Both parties had "poured oil into the
fire," as Allam-mi put it, and the rupture in diplomatic ties
was only bringing greater insecurity to the region. In order
to ensure that relations between both sides would continue to
improve, President Deby and President El-Bashir needed to
demonstrate the good will to commit to positive relations.
Chad, according to Allam-mi, was prepared to make this
commitment. The question was now whether Sudan, which
continued to harbor a Chadian rebel movement in Sudan, would
cease its support for opponents of the Deby regime.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
WE DO NOT SUPPORT SUDANESE REBELS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -



4. (SBU) The Ambassador turned to Darfur, and discussed
reftel points with Allam-mi. He pointed out that any
Chadians who supported Sudanese rebel movement in Darfur and
undermined the Darfur Peace Accords would become the
potential target of U.S.-supported United Nations sanctions.
The Foreign Minister was quick to deny any accusations of
explicit Chadian support of Sudanese rebels who opposed the
Darfur peace accords. He admitted that the Chadian
authorities were in contact with the G-19 Sudanese rebels
operating in Darfur, but the communications was merely to
gather information on the situation on the ground. He also
admitted that certain members of the GOC had reservations
about the DPA, and had argued that support for Sudanese
rebels might act as a counterweight against Sudan. But the
GOC was currently unified in its belief that peace in Darfur,
not the destabilization of Sudan, was in Chad's interests.



5. (SBU) The Foreign Minister identified the Justice and
Equality Movement and its leader, Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, as a
major reason for the perceptions of Chadian support for
Sudanese rebel movements. According to Allam-mi, Khalil and
the JEM were purchasing equipment and support from defecting
Chadian soldiers for their cause. He cited an example of a
recent Chadian military vehicle purchase (later transported
to Darfur) by JEM loyalists from a Chadian military officer.
While the GOC did not tolerate such actions by its military
officers, it was very difficult to control such behavior.
After all, the tribal and ethnic connections among the
Sudanese rebels and elements in the Chadian military meant
that military officers might independently supply weapons to
the rebel movements, but these actions were not part of a
government policy.



6. (SBU) Allam-mi was highly critical of the international

NDJAMENA 00001037 002.2 OF 002


community's treatment of Chad. He stated that the
international community, which was now considering sanctions
on members of the GOC, was supporting Minni Minawi, who
himself was undermining the N'Djamena cease-fire agreement
and the DPA by initiating attacks on other members of the
Sudanese rebel movement and committing atrocities against
civilians. He said that the international community had
forgotten the positive role that Chad had played in mediation
efforts between the GOS and the Sudanese rebel movement, both
trying to bring the parties to the negotiating table and
assisting in unifying the rebel movement in preparation for
the Abuja talks. These mediation efforts, according to
Allam-mi, were ignored by the rest of the world; and as a
result of Chad's diplomatic intervention in the Darfur
crisis, its relations with Sudan began to deteriorate. Chad,
in Allam-mi words, would not "play the game of the
international community" when it came to Darfur.



7. (SBU) When the Ambassador asked if Chad's recent
rapprochement with Sudan would mean that Chad would continue
to support the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping
force in Darfur and Eastern Chad, Allam-mi said while Chad
continued to support the formation of such a force, it would
have to assess how its support of a U.N. force impacted its
relations with the GOS.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
POLITICAL DIALOGUE CANNOT INVOLVE CHADIAN REBELS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -



8. (SBU) While noting that his area was foreign affairs, not
domestic politics, Allam-mi addressed the issue of a national
dialogue in Chad. He asserted that a political dialogue
cannot include members of the armed opposition. The Chadian
rebels did not represent the national interests, but rather
tribal interests and rivalries, and therefore would not be
accepted into any national forum for reconciliation until
they agreed to disarm and join the political process. When
the Ambassador asked about Allam-mi's contacts with
representatives of the armed opposition in Paris, the foreign
minister said that he had had no significant contacts with
Chadian rebels when in the French capital.

- - - -
COMMENT
- - - -



9. (SBU) Recent diplomatic efforts at reconciliation between
N'Djamena and Khartoum is a positive development for both
countries and the region. However, any future attacks by
Chadian rebels into Chad could easily restart the blame game
between the two governments. We will continue to discuss
reftel points with other members of the Chadian government.



10. (U) Tripoli minimized considered.
WALL