CHAD: DAOUSSA DEBY DENIES CHADIAN SUPPORT FOR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 001032 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR DARFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU SUBJECT: CHAD: DAOUSSA DEBY DENIES CHADIAN SUPPORT FOR DARFUR MILITIAS REF: STATE 1422 NDJAMENA 00001032 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Daoussa Deby, special advisor and half-brother of President Idriss Deby Itno, denied accusations by Sudanese Liberation Movement leader Minni Minawi and others that the Chadians are supporting Sudanese rebels who refused to sign the Darfur Peace Accords. He asserted that while the signing of the July 26 agreement between the Chadian and Sudanese governments is a positive step in bilateral relations, the international community should pressure the GOS to cease harboring and supporting Chadian rebels movements in Sudan. Deby also believes that international partners should examine whether the implementation of an agreement opposed by a majority of Darfurians is truly a viable option for peace in the region. In a separate conversation, the Chadian Ambassador to the United States rejected the notion that Chad sought to undermine the DPA. Assistance to the Darfur non-signatories (from whatever quarter) was simply an expedient tool to use against Khartoum. END SUMMARY. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CHAD DOES NOT MILITARILY SUPPORT SUDANESE REBELS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (U) On August 10, the Ambassador met with Daoussa Deby, presidential advisor and half-brother to President Deby, to discuss reftel points. The Ambassador noted that the U.S. was extremely concerned by reports of Chadian support for non-signatories of the Darfur Peace Accords, and pointed out that the U.S. would support targeted United Nations sanctions against Chadian officials who were supporting Sudanese rebel activity. The Ambassador also said that continued violence would endanger the DPA, which the United States viewed as the best way to achieve peace in Darfur. ¶3. (SBU) Deby thanked the Ambassador for his comments, and categorically denied any Chadian military support for Sudanese rebel groups in Darfur. Any Chadian military assets in the region were located on the Chadian side of the border, trying to defend the border towns of Adre, Tissi, and Tine. He said that the only assistance that the GOC had provided for Sudanese rebel groups was the right of transit and the right to reside in the country, assistance that was actually requested by the African Union in 2004. The GOC, according to Daoussa, would soon cease this support in accordance with the commitments the Chadian government made in signing the July 26 agreement with the GOS. - - - - - - - - - - - - - CHAD WANTS PEACE IN DARFUR - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (SBU) Deby also said that support for Sudanese rebel activity in Darfur was contrary to Chad's wish to see peace and stability in the region. After all, Chad was as much of a victim as the Darfurians from the conflict. To that end, noted Daoussa, Chadian authorities were hosting over 200,000 Sudanese refugees, and had acted as a mediator in the Darfur peace talks. Beyond that, President Deby had publicly supported the Darfur Peace Accords following its signing in Abuja. ¶5. (SBU) Daoussa pointed out that the President invited DPA-signatory Minni Minawi to N'Djamena following the conclusion of the Abuja talks, and told him that while Deby supported the DPA, he was fearful that the GOS would arm Sudan Liberation Movement forces loyal to Minni to destroy all Sudanese rebel groups opposed to the signing of the DPA. According to Daoussa, three days following the meeting, NDJAMENA 00001032 002.2 OF 003 Minni's forces, backed by GOS forces and equipment, attacked the non-signatory umbrella group G-19. Daoussa said that Minni, who was accusing the Chadians of arming the dissident Sudanese rebel groups, was no better than the Djanjaweed in the level of brutality he and his supporters inflicted on the Darfurians during their attacks. He, as Daoussa stated, was a "bad horse" who could not be trusted by the international community. Daoussa added that Minni was blaming the Chadians for being responsible for his defeats in Darfur, because he did not want to admit to his supporters that other Sudanese rebel movements had defeated him and marginalized his influence in the region. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - MAKE SURE THAT SUDAN IS HELD ACCOUNTABLE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) Deby turned to the subject of Sudan, and said that the GOC was pleased with the recent agreement with the Sudanese, and hopeful of improved relations. He noted that following the swearing-in ceremony of President Deby on August 8, the Head of State met with President Bashir of Sudan, President Qadhafi of Libya, President Bongo of Gabon, and President Sassou-Nguesso of Congo to discuss possibilities for improved border security and a re-establishment of respective embassies. According to Daoussa, these discussions reaped some positive results, and established a basis for further dialogue. ¶7. (SBU) Nevertheless, Daoussa stated that the GOC was concerned about the GOS's commitment to improve diplomatic relations with Chad. After all, past agreements in Tripoli and Banjul had not been successfully implemented, and the GOS continued to harbor a Chadian rebel movement within its borders. According to Deby, if the GOS wishes to demonstrate its commitment to stability in the region, it should stop its support for Chadian rebels who were able to directly attack Chad in the heart of its capital on April 13. "The ball is in Sudan's court," noted Daoussa. To that end, the international community could play an extremely important role in pressuring Khartoum to promote stability and cease its support of Chadian rebel groups. An international presence along the border, Daoussa believed, would assist in keeping the Sudanese in check. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - IS THE DPA REALLY THE BEST SOLUTION FOR PEACE? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (SBU) On the DPA, Daoussa argued that while the U.S. and others thought the agreement was the best chance for peace in Darfur, they should consider the feasibility of implementing an agreement that is not accepted by the majority of Sudanese rebel groups. He stated that the rebels concerns for greater compensation for Darfurian victims and a concrete time-frame for the disarmament of the Djanjaweed militia were genuine concerns that should be considered by the international community. After all, not developing a final agreement that is acceptable to most Darfurians would only exacerbate the level of violence and instability in the region, and hinder the repatriation of the Sudanese refugees back to their homeland. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - AMBASSADOR BASHIR ON SUPPORT TO DARFUR REBELS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (SBU) In a private lunch with the Ambassador, Chad's Ambassador to the United States disavowed any Chadian interest in undermining the DPA. He acknowledged however, NDJAMENA 00001032 003.2 OF 003 that it was "possible" that Darfur non-signatories were receiving assistance from Chadian sources. According to him, assistance to the non-signatories was simply an expedient tool to use against Khartoum. - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶9. (SBU) Daoussa's denial of Chadian military support to Sudanese rebels is not surprising, despite the proliferation of assertions that such support is continuing. We will continue to share the concerns in reftel with other members of the Chadian government. ¶10. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered. WALL