FRANCE REFUTES OFFICIAL CHAD SUPPORT FOR DPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001006 SIPDIS SIPDIS PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2016 TAGS: CD PGOV PREL SU SUBJECT: FRANCE REFUTES OFFICIAL CHAD SUPPORT FOR DPA SPOILERS NDJAMENA 00001006 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: DCM LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. Allegations by SLA leader Minni Minawi concerning Chad's support for DPA spoilers are false, according to the French Ambassador to Chad. He understands that President Deby's brother Daoussa Deby, and Mahamat Ali Nasser, Minister of Territorial Administration, are (with Libyan support) abetting the National Redemption Front (NRF) by channeling weapons from Libya, encouraging Chadian deserters to join the NRF ranks, and asking local authorities to help with recruitment. However, with French forces on the ground in Eastern Chad, France could say authoritatively that regular Chadian army forces were not deploying into Sudan against DPA signatories. The French Ambassador believed that Daoussa Deby and Mahamat Ali should be placed on the UN sanction list before President Deby's August 8 inauguration in order to ensure that neither would be given a governmental position in Deby's next administration. In a separate conversation, N'djamena-based SLA/MM representatives claimed that GOC pressure against Minni loyalists had increased following Minni's visit to Washington. The SLA/MM representatives expected to be evicted from their GOC-provided quarters in the near future. End Summary. ¶2. (C) French Ambassador to Chad Jean-Pierre Bercot called the Ambassador July 28 to express his concerns that SLA leader Minni Minawi's claims of Government of Chad (GOC) involvement in attacks on DPA signatories were being taken at face value. Bercot was further concerned that observers (including his own colleagues at the French Embassy in Khartoum) were describing the situation as a full-fledged proxy war between Chad and Sudan. On the contrary, stated Bercot, as Deby would be the principal beneficiary of peace in Darfur, it would be "incoherent" to think that he would work to destabilize it. Furthermore, as verified by French troops on the ground in Eastern Chad, there were no National Redemption Front (NRF) rebel bases in Chad, nor was the Chadian army deploying in support of the NRF in Sudan. Furthermore, Chadian helicopters were not picking up NRF wounded and flying them back to Chad as has been alleged by Sudanese authorities. Bercot stated that he could provide these assurances as France knew at any given time the exact location of Chad's armed forces. ¶3. (C) Bercot did recognize that President Deby's brother, Daoussa Deby, and the Minister of Territorial Administration, General Mahamat Ali Nassour, were most likely aiding the NRF by encouraging Chadian deserters to join the NRF ranks, channeling weapons to them (from Libya),and encouraging local authorities (prefets, governors) to recruit for the NRF. President Deby, according to Bercot, did not support these actions -- it was clear that he had nothing to gain from continued crisis in Darfur -- but he was not strong enough domestically to stop them. ¶4. (C) Concerning the Chad/Sudanese relationship, Bercot stated that Deby had no intention of implementing the Tripoli accords (despite assurances to the contrary that might be made). A strong monitoring force on the border would be an impediment to the transfer from an AMIS peace-keeping force to a UN peace-keeping force -- and there was no confusion in President Deby's mind as to which he would prefer to see. Bercot believed that it would be better to delete references to the Tripoli Accord from the draft UN Security Council Resolution for the same reason ¶5. (C) Concerning the role of Sudan, and recent announcements that the GOC and the Government of Sudan were on the path to reconciliation, Bercot acknowledged that this was the first step towards resuming diplomatic relations. At the same time, he cautioned that President Deby had no desire to move too fast. In particular, he had no wish to be upstaged by either President Beshir or President Quaddafi at his August 8 inauguration (he apparently invited neither, but Bercot wouldn't put it past Quaddafi to arrive in his plane with Beshir on board). ¶6. (C) Delving into Libyan meddling in Chad, Bercot stated that Quaddafi wanted to "control Deby" for the next five years. To that end, he was using Daoussa Deby as a wedge to NDJAMENA 00001006 002.2 OF 002 split the Zaghawas. And he was paying off inhabitants of Chad's northern regions -- members of the Goran and Tubu tribes, who were disgruntled over perceived favoritism to Zaghawas, Arabs and southern Chadians. Bercot pointed out that the northern regions (Borku, Ennedi and Tibesti) were risky areas and essentially ungovernable. It would be impossible for the GOC to maintain a position for more than a couple of days if those regions chose to rise up. ¶7. (C) Bercot concluded by stating that it was "high time" that the UNSC added Deby frere and Mahamat Ali Nassour to the sanctions list. This was particularly urgent in order to deny them cabinet positions in the new government that President Deby is expected to form after his August 8 inauguration. ¶8. (C) In a meeting the same day with EconOff, members of the Sudanese Liberation Movement faction loyal to Minni Minawi (SLM/MM) accused the GOC of denying medical and financial assistance, as well as shelter to SLA members loyal to Minni in N'djamena. The members claimed that the GOC had frozen all bank accounts belonging to SLA/MM loyalists in N'djamena, and were tracking and interdicting any private contributions from Sudan to these members. They also stated that members of the Police Intelligence Unit and associates of Daoussa Deby were forcing the SLA members and families to vacate their current residences shortly. They claimed that pressure against Mini loyalists had increased in the past few days, particularly following Mini's visit to Washington. COMMENT: ¶9. (C) Along with the French, we are skeptical that Chadian helicopters are flying missions in Sudan. However, we feel that Ambassador Bercot glosses over the fact that, while peace in Darfur is in President Deby's interest, Deby may also see it in his interest to allow others to continue to support the JEM and the G-19 on the grounds that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." ¶10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. WALL